Paul Cairney

THE SCOTTISH POLITICAL SYSTEM SINCE DEVOLUTION: FROM NEW POLITICS TO THE NEW SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT

2012-01-10T07:41:00.000-08:00

Here are the 'talking points' that I was asked to produce for the publication of my new book:

Argument 1: The World has Already Changed Since Scottish Devolution
a A Labour era has been replaced by a new SNP era in Scotland
b Labour dominated UK General Election results in Scotland for most of the post-war period
c Its success extended to early Scottish Parliament elections, but the more-proportional electoral system stopped it receiving enough seats to form a majority single party government
d A Labour-led Scottish Executive seemed inevitable for many years
e Labour lost the 2007 Scottish Parliament election to the SNP, which formed a minority government
f The SNP won a landslide Scottish Parliament election victory in 2011, securing a majority of seats and control of government and parliament
g The SNP wiped out Labour’s historical advantage, producing (in only 8 years) the sense of a new era in Scottish electoral politics

Argument 2: There is no such thing as ‘New Politics’
a Devolution was sold primarily as a way to solve the ‘democratic deficit’ when Scotland voted Labour but received a Conservative UK Government
b There was a residual feeling among devolution supporters that a successful ‘yes’ vote in the 1979 referendum would have saved Scotland from Thatcher rule from 1979-90 and Conservative rule from 1979-97
c The image of the UK Government was top-down and impositional, in a place with a strong tradition of collective action and consensus politics
d So, devolution would come hand in hand with new ways to foster that approach to politics
e The devolution agenda produced expectations about new forms of participation (e.g. a civic forum, a petitions system) and more consensual policymaking between parties, or between parliament and executive
f However, Scottish politics represents business as usual, with very few examples of new (and affective) forms of participation or new relationships between parties
g The government still governs and we still have government-versus-opposition
h This new reality, coupled with unrealistic expectations, produced a long spell of (particularly media) disillusionment about devolution and Scottish politics

Argument 3: Minority Government Made Little Difference to the Scottish Parliament
a Or at least , it made less of a difference than many expected
b From 1999-2007, Labour sought strength and stability in Parliament by forming a coalition with the Liberal Democrats, to maintain a majority of votes to ensure its legislative programme and avoid motions of no confidence
c From 2007-11 the SNP formed a minority government, more vulnerable to defeat and no confidence motions
d However, the SNP lasted the full 4 years
e It did not pursue some key measures (a referendum on independence; a reform of council tax; a minimum price on alcohol)
f However, it also passed a lot of legislation (over 40 bills, compared to the usual 50)
g More notably, it was able to pursue most of its objectives without recourse to Parliament, using finance, existing legislation, and its relationship with key organizations such as local authorities

Argument 4: The SNP appeared much more coherent in government – and benefited in the next election
a Labour traded strength/ stability in Parliament for reduced strength/ stability in government
b Its relationship within government was relatively convoluted
c The SNP cabinet was relatively small and able to act well as a collective body
d It was able to convey a sense of common purpose and efficiency not associated with 1999-2007
e Most policy is devolved to civil servants and negotiated with interest groups and other organizations. Governments operate best when recognizing that setup and providing the wider strategic framework in which those negotiations take place.
f The SNP Government maximized its impact by taking that high level strategic approach.
g This contributed to its image of governing competence, which became one of the key explanations for its huge success in 2011

Argument 5: Scottish-UK intergovernmental relations have been remarkably low key – and remain so, despite the arrival of the SNP and Conservatives
a 1999-2007 can be characterized as a period of informal IGR
b Formal mechanisms existed to resolve disputes and manage relations (the courts, the Joint Ministerial Committee, the Memorandum of Understanding and associated concordats between departments) but these were used rarely
c The governments resolved issues informally, through the Labour party and the civil service
d The SNP government did not produce a sea change in those relationships
e There were more disputes, but visible public disputes were still rare
f Nor did the election of a Conservative led UK government produce a new relationship in 2010
g The long term experience shows us the ‘logic of informal IGR’ in which the UK Government recognises the costs to top-down imposition (or merely disengages from devolution) and the Scottish Government picks its battles wisely or acknowledges its relatively less powerful position and limited room for formal dispute resolution in its favour
h This overall experience is qualified in chapter 5’s focus on two key sources of tension: the role of the Scottish Secretary (a UK government post) in Scottish affairs; and, the Scottish Government’s limited ability to engage in or influence EU affairs

Argument 6: The biggest SNP effect is on local government and policy implementation
a 1999-2007 produced a mixed picture of central-local relations
b There were some concerns that the Scottish Government would replace local government, even though local authorities largely supported devolution and enjoyed a better relationship with government than their counterparts in England
c The 1999-2007 relationship reflected that tension, with better consultation and more open access to devolved government sitting alongside key tensions on the funding and autonomy of local authorities
d The SNP government exploited that tense relationship, signaling an end to ‘top down diktats’ and freeing up local authorities to make more decisions on how they delivered and funded local policies
e Its concordat with COSLA (Convention of Scottish Local Authorities) summed up that shift. It involved the trade of more local autonomy for key commitments on aspects of education and, most politically importantly, to freeze local council taxes in preparation for the introduction of a new local income tax
f This shift of relationships is still unfolding, with interest groups now faced with the task of influencing not only one Scottish Government but also 32 local authorities

Argument 7: The Public wants more devolution, not independence
a Levels of Scottish national identity are relatively strong and remain strong; they have been affected little by devolution
b When given the choice between independence, more devolution or a return to the days of no Scottish Parliament, a plurality choose more devolution
c This changes little if we mess around with the question – about a third want independence and at least half want devolution or more devolution
d Independence sometimes gains a plurality of responses (not the majority, since too many people are undecided) if the question is asked in a particular way
e The question must refer to the negotiation of independence, not automatic independence
f The record of SNP Government has not changed these attitudes
g The 2011 election avalanche did not reflect a significant rise in support for independence
h Respondents generally suggest that devolution has made little difference to policy or their lives
i However, they do not blame Scottish institutions; rather, they want more devolution to make more difference
j They want a Scottish government to stand up for Scotland’s interests (even if few really know what this involves)
k This, and the SNP’s perceived record in office (and the status of its leader, Alex Salmond), helps explain SNP popularity – not support for independence
l Overall, the evidence suggests that the only way people will vote for independence is if the UK Government holds a snap poll (annoying the Scottish electorate and reminding them of the old top-down Conservative rule) and asks the electorate to make a yes/ no decision on independence. This will turn the process into a vote for the Scottish government over the UK government.
m That move might eventually be more popular in England, where there is some (but let’s not exaggerate it) rise in the perception that Scotland is doing disproportionately well out the of the Union
n In other news, the link between public opinion is often very weak indeed. This effect began almost immediately, with the Scottish Parliament putting leadership before opinion when deciding to abolish ‘section 28’. Few examples since then have produced a closer association between opinion and policy. Indeed, in key areas of public health (such as smoking and drinking), the Scottish Government appears more interested in changing rather than reflecting public opinion.

Argument 8: Evolution, not revolution, in public policy
a There was much talk before devolution about the need for ‘Scottish solutions to Scottish problems’ and the idea of Westminster having no time for Scottish legislation
b Hopes were high for policy innovation and new ideas
c At the same time, devolution was seen by many as a way to avoid policy innovation; to step off the train associated with the constant top-down reform agenda of the UK government
d The latter image is a better guide
e Public policy did not change dramatically after devolution, and did not mark dramatic policy divergence from the past or the rest of the UK
f There were key examples of divergence, including ‘free’ personal care for older people, the abolition of higher education tuition fees, the abolition of the healthcare internal market and the introduction of the single transferable vote in local elections
g There were also sources of policy change in areas such as housing stock transfer and anti-social behavior
h However, there was also a notable degree of policy continuity and pressure to converge with UK government policy
i The phrase ‘Scottish solutions to Scottish problems’ may relate more to how it processes policy than the actual policy outputs and outcomes

Argument 9: The much-maligned ‘Barnett formula’ has proved to be remarkably durable despite its lack of public support
a Scotland appears to enjoy a funding advantage, with more public money spent per head in Scotland than in most parts of England and Wales
b This advantage has become associated with the Barnett formula, even though the formula is not the cause of (and does not help protect) that advantage
c The Barnett formula represents a way to determine annual changes to the Scottish budget
d We identify (comparable) changes to English budgets and assign a Scottish share based on its share of the UK population
e If all else remains equal, and spending rises, the Barnett formula may in fact help reduce Scotland’s higher per capita rates of spending
f The pre- and post-devolved experience is that things do not remain equal and that other factors (including incorrect estimates of Scotland’s share of the UK population) have contributed to the maintenance of Scotland’s financial position
g This issue received relatively low attention in the first 10 years (or so) of devolution, when overall UK expenditure was high and rising
h It now receives more attention during the new age of economic austerity, but has yet to produce a new system in Scotland
i The experience shows us the importance of inertia in politics, where the status quo is difficult to shift when there is no agreement on what new system to introduce, hard choices have to made and any new system will produce vocal ‘losers’
j It exposes a contradiction of sorts, in which the UK Treasury remains a powerful actor in Scottish politics, determining the size of the Scottish budget but also providing a large budget and often giving little direction on how to spend it (with the exception of areas such as capital spending, where it limits the ability of devolved governments to pursue alternatives to public private partnerships)
k The Scottish Government does not have the equivalent of a Treasury and its control of the key economic levers are very limited

Argument 9: We are entering a new phase of constitutional fixation

a. The first half of devolution was characterized by relatively low attention to further constitutional change
b. Constitutional issues arose rarely and referred to the potential anomalies of devolution, including the ‘West Lothian’ question and the role of a UK Supreme Court in Scottish criminal justice
c. The prospect of an SNP election victory helped raise the constitutional question up the Scottish agenda
d. The 2007-11 period saw two reviews of the devolution settlement – the SNP’s National Conversation (seeking views on its preference for devolution) and the Scottish Parliament commissioned (and UK Government financed) Calman Commission review of devolution.
e. Both operated on parallel tracks, with limited engagement between the two
f. The National Conversation did not culminate in a referendum on independence, since the SNP did not have enough support in the Scottish Parliament to pass a referendum bill
g. The Calman Commission produced recommendations to extend devolution in a number of small ways (such as on airguns policy and the devolution of some taxes) and provide a new framework for the administration of Scottish income tax (allowing the Scottish Parliament to vary the rate by ten pence in the pound and obliging it to choose its income tax rate in a way not seen before)
h. The Scotland Bill may now be amended to reflect many of Calman’s recommendations, but the 2011 election result has complicated matters
i. A particular source of tension regards the Scottish Parliament’s scrutiny of the new Scotland Bill in the light of a new SNP majority on the relevant committee
j. Independence following a referendum is unlikely, but the referendum may result in a vote for further devolution or ‘devolution max’
k. Whatever the result, further devolution is likely to result in a very messy compromise, since no one is quite sure what further devolution will involve

Argument 10: Scottish devolution has been a success, but only if we measure success in a particular way
a. There are many ways to measure the success of devolution, from instant success, as soon as the Scotland Bill was passed in 1998, to almost no success, as the Scottish Parliament failed to live up to its billing as the symbol of new politics
b. If devolution is about a new form of politics, then it has been a failure – but we should not compare its actual operation with the unrealistic aspirations of its most naïve supporters
c. The often-peripheral role of the Scottish Parliament in the policy process should not detract from its new role as a source of light on the policymaking process in Scotland
d. Further, there is now a Scottish political system with its own institutions that are here to stay

Independence Referendum: One for the Trainspotters

2012-01-10T07:24:00.000-08:00

One of my students pointed out that the SNP commitment to hold the independence referendum in the second half of the 2011-16 parliamentary session is not in its 2011 manifesto. So, I checked and he is correct. Yet, both Alex Salmond and Nicola Sturgeon (in the video above Curtice's article) are very clear that they have an electoral mandate for that timetable. What this means is that the SNP made this commitment orally during the campaign itself. Specifically, Alex Salmond made the commitment during the BBC debate on May 1st. This was described by the Telegraph as a climb down to stop scaring potential voters, while the Daily Record reports in its class style: 'After weeks of refusing to name a date, he said he wanted Scots to vote on breaking up Britain "in the second half of the parliament"'. Salmond's justification in the BBC debate was that the first half of the session would be taken up by scrutiny of the new Scotland Bill. In any case, it seems to have been well-known-enough during the campaign (certainly, all the main opposition parties and media knew about it) to justify recent statements, but it is one of those issues that makes us wonder what 'the electorate' is said to give a mandate to - the party in general or the manifesto in particular?

The Independence Referendum - annoyance is important

2012-01-10T03:18:00.000-08:00

I'm not much of a blogger, and you probably shouldn't blog when you are annoyed (just like email), but I am annoyed and so I want to blog about the independence referendum chatter. What a pile of nonsense. Yes, that's quite vague, but that is my overall feeling about the current debate. There is the usually excellent reasoning given by John Curtice about why David Cameron is pushing the issue now, in terms of current opinion polls and the window of opportunity to close the matter down. However, I don't think there are many analyses about the basic link to the emotions on which we draw when we make major decisions. We make different decisions when we are annoyed. We make different decisions when we feel that we are being pressured or told what to do. We make different decisions when people tell us that we do not have the right to make decisions. Indeed, we might even make contrary choices simply because some people have told us to do otherwise. That is why David Cameron's recent strategy seems so off the mark. In my mind, the only thing that will produce a 'yes to independence' vote is a combination of two things: (1) the referendum is held and controlled by the Conservative-led UK Government (since many Scots feel much more strongly about the Conservatives than they do about constitutional change); and, (2) it asks a stark yes/ no question about independence (since the best way to ensure a lower vote for independence is to offer further devolution instead). However, the more that this goes on, the more I think that the Conservative-led UK Government can screw it up without holding the referendum itself. All it has to do is keep banging on about the 18-month timetable of permission (just as Iron Lady is coming to our screens) and watch as a huge population of docile people suddenly get annoyed enough to vote 'yes'. For anecdotal evidence, take me as a best case. When asked about this issue in private I say 'I don't care about independence'. When asked on academic panels, and I have to be more polite and sound more intelligent, I say 'I really don't think that independence will have a significant effect on our daily lives'. Yet, now, I DO care - and, if the vote was tomorrow, I would vote 'yes'. Now, let's say that I am am a relatively intelligent and thoughtful person, that I think carefully about major decisions and that, therefore, I am a decent 'best case' for either side. I have just said that a combination of David Cameron's poor strategy, combined with being annoyed by commentators on Sky News saying 'we English should have a say, too' (the best response seems to be to consider a relationship in which one person wants out; the other person gets a say in how they divvy up their possessions, but not if they stay together), has made me want to vote 'yes' instantly. Now consider all those people who don't study Scottish politics for a living and are much more likely to make an emotional decision backed on little evidence. Be careful not to open doors towards you, otherwise you will be knocked over by the stampede to the polling booths (or, in my case, first class post). My advice to unionists is simple: do not let anyone from the current (or, in the case of Michael Forsyth, former) UK Government near this issue (with the exception of civil servants negotiating the details behind closed doors). There may be few sparkling lights in the Scottish political class, but the fact that they are practicing their politics in Scotland and adapting to its environment is much more valuable than a smoother operator making pronouncements from on high.

Draft chapters of 'The Scottish Political System Since Devolution'

2011-06-27T09:27:00.000-07:00

Class sizes

2011-05-30T03:27:00.000-07:00

This is just a list of newspaper articles on class size targets, linked to Fiona Hyslop's departure as Education secretary in 2009. I refer to it in my book 'The Scottish Political System Since Devolution' (http://www.booksonix.com/imprint/bookshop/ ). Some of the links may no longer work (e.g. The Times has gone subscription-based since I collected them), but the Scotsman has a very good archive.

D. Maddox 16.10.09 ‘Hyslop admits government has failed on class sizes’, The Scotsman, http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Hyslop-admits-government-has-failed.5739396.jp
F. Macleod 12.11.09 ‘Failure on class sizes isn’t my fault ... blame the recession, councils and minority rule – Fiona Hyslop’, The Scotsman, http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Failure-on-class-sizes-isn39t.5816932.jp
L. McIntosh 12.11.09 ‘Hyslop blames class size failures on councils’, The Times, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6913280.ece
B. Currie 03.12.09 ‘Gray: Salmond misled MSPs with promise on class sizes’, The Herald, http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/politics/gray-salmond-misled-msps-with-promise-on-class-sizes-1.989349
S. Johnson 03.12.09 “Alex Salmond accused of misleading MSPs over ‘unachievable’ class size pledge”, Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/scotland/6719692/Alex-Salmond-accused-of-misleading-MSPs-over-unachievable-class-size-pledge.html
T. Peterkin 06.12.09 ‘Three codes broken in promoting SNP class size pledge, claim Lib Dems’, Scotland on Sunday, http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Three-codes-broken-in-promoting.5887767.jp
C. Mackie 08.12.09 ‘Ex-education minister calls for inquiry into SNP class sizes pledge’, The Scotsman, http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Exeducation-minister-calls-for-inquiry.5891301.jp
Herald Scotland 07.12.09 ‘Salmond faces Holyrood inquiry over primary class sizes’, The Herald, http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/politics/salmond-faces-holyrood-inquiry-over-primary-class-sizes-1.990575
BBC News 08.12.09 ‘Salmond’s class size claim probed’, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/8402839.stm
C. Churchill 10.12.09 ‘Anger as Russell offers up new class size deal’, The Herald, http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/education/anger-as-russell-offers-up-new-class-size-deal-1.991429
F. Macleod 12.12.09 ‘Mike Russell admits class sizes will not be reduced in lifetime of government’, The Scotsman, http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Mike-Russell-admits-class-sizes.5906199.jp
Scottish Government News Release 11.11.09 ‘Review of class sizes taken forward’ http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2009/11/11163026
Scottish Government News Release 23.09.09 ‘Action to tackle class sizes’ http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2009/09/23094529
I. Swanson 01.12.09 ‘Fiona Hyslop sacked as Education Secretary’, The Scotsman, http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Fiona-Hyslop-sacked-as-Education.5871555.jp
A. Macleod 02.12.09 “Salmond ‘sacrifices’ his Education Secretary”, The Times, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6939893.ece
A. Macleod 01.12.09 ‘Fantasy of education portfolio sealed Hyslop’s fate’, The Times, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6940021.ece
A. Macleod 01.12.09 ‘Fiona Hyslop stripped of education role in SNP Cabinet’, The Times, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6939026.ece
BBC News 01.12.09 ‘Demoted SNP education secretary endorses successor’, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/8388141.stm
A. Cochrane 02.12.09 ‘It is good news for Scotland’s children that Alex Salmond has finally faced reality on Fiona Hylsop’, Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/columnists/alancochrane/6707191/It-is-good-news-for-Scotlands-children-that-Alex-Salmond-has-finally-faced-reality-on-Fiona-Hyslop.html
Telegraph 02.12.09 ‘Alex Salmond forced to sack education minister after resignation bluff called’, Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/scotland/6702176/Alex-Salmond-forced-to-sack-education-minister-after-resignation-bluff-called.html
T. Peterkin 04.12.09 “Alex Salmond ‘used sacked Fiona Hyslop as scapegoat and misled Holyrood’”, The Scotsman, http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Alex-Salmond-39used-sacked-Fiona.5883882.jp
A. Macleod 04.12.09 “Salmond accused of ‘sticking knife’ into Hyslop over class size memo”, The Times, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/education/article6943650.ece
M. Linklater 04.12.09 ‘Alex Salmond is hurt and Holyrood knows it’, The Times, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6943692.ece
A. Macleod 02.12.09 “Salmond sacked Hyslop ‘because she had lost support of the party’”, The Times, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6941802.ece

Namesakes

2011-05-20T04:17:00.000-07:00

We all Google ourselves, don't we? When I Google myself I know that I share the name with a Scottish footballer, someone who used to be the contact for bus shelter complaints in MidLothian council, and a US soccer coach - and that's about it. So, how about this for a (not particularly exciting or interesting for anyone else) coincidence? I was called by someone from the Herald asking if I had posted on politicalbetting.com about Professor James Mitchell being Alex Salmond's election agent. I said 'no' (because I hadn't). Then I checked it out and, sure enough, there is a post here that says, "Mike - James Mitchell was Alex Salmond’s election agent in the 1980’s - so please take anything he says with that in mind! Scottish opinion polls always underestimate the Conservative Party and overestimate the SNP by P Cairney April 8th, 2011 at 09:47”. I was so mortified (more than none) about the thought that I looked like a bitter gossip that I emailed James to deny my involvement! For the record, the comment by P. Cairney is made up, either by someone called P. Cairney or (a slightly more interesting prospect) someone using my name for a laugh.

Political Quarterly - Coalition and Minority Government in Scotland: Lessons for the United Kingdom?

2011-05-19T04:06:00.000-07:00

I have an article out in Political Quarterly's next issue. The journal can be accessed here (or you can read a version of the article here). The title is 'Coalition and Minority Government in Scotland: Lessons for the United Kingdom?'. In a nutshell, it argues that strength and stability in Parliament may come at the expense of strength and stability within Government. In other words, UK and devolved governments tend to prefer coalition governments because they provide them with a parliamentary majority and therefore strength in numbers (commanding the parliamentary vote) which ensures relative stability (since, for example, they are not vulnerable to motions of no confidence in Parliament). Yet, coalitions also complicate the machinery of government, whereas a minority government may be able to operate in a more cohesive manner. This certainly seemed to be the experience of the SNP from 2007-11 and its resultant strong image of governing competence is one part of the explanation for its huge win in the 2011 election (see other posts below). However, that huge win has made part of my article look a bit silly. It goes like this (in the conclusion):
"The United Kingdom ... has no equivalent to the Scottish Conservatives: content to make deals in opposition because it has a minimal chance of being part of government (and because it may help the party’s profile in Scotland). Instead, it has a single kingmaker in the shape of the Liberal Democrats, which might analyse the Scottish experience and find no incentive to remain in opposition".
At the PSA conference, Nicola McEwen was - quite rightly - sceptical about the ability of the Liberal Democrats to stop a minority government being formed. In a minority situation, they would have to combine with another party to elect an alternative First Minister or, at least, threaten to do so. Yet, this may not be successful. They may also have little hand when it comes to threatening a vote of no confidence later on because no party in Scotland wants to be seen to be responsible for an early election. Nor can parties afford to finance an extra election. Of course, that discussion became largely redundant when the SNP formed a majority government. That is the silly part – the Liberal Democrats are no longer the kingmakers in Scotland (unless you count selecting Willie Rennie as their new leader, of 5, in the Scottish Parliament). Instead, they have been relegated to the backbenches of the Scottish Parliament. It just goes to show two things: (1) I really need to avoid discussing the future (academics are better at explaining the past); and (2) journal articles are always vulnerable to being dated quickly when they discuss current events. I wrote this thing in January and it is already cracking by May!

Scottish Election 2011 - Holyrood Magazine

2011-05-09T10:32:00.000-07:00

Here is something I wrote for Holyrood Magazine on the 2011 Election:

I once met a fellow academic at a conference, who told me that he did not care about the study of public policy at all. It was something along the lines of, ‘as soon as the election is over, I lose interest’. I tend to say the opposite – ‘elections don’t matter; it is what happens between them that matters’ – and don’t get excited at all about elections. Yet, even I was blown away by the nature of the SNP victory in 2011. The SNP managed to do achieve three things that few us (perhaps with the exception of John Curtice and some very optimistic SNP supporters) thought possible. First, they achieved a majority of seats in a system designed to stop that happening (although, perhaps ironically given the rejection of AV, STV might be a better bet to achieve that aim). Second, they did it on the back of a major reversal of fortunes in the constituency vote, winning 53 (73%) of the constituency seats – the figure that Labour reached in 1999 when the SNP won 7 (10%). Third, they won the majority of constituency seats in key Labour strongholds such as Glasgow. They also helped reduce the Liberal Democrats to the status of a small party, keep the Greens down to two, and perhaps only Margo MacDonald’s victory spoiled the perfect night for them.
The effect on the parties may be dramatic. The Conservatives may go back to the peripheral role they enjoyed from 1999-2007. The Liberal Democrats may seek ways to disassociate themselves from their UK counterparts, albeit without Tavish Scott, who resigned as their leader. Labour will also elect a new leader, in the Autumn, following a review of the party initiated by Iain Gray before his departure.
But will the election effect be as dramatic on the Scottish Parliament itself? In a word, ‘no’. The Parliament has been a peripheral part of the Scottish policy process for the majority of its 12 year existence and majority government will only accelerate its declining importance. In the first eight years, the Labour and Liberal Democrat coalition performed the role of a majority government, controlling the vote in plenary and committees and passing so much legislation that most committees devoted most of their activities to scrutiny (instead of agenda setting inquiries). There was little evidence of ‘power sharing’ or ‘new politics’ and much more evidence of a concentration of power in the government combined with an adversarial atmosphere that we associated so much with ‘old Westminster’. We might have expected a big difference in the latter four years, with the Scottish Government finally having to negotiate with opposition parties in the Parliament to secure its policy aims. Yet, with the exception of some high profile government retreats (on the independence referendum, local taxation reform and minimum alcohol pricing – all of which are set to return), there was a muted parliamentary effect. The Scottish Government produced and amended the vast majority of the legislation and found that they could pursue many of their their aims without recourse to Parliament – through public spending, the use of legislation already on the statute books and, most importantly, its new relationship with local government. Committees were no more effective. Indeed, at times, they seemed less effective either because the main opposition parties seemed disinterested in committee business, party politics got in the way of business-like cooperation (a development summed up in the attempts by Labour to make Alex Salmond pay for his association with Donald Trump), or simply because they did not have the resources to find out how local (and health) authorities were spending public money.
Iain Gray has promised to initiate a ‘root and branch’ review of Scottish Labour. Perhaps it is time to take the same long and hard look at the Scottish Parliament. It is time to forget about ‘new politics’ for two main reasons. First, what we have, and have had for some time, is good old fashioned government and opposition. Second, the term breeds complacency. It makes it look like Scotland cracked electoral and intuitional design before 1999 and that it is superior to its London counterpart. Yet, in a promising new development, the Conveners Group of the Scottish Parliament has recently had the courage to suggest that Westminster often does it better. It suggests that committees can be more assertive because they present an alternative career path for MPs (something that Holyrood has failed to provide). It also suggests that Westminster has not stood still, introducing reforms to reduce the influence of parties when committee chairs are selected. Such reforms may not shift the balance of power, but they at least show a willingness to change. I doubt there is much of an appetite for this sort of discussion in Scotland, because the reviews by opposition parties will focus more on how to win votes next time. Perhaps there is more hope for the SNP despite the fact that it needs the Parliament less than it ever has. The SNP Government has shown that it can govern well. Now it is time to show that an independent Scotland can have a Parliament worthy of its proposed (independent or further devolved) status.

Scottish Election 2011 - SPICe Briefing

2011-05-09T10:31:00.001-07:00

Here is something I wrote for the Scottish Parliament Information Centre's 2011 election briefing. It has been edited a bit by SPICe so, if you have a lot of time on your hands, feel free to try to spot the differences:

The Scottish Election of 2011 has to go down as the most exciting in its short history (and probably for decades to come). The size of the SNP win was staggering for at least three reasons. First, it achieved a majority of seats (69, 53% of 129) under a system designed to make it unlikely that one party achieves a majority without a majority of the vote (it secured 45.4% of the constituency and 44% of the regional vote). Second, it was built on a reversal-of-fortunes, with the SNP now dominating the constituency vote at the expense of Labour when, in the past, it received most of its seats from the regional lists. Third, it won in key Labour strongholds such as Glasgow.
But what are the wider or longer term consequences? Are they, or will they be, as dramatic?
Public Policy. The most immediate and significant effect is that there is now a clear mandate for SNP policies. It will almost certainly introduce a bill to hold a referendum on independence and pursue policies for which it had insufficient parliamentary support in 2007 – including a minimum price on a unit of alcohol and a replacement for the council tax (it has already promised to maintain a freeze on council tax). However, there are three main qualifications to consider. First, its ability to pursue policy innovation is limited by the financial climate and many of its decisions will relate to which aims to prioritise or drop, rather than which new policies to fund. Second, the SNP Government has built a reputation for governing competence, which is often about the management of people and existing resources rather than constant innovation. Third, its plans for the delivery of policies is perhaps less certain. In particular, a key part of its governing strategy in 2007 was to devolve more responsibility to local government. While it agreed ‘single outcome agreements’ with (and set some national priorities for) local authorities, the emphasis was on reducing ‘ring fenced’ budgets and giving local authorities the space to make their own decisions. This caused a degree of tension at a national level, with many organisations (including the Scottish Parliament) often expressing frustration at their ability to be involved in policy at only one stage of the process, and the Scottish Government under a degree of pressure to deliver on its commitments. We may detect a partial shift back to national direction from 2011. For example, the high profile issue of class sizes will return, with the Scottish Government still only recommending a limit of 18 in P1-3 but now willing to set a legal maximum of 25.
The MSPs. The proportion of new MSPs has risen to 37% (48) from 33% in 2007 and 20% in 2003. Despite some concerns about the departure of key Labour women, and a huge reduction in the parliamentary Labour party (traditionally the source of more than half of the Scottish Parliament’s female members), the gender balance improved slightly at 65% men and 35% women because very similar numbers of women and men left and returned (it is now only the second-worst gender imbalance since Scottish devolution!). The Parliament is now not exclusively white (note that Bashir Ahmad served from 2007 until his death in 2009), with two new Scottish–Asian MSPs representing 1.6% of MSPs (black and ethnic minorities represent 2% of the Scottish population). Yet, more work is required to tell if the occupational background of MSPs has changed. Political parties in many countries have an increasing reputation for recruiting candidates from ‘politics facilitating’ occupations (such as party, interest group and think tank workers) and the Scottish Parliament is no exception.
From Coalition to Minority to Majority Government. The first eight years of devolution showed us that the Scottish Parliament was not the powerful body that it was cracked up to be. The Scottish Executive coalition held a majority of MSPs in plenary and all committees, allowing it to introduce the vast majority of legislation and ensure control over its amendment during parliamentary scrutiny. Four years of minority government showed that, while the Scottish Government passed fewer bills in four years (42, compared to 50 from 2003 and 53 from 1999) and required the support of other parties to pass annual budgets, the balance of power did not change dramatically. The Scottish Parliament’s role is limited largely to departmental and legislative scrutiny. It does not have the resources to present an alternative legislative agenda. For example, committee bills are generally limited to parliamentary reform and standards. Members’ bills either take a long time to produce (the fox hunting ban took two years) or relate to issues in which non-complex legislation can be used (in areas such as dog fouling and the ability of shops to open at Christmas). The committees’ ability to undertake agenda-setting inquires is limited. The election of a majority party may further tip the balance of power to government, with a single party now able to command a majority in plenary and committees.
The Scottish Government and UK Government relationship. From 1999-2007 the Scottish-UK government relationship was low key; discussions were conducted informally and almost entirely through political parties, ministers and civil servants. Formal mechanisms for negotiation and dispute were used rarely and the Scottish Executive played a minimal role in EU policy making. These relationships did not change remarkably following the election of the SNP in 2007 and the coalition government in the UK and 2010. Although there were more instances of high profile disagreements from 2007, there was a still tendency for this charged atmosphere to give way to a more humdrum, day-to-day relationship as different civil servants worked through the details. David Cameron also seemed determined to ‘govern Scots with respect’ from 2010. This process may continue, because both governments recognise the value of a smooth working relationship, or it may not – partly because their relationship will form the backdrop to the agenda on independence from 2013. A UK Conservative government in office during a period of economic retrenchment probably provides the best chance for the SNP Government to demonstrate that it would be better making all of its own decisions, and it would be a surprise if it did not exploit that opportunity.
The Parties. Scottish Labour will elect a new leader in the Autumn, following a ‘root and branch’ review initiated by Iain Gray before his departure. The Liberal Democrats will surely have to do more work to distance themselves from their electorally-toxic UK counterparts (although it is already a federal party and the Liberal Democrats are unlikely to be in government from 2015). The Conservatives may look back on their position in 2007 with a degree of nostalgia since they may return to the peripheral role in the Scottish Parliament that they enjoyed from 1999-2007. From 2007-11 they often propped up the SNP, securing small policy concessions for support on key votes (most notably on the budget, but note that they voted in agreement with the SNP over 70% of the time). Now, Annabelle Goldie is reduced to ‘keeping an eye’ on Alex Salmond rather than holding his hand. Perhaps the immediate future of the SNP will become the most interesting. Minority government, combined with opposition party opposition to an independence referendum, may have produced a strong them-and-us mentality and the coherence of the SNP within both Government and Parliament was remarkable. However, if we remove both constraints (and add the notion that majorities sometimes produce divisions within parties) we may find that the party becomes more difficult to manage.

Scottish Election 2011 - The Monitor

2011-05-09T10:30:00.000-07:00

Here is something I wrote on the election for the UCL's Constitution Unit Monitor:
"The Scottish Election of 2011 has to go down as the most exciting in its short history (and probably for decades to come). The size of the SNP win was staggering. The size of its majority (it has 69, 53% of 129 seats) is not the notable part. The most staggering part is that it gained a majority at all – given that the system was designed to stop one party winning in this way. Indeed, ironically, the talk before devolution was that proportional representation was chosen by Labour to stop the SNP ever the getting the majority it needed to push hard on the independence agenda. Put more positively, the system is designed to make it unlikely that one party achieves a majority unless it gains a majority of the vote. PR is supposed to produce a different kind of party system in which the largest party forms a coalition government with at least one other party (as Labour did with the Liberal Democrats in 1999 and 2003) or a minority government (as the SNP did in 2007, performing the unlikely task of fulfilling a full 4-year term with 36% of the seats). However, the Mixed Member Proportional (or ‘additional member’) system clearly does not make it impossible to gain a majority of seats without a majority of the vote because it is not entirely proportional. The explanation for the SNP’ s win comes from the role of first-past-the-post to elect 73 of its 129 MSPs. The SNP secured 73% (53) of those seats from 45.4% of the vote. While it received only 16, or 30%, of regional seats from 44% of the regional votes, this was not enough to offset its constituency majority.
The second surprise is how well the SNP did in the constituency vote. In the three previous elections it came behind Labour: in 1999 Labour won 53 constituency seats to the SNP’s 7; in 2003 the split was 46 and 9; and, even in 2007, the split was 37 to 27, with the SNP becoming the largest party on the back of its 26 regional seats (to Labour’s 9). Now, 53 SNP compares to 15 Labour. The third is that the SNP did well in areas that, in the past, were Labour strongholds. One of the most notable areas is Glasgow, where Labour won 10 of 10 constituencies in 1999 and 2003, then 9 in 2007. Nicola Sturgeon was the SNP’s exception and, at the time, this seemed like a symbolic blow to Labour’s dominance. In 2011, the SNP took the majority (5 of 9) of the constituency seats in Glasgow – a result that must seem like a crushing blow to Labour. The result for the Scottish Liberal Democrats is more predictable. It suffered from its association with the UK coalition government, securing only 5 seats (17, 17, 16 in 1999, 2003, 2007). The Scottish Conservatives did comparatively better, securing 15 (18, 18, 17). The small parties were, again, marginalised – the Greens secured 2, only one more than independent Margo MacDonald.
The short term future seems clear: the SNP goes on with a clear mandate for a referendum on independence and to continue its wider policy agenda (for example, by returning to its aim to set a minimum price for a unit of alcohol); Scottish Labour will elect a new leader in the Autumn, following a ‘root and branch’ review initiated by Iain Gray before his departure; the Liberal Democrats work to distance themselves from their electorally-toxic UK counterparts; and the Conservatives may return to a peripheral role in the Scottish Parliament. From 2007-11 they often propped up the SNP, securing small policy concessions for support on key votes (most notably on the budget). Now, Annabelle Goldie is reduced to ‘keeping an eye’ on the SNP".

Scottish Election 2011

2011-05-06T02:12:00.001-07:00

I have joked for a long time about being so wrong about election (and other) predictions that you should place a bet on the opposite of what I say. Now, I am convinced that you would make a fortune if you did so. My favourite mistakes are the ones I do with newspapers (luckily, I think they only publish John Curtice’s predictions for obvious reasons (if they are not obvious - it is because he is almost-always correct)). So, for example, I said that Wendy Alexander would ride out the storm and remain Scottish Labour leader. Then, I made an accumulator prediction of sorts from 2007: that the Conservatives would win the 2010 election (that is the closest I have come to being right), the SNP would use it to full effect in the referendum campaign (there was no referendum), the referendum would produce a ‘no to independence’ vote (or a ‘more devolution’ vote if the 3rd option was given) and the SNP would then lose in 2011 because the wind would be out of their sails. I also reckoned, even after the non-referendum, that Labour would be the biggest party (and might form a coalition with the Liberal Democrats!) just because of the incumbency effects: the SNP were the incumbents and would lose a few votes accordingly, plus Labour were not in government in the UK or Scotland anymore (so wouldn’t be punished at the polls for Iraq and the economy in the same way). This has to go down as my most spectacularly wrong prediction to date (John Curtice is now predicting an SNP majority). In my defence, I am not a psephologist and do not have any expertise to draw on here. My expertise is in other things: coalition/ minority government and the Scottish Parliament, public policy, intergovernmental relations, and so on (and I will publish a few posts in the next week or so). But you would think that I would get some of these correct, even by the law of averages, wouldn’t you? My latest prediction is that there will be a referendum in 2 years or so (surely this has to be right!) but that it will not produce enough support for independence. So, of course, that means independence tomorrow. Place your bets.

Rational Choice - full section.

2011-02-14T07:59:00.000-08:00

My book Understanding Public Policy: Theories and Issues (Basingstoke: Palgrave) has a section entitled 'The Main Debates between Rational Choice Advocates and Critics'. For the sake of space, I shortened this section and referred the reader here for a fuller discussion. Well, here it is (see the book for the references) ...

The complication to rational choice defences is that they are often stated too provocatively by their advocates. For example, the ‘instrumentalist-empiricist’ (MacDonald, 2003: 553) claim that models should be assessed not by the realism of their assumptions but by the accuracy of their predictions is ripe for abuse and misinterpretation. Friedman (1953: 14-15) argues that the assumptions of hypotheses must be ‘descriptively false’ (because they assume, for the purposes of the inquiry, that other causal factors are unimportant) when he means that they are ‘good approximations’ whose worth should be determined by ‘one test’: whether the theory ‘yields sufficiently accurate predictions’. The aim of rational choice theory is not only to produce predictions that are consistent with the evidence but also to explain why; to argue that things happen because people act in the way described (Laver, 1997: 5). Therefore, much extraneous debate could be avoided if we stuck to describing assumptions as parsimonious rather than unrealistic; as an extraction of one essence of individual behaviour (Tsebelis, 1990: 32 uses the term ‘subset’; compare with Hindess, 1988: 113). As Ward (2002: 69) argues, models are ‘simplified representations of reality constructed with a view to improving our understanding’. Similarly, one aim of modelling is to explore the consequences of behaviour under particular conditions that may not have occurred but could occur in the real world (Laver, 1997: 4-5). This is not a claim that the assumptions of a model are deliberately unrealistic in the way we would commonly understand the phrase.

Relatedly, Shepsle and Bonchek’s (1997: 16-7) argument that we do not need to know why individuals hold particular preferences (instead, we entertain ‘hunches and intuitions about that person’s motives’) requires qualification. The argument is not that such things are unimportant, but that their explanation is problematic when we analyse the ‘behaviour of large numbers of people’ (Elster, 1986: 16). There are two main solutions. The first is practical: set up a division of labour, with some models treating preferences as exogenous (caused by factors outwith the realms of the model) complemented by other models that explain preference formation (Dowding and King, 1995: 5; Parsons, 2005: 8-9; although Hampsher-Monk and Hindmoor, 2010 suggest that attempts to link the two are rare). The second is methodological: highlight the difference between ‘stated’ and ‘revealed’ preferences and argue that it is at least as legitimate to observe behaviour and impute motivations as it is to ask people why they behaved as they do. Since both methods are problematic on their own (people lie or may be mistaken when they explain their motives; people may act strategically and misrepresent their preferences when acting), neither should be relied on exclusively (Dowding and James, 2004: 188; Hampsher-Monk and Hindmoor, 2010: 57).

Finally, we may see unconvincing responses when substantive models are assessed for their usefulness. In particular, Green and Shapiro (1994: 34) identify a tendency in the literature for ‘post hoc theorizing’ when the limits of models’ predictions become clear. While the modification of original models can be legitimate in the light of empirical evidence, this should be done in a particular way: the modified model should explain everything the old model explains and more, and/ or produce new predictions ‘at variance’ with the old model (Dowding and James, 2004: 189; see box 7.4.2 and 7.4.3). One of the most striking attempts is the concept of ‘nested games’ (box 7.3).

Scotland, The Monitor January 2011

2011-01-16T03:08:00.001-08:00

This is for the UCL Constitution Unit's January 2011 edition of 'The Monitor':

There has been a number of stories vying for attention in the latter part of 2010, including the US report on Lockerbie (suggesting economic pressure on the UK to free the Lockerbie bomber), the date of the referendum on AV (the Lords process may push it past the Scottish Parliament election date), the resignation of Stewart Stevensson (blamed for motorists being trapped on the M8 overnight during the cold spell), the non-story regarding the lapse of the Scottish Parliament’s powers to modify Scottish income tax (the power would not have been used) and, of course, Tommy Sheridan. However, the biggest issue relates to the economy and the budget. Legislation, based on the Calman report (see previous monitors) is currently going through Westminster to devolve a range of taxes to the Scottish Parliament (despite opposition by the SNP). We are also gearing up for the annual budget bill which has generally proved controversial. There are two added elements this time. First, it is the first budget bill in the new era of austerity, with the Scottish Government faced with finding ways to reduce budgets across the board. This is the context for most coverage of issues with, for example, Scottish Labour linking C difficile related deaths to NHS cost cutting, the Auditor General warning that further cuts in the NHS have to be made, Education Secretary Mike Russell accused of interfering in the schools closure agenda in his constituency and challenging the opposition parties to state their position on charging tuition fees, and Justice Secretary Kenny MacAskill considering the move to single fire and police services. Second, Alex Salmond’s threats to resign and force an early election may have a bit more bite this time (although SNP support is not that high) because we are within six months of May (meaning that another election would be unnecessary; the new government would operate for over 4 years). Much centres on Finance Secretary John Swinney’s proposal of a ‘supermarket tax’ (or rise in business rates for large businesses) which has been opposed by the three main opposition parties. Swinney has also begun to play hardball with local authorities, linking funding to a commitment to maintain police and teacher numbers and to freeze council tax (or face a reduction in budget settlements).

Intergovernmental Relations in Scotland: what was the SNP effect?

2010-10-18T08:25:00.000-07:00

Here is a copy of a paper that I will present at this conference - http://www.abdn.ac.uk/riiss/isf5nov10.shtml - on the 5th November

Paul Cairney, University of Aberdeen, AB243QY paul.cairney@abdn.ac.uk

Intergovernmental Relations in Scotland: what was the SNP effect?

Abstract
In Scotland, the formation of a minority government in 2007 by the Scottish National Party (SNP) provided the potential for profound changes in intergovernmental relations. This followed eight years of Scottish Labour led coalition government characterised by a low-key and informal relationship with the UK Labour Government. From 1999-2007, discussions were conducted informally and almost entirely through political parties and executives. Although formal mechanisms for negotiation and dispute resolution existed – including the courts, concordats and Joint Ministerial Committees - they were used rarely. The Scottish Executive also played a minimal role in EU policymaking. Yet, an ‘explosive’ new era of relations between the Scottish and UK Governments did not arrive in tandem with a change of party in government. The aim of this paper is to explore these issues by asking two main questions: why were formal mechanisms used so rarely from 1999-2007, and what factors have produced muted rather than problematic IGR since 2007?

Keywords: intergovernmental relations – policy communities – asymmetry – minority government

The New Political Context
In Scotland, the formation of a minority government in 2007 by the SNP provided the potential for profound changes in IGR. It followed eight years of remarkably informal and uncontroversial relations between the UK and Scottish executives. From 1999-2003 and 2003-7, Scottish Labour and the Scottish Liberal Democrats formed a coalition (the Scottish Executive) which commanded the majority of MSPs in the Scottish Parliament. In each parliamentary session the parties produced a ‘partnership agreement’ setting out in detail their legislative and policy plans. While the Liberal Democrats may have done disproportionately well out of the agreement, Labour was the senior partner in both sessions (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 121). This allowed relations to develop between the UK and Scottish executives as if there was a shared party in government.

From 1999-2007 the Scotland-UK IGR strategy was clear: discussions were conducted informally and almost entirely through executives. Other mechanisms for negotiation and dispute resolution existed but were used rarely. The role of the courts was minimal. There were no references of Scottish bills to judicial review; the Scottish Executive was more likely to ‘remove offending sections’ than face delay (Page, 2005). The role of Holyrood-Westminster relations was limited, and the Scottish Parliament was restricted to the passing of ‘Sewel’ (legislative consent) motions, giving consent for the Westminster Parliament (and in effect the UK Government) to pass legislation on devolved policy areas (Cairney, 2006; Cairney and Keating, 2004). There was a clear bias towards informality between executives. Although a Memorandum of Understanding was produced to guide the conduct of executives, and individual concordats to encourage cooperation between departments, the day-to-day business was conducted through civil servants with minimal reference to them. As Horgan (2004: 122) suggests, there was an ‘informal flavour’ to formal concordats since - as in Canada and Australia - they are not legally binding. Rather, they represent a, ‘statement of political intent … binding in honour only’ (Cm 5240, 2001: 5). The Memorandum’s main function is to promote good communication between executives, particularly when one knows that forthcoming policies will affect the other. This emphasis is furthered in the individual concordats which devote most of their discussions to reiterating the need for communication, confidentiality and forward notice (the ‘no surprises’ approach, furthered by the ‘partnership agreement’ that allowed the UK, to a large extent, to see what was coming). For the civil servants that produced them they represented ‘commonsense’ with little need to refer to them (Sir Muir Russell, former Permanent Secretary, Scottish Office and Scottish Executive, in Commission on Scottish Devolution, 2008a: 2; see also Jack McConnell, former First Minister, Commission on Scottish Devolution, 2008b: 13).

Although the Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC) was designed to allow the UK government to call a meeting with the devolved governments to coordinate working arrangements, discuss the impact of devolved policy on reserved areas and vice versa, share experience and consider disputes, it met infrequently (Trench, 2004). The JMC is a consultative rather than an executive body, with issues to be referred to it on the rare occasions that discussions between executives break down. Such was the bias against taking issues to the JMC that its members found little to discuss (Jack McConnell, Commission on Scottish Devolution, 2008b: 12; Jim Wallace, former Deputy First Minister, Commission on Scottish Devolution, 2008c: 9). Instead, bilateral working relationships between government departments became the norm, while matters of concern were discussed through political parties (and Scottish and UK Labour ministers in particular). The existence of coalition in government in Scotland complicated matters to some extent, and the most high profile instance in which an issue ‘broke free’ from the quiet world of IGR related to a policy (free personal care for older people) linked closely to Liberal Democrat aims (there were also tensions on PR in local elections). Yet, there was no systematic pattern of disputes and little demand for high profile resolution. The formal system of IGR was prepared as an afterthought and treated as such (Mitchell, 2010).

In 2007, the SNP formed a minority administration and promptly changed its name to the symbolically significant Scottish Government. It had already stated that it would not continue with the existing arrangements. Instead, it would: push for an independent civil service; discourage Sewel motions; call for a reinstatement of regular JMC plenary meetings; challenge UK policies (such as nuclear power); and publicly ‘stick up for Scotland’s interests’ rather than (in Alex Salmond’s words) be careful not to be seen arguing with its ‘big brother’ (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 162) (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008). The new relationship appeared to begin almost immediately when then Prime Minister Tony Blair did not congratulate Salmond on his election as First Minister, and Salmond criticised Blair publicly for not consulting the Scottish Government on plans to create a prisoner transfer agreement with Libya (that would contribute to pressure on the Scottish Government to release the ‘Lockerbie bomber’ – see Cairney, 2009b). Developments in UK politics also spilled over into the relationship. The ascension of a Scot, Gordon Brown, to Prime Minister prompted an increase in UK media and (particularly Conservative) party attention to Scotland’s disproportionate share of UK public expenditure (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 165), the number of Scotland MPs and the ‘West Lothian’ question (see Cairney, 2009a: 23). Combined, the new UK and Scottish contexts provided the potential to reinforce a shift in IGR caused by party incongruence in 2007. Yet, the new era of IGR did not materialise; the post-2007 period has been marked by a striking level of continuity in UK-Scottish relations.

The aim of following sections is to explore these issues by asking two questions: why were formal mechanisms used so rarely from 1999-2007, and what factors have produced muted rather than problematic IGR from 2007-10? The common factors in both cases are a ‘logic of informality’ that suits both sides, but also an asymmetry of power between executives. The article also considers one factor specific to the SNP era: the effect of minority government and the tendency for inter-party relations to pre-empt intergovernmental relations. It concludes with a brief discussion of the initial effects of the formation of a Conservative-Liberal Democrat UK Government in May 2010.

The Logic of Informality
The logic of informal IGR has direct parallels to the ‘logic of consultation’ between interest groups and governments. As Jordan and Maloney (1997) argue, close and policy-community-like relationships between groups and government are pervasive as a ‘consequence of policy making requirements’. Governments and groups trade access and influence for information and advice; this ‘logic of policymaking … acts as a drive towards … stable, regulated predictable relations’. The logic of ‘bureaucratic accommodation’ refers to the benefits of reaching a consensus (or at least practical understanding) with interest groups rather than imposing decisions. Although the UK is characterised as a ‘majoritarian’ system associated with ‘top-down’ policymaking (Lijphart, 1999), it does not operate as such. Instead, the UK government shares a common policy style with governments in ‘consensus democracies’, based on the need of civil servants to gather information from interest groups and legitimise decisions through consultation (Richardson, 1982; Cairney, 2011a). This need is strong since it encourages group ownership of policy and maximises governmental knowledge of possible problems. Further, the size of the state and scope for ‘overload’ necessitates breaking policy down into more manageable sectors and sub-sectors that are less subject to top-down control (see Cairney, 2008a). Even during periods of political conflict, this logic ‘tends to reassert itself and policy community-type features can emerge in the context of the conflict’; on many occasions the resolution of high profile controversies requires disaggregation into a series of ‘less contentious manageable facets that are processable within policy community arrangements’ (Jordan and Maloney, 1997).

The broader lesson is that few governments are willing or able to bear the cost of continuous top-down policymaking, even if their political structures appear to give them a particular advantage in this regard. Therefore, a consistently top-down approach to IGR is no more likely than a top-down approach to consultation. Instead, we would also expect executives to find ways to cooperate for mutual gain. This logic can be linked to what McGarvey and Cairney (2008: 167) call ‘positive’ reasons for informal IGR, bearing in mind that they may be more positive for the executives involved rather than those they represent and are accountable to (Cairney, 2009a: 5-7). The classic example is the Barnett formula used to determine changes to devolved public expenditure. There is considerable debate in the literature about the origins of the formula, what it was designed to do and what its effect has been (described in Cairney, 2009a: 5-6 and 23, note 5). For our purposes, the most relevant reason to maintain Barnett is that it suited both parties. For Scottish administrations it was one way to minimise a reduction in Scotland’s share of UK public expenditure, while for the Treasury it was a way to avoid spending a disproportionate amount of time on protracted annual budget negotiations for sums that are small when compared to its overall commitments.

A key tenet of the policy communities literature is that policy issues are portrayed as dull affairs to limit public interest and participation. If an issue can be successfully presented as a ‘technical’ issue for experts (related to a problem which has largely been solved), power can be exercised behind the scenes by a small number of participants (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Jordan and Maloney, 1997). In this sense the Barnett formula represents a successful attempt by decision-makers in Scotland and the UK to keep the big and potentially most contentious questions of funding off the political agenda. Barnett ‘solved’ the problem of devolved finance and the annual budget rounds became almost automatic, with scope for negotiation only on the ‘technical’ issue of Barnett consequentials (the sums received by devolved governments when levels of spending in England change). Further, their relationship was helped considerably during the 1999-2007 period by significant rises in UK and Scottish public expenditure. The types of disagreements on the adequacy of the funding settlement that we are now witnessing between the UK, Scottish and other devolved governments are unusual; fundamental issues of territorial finance have tended to arise sporadically, for example when linked to other events such as the election of a nationalist party just before the rise of a Scottish Prime Minister or an economic crisis.

A second example is the extensive use of Sewel motions (79 were passed from 1999-2007). The Sewel motion became a convenient tool to minimise negotiations to coordinate separate legislation, when the boundaries between reserved and devolved responsibilities were unclear and/ or when a UK-wide approach was necessary to maintain consistency of standards. Instead, the UK government legislated on Scotland’s behalf and often devolved the day-to-day responsibility for policy to Scottish ministers (‘executive devolution’). In many cases, the issues were innocuous and commanded cross-party support. Yet, there were also instances of political cowardice when the Scottish Executive seemed keen to remove issues from its agenda, reinforcing opposition party claims that the Scottish Parliament was marginalised from issues of IGR and that formal contact on Westminster legislation affecting Scotland should involve a relationship between legislatures as well as executives (Winetrobe, 2005; Page and Batey, 2002).

The overall lack of formality in IGR was also criticised by the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution (2002). Since most contact between ministers and parties was by email, telephone or ‘quick words when people meet socially’ it was not recorded in the same way as formal minuted meetings. The report suggests that such informality depends on the ‘fundamental goodwill of each administration toward the others’. However, if the importance of formal contacts, for example through the JMC, was not made clear from the start, this may store up problems when Scotland and the UK do not share the same party of government (or at least when those in key posts no longer know each other – Jack McConnell, Commission on Scottish Devolution, 2008b: 14).

Yet, such fears proved to be largely unfounded, in part because the Scottish Government frequently had as much to gain from the relationships fostered by the Scottish Executive. Although there have been more instances of high profile disagreements (see Cairney, 2009a: 21-3), there is a tendency for this charged atmosphere to give way to a more humdrum, day-to-day relationship as different actors (usually civil servants) work through the details. In this context, our research question regards the extent to which the SNP Government would accept the relationship in the same way as its predecessor. Again, we can draw parallels with group-government relations and the decision by interest groups to engage in insider or outsider strategies (Grant, 1995; Maloney et al, 1994). If we treat the SNP as a radical group, we may wonder if its leadership behaviour revolves, ‘around one central point: how many recruits will this bring into the organization?’ (Alinsky, 1971: 113; Grant Jordan, in correspondence). Ministers may be driven by the pay-offs associated with standing up for Scotland’s interests; engaging in, and publicising, disputes even if there is no hope of winning them. Indeed, this motivation may be stronger for parties than interest groups. Yet, as Mitchell (2008) argues, it is difficult to treat the SNP as radical. Instead, the ‘fundamentalists’ have been replaced by ‘pragmatists’ in the SNP hierarchy which is ‘more in search of respectability than revolution’ (2008: 248) and which has found it more effective to recruit members through the ‘presidentialization’ of its leader and professionalisation of the party’s operations (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 63).

The SNP has largely been willing to adopt an insider strategy which includes an acceptance of the ‘rules of the game’, or a willingness to engage in self-regulating activities (the value of which some of the party rank-and-file may not appreciate) in the short term, to allow it to benefit in the long-term. The best example may be the SNP’s attitude to negotiations with the UK over EU policy formulation. There has been a stronger rhetoric on Scotland’s independent role on the world stage (marking a shift, to some extent, from para- to proto-diplomacy - Keating, 2010: 162) and the desire of the Scottish Government to enjoy a higher status than before in relation to the UK, perhaps even taking the lead in UK/ EU negotiations in areas such as fishing (Cairney, 2011b). Yet, SNP ministers have also operated within UK structures, agreeing to uphold a principle that they criticised in opposition: ‘the devolved administrations are involved in the formulation of the United Kingdom line but on the basis that they may not disclose to anyone – including their own legislature or assembly – what disagreements they have had with the UK Government over the formulation of that line’ (Johnston, 2007; Cairney, 2009a). Overall, the SNP approach has been ‘pragmatic’, consisting of a greater propensity to make direct submissions to EU institutions (e.g. regarding the North Sea ‘supergrid’) but ‘not to disrupt the UK position’ and based on an understanding of the ‘reality of the pecking order where member states have the weight’ and devolved governments make a relatively small contribution to EU policymaking (interview, July 2009; Keating, 2010).

We can also see more pragmatism than posturing on domestic matters. The SNP has pursued strongly the formalisation of IGR through the JMC machinery and has also sought the cooperation of its counterparts in Wales and Northern Ireland to boost the status of devolved governments in relation to the UK Government. However, it has rarely pursued this agenda through anything other than diplomatic means. Overall, the SNP Government has ‘surprised many by not being overtly confrontational’ and by encouraging its civil service to be, ‘open, cooperative and helpful to their counterparts in the UK Government, rather than to maximise points of friction’ (Trench, 2007: 46; Trench, 2008b: 56). While there have been publicised short-term disagreements, these often give way to longer term negotiations behind the scenes. For example, the issue of Barnett consequentials for the London Olympics has parallels in Jordan and Maloney’s (1997) discussion of Brent Spar (which began as a Greenpeace protest and public denunciation of BP, followed by a lower profile negotiated settlement using the government machinery). What began as a public dispute soon changed into an issue processed behind the scenes. Similarly, the SNP’s criticism in opposition of Scottish Executive attempts to pilot an airgun licensing scheme in Scotland, as part of an overall UK strategy, was followed by its pursuit of the same idea when in government (Cairney, 2008b; McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 163). These examples supplement the more ad hoc links between executives during crises (such as the terrorist attack on Glasgow airport, the fuel crisis caused by strikes at the BP Grangemouth oil refinery, the foot-and-mouth outbreak and the spread of swine flu – Trench, 2007; Mitchell, 2010). Overall, ‘a surprising amount of the old informality and co-operation has re-emerged as ministers at both levels realise that they have problems in common and need each other’ (Keating, 2010: 146).

The SNP Government’s promotion of Sewel motions also suggests that the expediency and convenience of the process extends beyond governments with the same party (Mitchell, 2010; Crawford, 2007; Crawford, 2010). It approved proportionally fewer motions and has sought, when possible, to promote Scottish parliamentary measures instead. However, we have not witnessed the type of sea change we might have expected from a party which, in opposition, presented principled stances against the process (for a taste of the parliamentary debate on this issue, see Cairney, 2009a: 12).

One issue that seems to contradict the idea of party continuity is the diminished ability of the civil services to maintain close links since 2007. Yet, the links between civil servants in the early years of devolution have been exaggerated and they have weakened naturally over time as devolved governments deal increasingly with different issues. The need for mobility between Edinburgh and London was ‘a decisive argument in the decision to keep a unified civil service’ (Keating and Cairney, 2006: 53), but 70% of senior civil servants in Scotland have not enjoyed a spell working in a Whitehall department (2006: 55). Further, the idea of a Whitehall club in which civil servants in Scotland were consistently invited to policy meetings (Parry and Jones, 2000: 63), and developed personal networks, has been undermined over time by significant Whitehall ignorance of political differences in Scotland and a decreasing willingness among civil servants to trade-off time spent in the UK for time lost developing policy in Scotland. This is particularly the case in departments such as health and education where policy has diverged and policymakers in UK and Scotland face different problems. Evidence from the Scottish Government’s former Permanent Secretary John Elvidge suggests that the informal contacts between civil servants in Scotland and England had already diminished before the SNP took office. The SNP’s handling of a high profile disagreement on foot-and-mouth compensation in 2007 was said to have undermined the UK government’s willingness to engage informally through the civil service network – but this would be, ‘breaking quite a slender thread’ (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 131). In other words, the SNP era merely accelerated a natural reduction, but not abolition, of the formal and informal circulation of papers and ideas across the UK civil service network (Keating, 2010).

The Asymmetry of Power
The UK is asymmetrical in two senses - first because devolution was extended to a small share of the population, with Scotland (8.6%), Wales (4.9%) and Northern Ireland (2.9%) accounting for 16.4%; and, second, because the balance of power is tipped towards UK policy departments dealing predominantly with the English population and, in particular, the Treasury which is both a player and the referee in negotiations with devolved governments. As Keating (2005: 120) suggests, the UK ‘centre’ is faced with small devolved governments which do not match the powers of federated or devolved authorities in countries such as Germany, Spain, Belgium or Canada. Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are not part of a collection of powerful regions and the UK does not have a ‘supreme constitution’ guaranteeing a level of autonomy for devolved governments (Watts, 2007). This imbalance of power was summed up by the early role of the Secretary of State for Scotland as the UK Government’s representative in Scotland. Under its first Secretary John Reid, the Scotland Office was prepared to intervene in Scottish politics in a way viewed by the Scottish Executive as interference (Leicester, 2000: 27; McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 159), while under its second, Helen Liddell, there was still a perception that it was a legitimate Scottish Secretary role to manage, if not the policy process, then at least the internal affairs of the Scottish Cabinet (Mitchell et al, 2001: 56).

While the visibility of the Scottish Secretary receded from 2002, this was at the prerogative of the UK Government. Indeed, it reinstated the full-time role in 2007, in part reflecting the need for more mediation between different parties but also the desire for Labour to regain political ground in Scotland. Although Jim Murphy was initially at pains to stress his role as ‘Scotland's man in the cabinet rather than the cabinet's man in Scotland’ (Trench, January 2009a: 71), it is difficult to ignore the party-political overtones of statements about the ‘arc of insolvency’ (in relation to Alex Salmond’s previous discussion of certain independent countries as the ‘arc of prosperity’) and the apparent strategy of refusing First and Prime Ministerial meetings to ‘equate Salmond on a par with Murphy and therefore less important than Brown’ (Cairney, 2011b). Murphy’s involvement has also produced, from the perspective of some members of the Scottish Government, a ‘less smooth, less direct’ relationship, or a ‘wedge’ between previously direct Scottish and UK Government departmental relationships as more issues are funnelled through a third party (interview, July 2009). Certainly, relations seemed smoother when the Scottish Government previously dealt with David Cairns (Minister of State) when the Scottish Secretary was still a part-time role (Mitchell, 2010).

The asymmetry of power has three main effects. First, the devolved governments do not have a mechanism with which to oblige the UK government to consult and there has been a tendency for UK ministers to disengage from the formal IGR process. The lack of JMC meetings during a Labour-led Government was: ‘a clear indicator that devolution is no longer a prime concern of the Prime Minister and other politicians’ (Trench, 2004: 515–6). The UK Government was also slow to agree to the SNP’s call for the reinstatement of regular JMC meetings - the JMC plenary met only twice from 2007-10, while the JMC (Domestic) met once (Trench, 2008a; 2009a).

Second, civil servants in Whitehall often forget about Scotland and neglect to consult, then make statements on UK policy without a Scottish qualification or opt-out – a problem which grew over time as devolution faded from view in London (Keating, 2005: 125; Keating, 2010; McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 167; Cairney 2011b). In other words, devolved governments may generally pursue an insider strategy, but are often treated effectively as outsiders. These issues were discussed briefly in the public domain following a leaked report from the Scottish Executive’s EU office (Aron, 2006; SNP, 2006). The main finding is that the best way for the Scottish Executive to influence Europe is through Whitehall (particularly since the UK government discouraged the Scottish Executive’s direct EU involvement - Cairney, 2011b), but its success depends on a disproportionate amount of coordinated work by Scottish officials. In some cases, Whitehall departments have deliberately excluded their Scottish counterparts from the process, while in most cases the problem is that the Executive is not consulted at a stage early enough to influence the direction of policy. The overall success of IGR also varies strongly by policy area (and, in some cases, personalities) with, for example, a long tradition of cooperation in agriculture contrasting with areas such as economic development in which UK Government/ Scottish Office contact was minimal (interview, Scotland Office, 2009).

Third, Scottish actors are reluctant to challenge the authority of the UK. For example, Page and Batey (2002: 513; Page, 2002) suggest that the UK government drove the agenda for policy coordination. Most Sewel motions came from UK departments after the legislative slot had been secured, with Scottish ministers ‘effectively forced to agree to Westminster legislation in the devolved areas’ given the uncertainty over devolved government powers and the prospect of the UK government referring the issue to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Further, in high profile issues of disputes – such as free personal care for older people and Hepatitis C compensation - the Scottish Executive was reluctant to ‘rock the boat’ and instead accepted UK ‘victories’ to maintain its good relationship with Whitehall (Trench, 2004; although a focus on a very small number of disputes exaggerates their overall importance). The SNP is also, to some extent, stoical about its status as one of many UK Government departments (interview, July 2009). In particular, it recognises the limits to its negotiating power with a Treasury department that exerts considerable power across the UK Government as a whole. Overall, the SNP finds itself in a difficult position. One of its main aims has been to present an image of governing competence (to further its agenda on independence), in part by demonstrating that it can use its existing powers effectively. This is not consistent with a strategy of continuously venting its frustration with the power of the UK Government.

Inter-Party Relations
The third aspect of informal IGR results from minority government: many potential intergovernmental issues are played out within Scotland without necessarily reaching a decision-making point at the UK level. For example, the SNP Government may have relished a debate with the UK government over its plans for a local income tax to replace the council tax (it would have triggered a loss of UK social security benefits to Scottish residents; the UK government was not sympathetic on this or previous occasions). However, it did not have enough opposition party support to pass the legislation. Parliamentary opposition, along with the uncertainty over funding (particularly since the Scottish Government was preparing for an overall reduction of its budget), was cited by Finance Secretary John Swinney as the reason to withdraw the policy (Scott, 2009: 75). Similarly, although the Scottish Government was highly critical of its budget settlement in 2007, much of this debate was played out in the Scottish Parliament as Scottish ministers attempted to deflect opposition criticism and justify the incomplete delivery of manifesto commitments.

Perhaps most importantly, IGR has been rather muted because the fundamental bone of contention between the SNP and UK governments – constitutional change – has not come to a head. Instead, the SNP initiated a ‘national conversation’ with the Scottish population, in part as a means to keep the issue on the public agenda but also put off a decision until the SNP’s preferred 2010 referendum. Again, most debates about the referendum process itself were played out in the Scottish Parliament, with the SNP needing the support of at least two other parties to pass a referendum bill. This did not happen. Indeed, the opposition parties (Scottish Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat) appeared eager to reject the bill before the UK general election 2010, prompting the SNP to publish a draft bill for public consultation rather than parliamentary consideration (Gunn, 2010). Instead, the more likely constitutional change will come from the recommendations of the Commission on Scottish Devolution led by Professor Kenneth Calman. These include plans to: reduce UK income tax by 10 pence in the pound to oblige the Scottish Parliament to make a decision on how much tax should be raised; devolve Stamp Duty, the Aggregates Levy, Landfill Tax and the Air Passenger Duty; devolve responsibility for Scottish Parliament elections, airgun regulation, drink-driving limits, national speed limits, animal health funding, marine nature conservation, the Deprived Areas fund, discretionary elements of the reformed Social Fund and the prescribing of controlled drugs (e.g. heroin) to treat addiction; and formalise and extend the process of IGR. Yet, there was a certain irony in the fact that the party which has arguably been most in favour of implementing Calman’s recommendations quickly has been the SNP. Notably, while Labour and the Conservatives welcomed the report’s recommendations in principle, there has been no serious commitment to take them forward quickly. The Labour Government produced a White Paper (Cm 7738, 2009) based on Calman’s proposals, but this came too close to the 2010 general election to take forward (and it rejected a motion passed in the Scottish Parliament calling for the early transfer of some powers – see Trench, 2010a).

The lack of Scottish Government ability to innovate with legislation has the potential to cause an imbalance of conflict towards instances in which the Scottish Government can obstruct UK policies. The main example has been nuclear power. While the issue of energy is a reserved matter, the Scottish Government has final responsibility for planning decisions and has signalled a willingness to refuse planning permission for any new nuclear power plant. Yet, the boundaries between devolved and reserved in this area have always been unclear and the Scottish Government’s power has never been fully established. The line by the previous Scottish Executive was that it could make decisions on nuclear power under the executive devolution granted by the UK government (Cairney, 2006: 441) and that planning powers to secure energy supplies were reserved (Summers, 2002). More importantly, a Scottish-UK dispute has rarely seemed likely. Tony Blair assured Alex Salmond in 2002 that the final decision rested with the Scottish Parliament (Summers, 2002), while an acceptance of the Scottish veto was also contained in its energy White Paper in 2008 (Trench, 2008b; even though UK ministers criticised the SNP stance).

The SNP and Local Government
Perhaps surprisingly, the SNP’s biggest effect has been in its relations with local government, but this represents a further move towards cordial relations. Again, this followed a combination of pragmatism and principle. Pragmatic benefits ranged from the need to present an image of governing competence (by fostering consensus and avoiding unnecessary disputes where possible) and the desire to establish policy distance between it and Labour, to the specific need to ensure local authority cooperation for its plan to freeze council taxes until it introduced a local income tax (perhaps with the added benefit of a sense of detachment from unpopular council decisions during cutbacks). Therefore, Finance Secretary John Swinney was quick to embark on a tour of councils and Alex Salmond signalled a ‘culture change in the relationship between central and local government in Scotland. The days of top-down diktats are over’ (Cairney, 2011b). The Scottish Government then oversaw a series of measures to give to local authorities what they most wanted, or at least had been stripped of in previous decades. This includes, most importantly, a new concordat between the Scottish Government and COSLA which not only refers to ‘mutual respect and partnership’ but also (unlike previous agreements) reinforces the message with a series of tangible commitments: to not consider reforming local government structures; to introduce broader and longer term single outcome agreements (signalling a strong move away from centrally driven targets); to reduce ring-fenced funding; to allow local authorities to keep their efficiency savings; and, in effect, to stop ‘micromanaging’ local government. These measures are consistent with its agenda on decentralisation, which also extends to moves towards direct elections to health boards (to make boards accountable to local populations as well as central government, through targets), and its growing adaptation to minority government in which it is obliged to seek rather than impose agreement (interview, Scottish Government July 2009).

Conclusion
The UK intergovernmental style is informal. This was particularly the case when the Scottish and UK governments effectively shared a party of government: formal mechanisms to discuss and resolve intergovernmental issues were rare. Instead, the executives worked through their civil services and shared Labour party and ministerial contacts, and relied on measures, such as the Barnett formula and Sewel motions, to make the process of IGR semi-automatic. The formation of an SNP government had an effect on this intergovernmental relationship. There have been more public disputes, the Scottish Government has pursued measures to formalise IGR, and the reduction in relatively close personal relationships may have necessitated a higher degree of formality between ministers. The SNP has also been less receptive to the Sewel process and has been content to consider funding alternatives to Barnett when in government.

Yet, the overall effect has largely been piecemeal, with high profile SNP calls for the reinstatement of JMC meetings having, at best, an uncertain effect. Whitehall departments have also shown a continuing ability to forget to consult the Scottish Government (Trench, 2008b: 56). Informal and ad hoc relationships between ministers and civil servants in each executive are still the norm. These relationships endure for three main reasons: the logic of informality or mutual gain, in which the UK government has minimal incentive or ability to consistently impose policy from the top and the SNP Government often has as much to gain from pursuing an insider strategy; the asymmetry of power, which often allows the UK government to neglect the relationship and dissuades Scottish executives from pursuing issues in public; and, inter-party relations, in which most policy and constitutional issues which could have caused intergovernmental conflict were instead processed by parties in the Scottish Parliament.

A strong confirmation of continued IGR informality comes from the Calman commission’s recommendations on formality. First, it argues that the Joint Ministerial Committee (supplemented by a JMC Domestic and JMC Finance) should become a body to foster close working and cooperation relationships (perhaps like the JMC Europe) rather than just dispute resolution. Second there should be more training for UK civil servants to improve their knowledge of devolution and that the civil service code should be amended to ensure cooperation and mutual respect. Third, the Sewel process must be used better to foster meaningful links between Parliaments (and there should be a Westminster equivalent to the Sewel motion). Yet, it is unclear how much demand there is within government for such reforms. Further, even if formal intergovernmental mechanisms become more of a regular feature, we may still find that policymakers are reluctant to engage and, instead, find other arenas in which to resolve issues (a feature that has strong parallels with group-government relations where formal consultations are supplemented by pre-consultation).

A more likely source for IGR reform was the formation of a Conservative-led coalition government in the UK (perhaps combined with the fallout from the economic crisis in 2010). The policy communities literature has long demonstrated that the need to appear legitimate in the eyes of those they govern is a strong driver for unelected decision makers to consult widely (hence part of the reason that civil servants consult so much with pressure participants). This is an issue that the Conservative party effectively faces in Scotland because in 2010 it returned only one MP. The result was qualified to some extent by the Conservative coalition with the Liberal Democrats, a party with a respectable number of Scotland MPs (11, compared to Labour’s 41 and the SNP’s 6) and providing the likely recruitment ground for all Scottish Secretaries. The Conservative position was also helped by the status of the Scottish Conservatives in the Scottish Parliament – not only as the holder of 17 seats (13%) but also as a party with often-similar views to the SNP and the key player in the SNP’s successful attempt to maintain a minority government for a full 4-year session (the Conservatives and SNP voted together on parliamentary motions 72% of the time – MacGregor, 2010). Yet, there was still a sense (at least until the prospect of a referendum diminished) that the SNP Government could use any dispute with the UK government as a way to remind Scottish voters of the legacy of Thatcherism (associated, particularly in Scotland, with a top-down, impositional style of policymaking) and increase support for independence.

However, the Conservative’s most significant response was not the formalisation of IGR. The UK and devolved governments produced a revised Protocol For Avoidance And Resolution Of Disputes (Cabinet Office, 2010) - a logical progression from the Memorandum of Understanding that was produced in 2001 and rarely referred to by executives (Trench, 2010b). Further, the JMC plenary met less than a month after the 2010 election, was chaired by David Cameron, and produced a schedule of further meetings (Scottish Government, 2010). Yet, the most intriguing development has been the promotion by the UK government of the rather vague idea, promoted by David Cameron (2009) during the general election campaign, that it would govern the Scots with respect. Of course, this idea is subject to interpretation and a similar process of informality and neglect may develop.

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endnotes

See Cairney (2009a) for further details on the standings and structures of Scottish parties.
The JMC ‘plenary’ did not meet from 2003-7. The JMC (Europe) met much more frequently.
Although Salmond had less criticism for Brown, the pair did not meet regularly. See H. MacDonell 6.2.08 ‘Crisis – but First Minister and Brown haven't met for a year’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/scotland/Crisis--but-First-Minister.4954040.jp
7 or 8 per year compared to 10 per year under the former Executive (although it has passed more in proportion to its own legislation than the Executive).
This narrative is disputed by the Scotland Office (interview, July 2009). There is disagreement about the extent to which the Scotland Office helped or hindered a deal with the Ministry of Justice over the Somerville case (see Trench 2009b: 86) and the issue of Forth bridge funding.
The Scottish Office was the pre-devolution UK government department in Scotland which was effectively inherited by the Scottish Executive. The Scotland Office is the much smaller office now acting as a conduit between the UK and Scottish Governments.
For example, while one of the first measures of ‘respect’ was to welcome devolved ministers to European council meetings, this was followed quickly by SNP complaints that it was not consulted on measures to reduce public spending – such as the UK government’s bonfire of the quangos (Edwards, 2010) and its brief flirtation with the abolition of milk at school (although the latter would not have obliged the Scottish Government to follow suit).

Coalition and Minority Government in Scotland: Lessons for the UK?

2010-10-18T08:21:00.000-07:00

Here is a copy of a paper I will present in Sussex on Friday, written in the Political Quarterly style. If you want to see where the endnotes appear, I can email you a Word version.

The Coalition Government in the UK in Comparative Perspective, Sussex European Institute October 2010
Paul Cairney, University of Aberdeen paul.cairney@abdn.ac.uk
Coalition and Minority Government in Scotland: Lessons for the UK?

Abstract
The UK general election result in 2010 produced a hung or balanced parliament for the first time in over three decades. Since the UK has limited post-war experience of this outcome it is natural that commentators have begun to look elsewhere for lessons on the practicalities of minority and coalition government. This paper considers the lessons we can learn from the Scottish parliamentary experience since 1999. It outlines two main points of comparison: strength and stability. We might assume that coalition provides more of both than minority government. Indeed, it is rare for UK or devolved governments in the UK to operate as minorities through choice. Yet, the Scottish experience shows that the differences between coalition and minority government are not completely straightforward. Much depends on the institutional context and, in many cases, idiosyncratic elements of particular systems. Consequently, we can identify a trade-off in comparative analysis: as our identification of elements specific to one system increases, our ability to draw clear meaningful lessons decreases.

The UK general election of 2010 has produced its first hung parliament since 1974 and commentators have begun to look elsewhere for lessons on the practicalities of minority and coalition government. The search for lessons may be specific and focused on elements most relevant to the UK’s ‘majoritarian’ history. Two features of the Westminster system stand out. First, it usually produces a ‘strong’ government: it is able to make decisions and initiate policy change quickly, without significant opposition. The ‘Westminster model’ suggests that power resides within the centre: the electoral system produces exaggerated majorities, allowing the single party in government to dominate Parliament; the government is run by ministers that direct civil servants in departments and by the Prime Minister who controls the appointment of ministers. While this image of UK government is now treated as a caricature, and the literature on governance uses it as a way to describe what doesn’t happen, the idea of strong centralised government is still powerful and lessons may be sought to ensure a set-up that is as close to the Westminster ideal as possible. Second, it produces relative stability. In parliamentary democracies, the average tenure of a single party majority is 30 months, compared to 17-18 months for coalitions and 13-14 months for minority governments. These features were highlighted as the most important requirements for a UK government by both David Cameron and Gordon Brown in the aftermath of the election result.
This paper considers the lessons on strength and stability that we can learn from the Scottish parliamentary experience since 1999. We might assume that coalition provides more of both than minority government. Indeed, it is rare for UK or devolved governments in the UK to operate as minorities through choice (particularly given its chequered history). Yet, the Scottish experience shows that the differences between coalition and minority government are not completely straightforward. Strength may refer to the ability of a government to dominate Parliament and its legislative process, but may come at the expense of a single party’s ability to dominate ministerial office and the levers of government. Stability may arise from relative immunity to defeats and (in particular) votes of no confidence in Parliament but may be tempered by instability and tension within the machinery of government. Much depends on the institutional context and, in many cases, idiosyncratic elements of particular systems. In other words, we need to identify why particular governing structures produce strength and stability and if those results are likely to be replicated elsewhere. The Scottish Parliament shares many features with Westminster (despite its architects using ‘old Westminster’ as a source of negative lessons for Scotland’s ‘new politics’ ), but also displays key differences such as a more proportional electoral system. Consequently, we can identify a basic dilemma in comparative analysis and our efforts towards ‘lesson drawing’ : as our identification of elements specific to the Scottish system increases, the process of drawing meaningful lessons for Westminster becomes more complicated.

The strength and stability of coalition governments
One key difference between the Scottish Parliament and Westminster is that the former was designed to be relatively strong, in terms of possessing mechanisms to improve policy scrutiny and the ability of committees to set the policy agenda. It is certainly strong according to Strøm’s criteria. It has permanent and specialized committees with relatively small numbers of members (to foster a collective identity), a combined standing and select committee function (to foster policy expertise within them), a proportional (by party) number of convenors (chairs) selected by a committee, a committee role before the initial and final plenary stages of legislative scrutiny (to foster parliamentary deliberation), the ability of committees to initiate and redraft bills (although perhaps only as a last resort), and the power to invite witnesses, demand government documents and oversee pre-legislative consultation. Yet, the Scottish Parliament did not prove to be strong when compared to the Scottish Executive (renamed the ‘Scottish Government’ by the SNP in 2007). Rather, from 1999-2007, the Scottish Labour and Liberal Democrat coalition operated in much the same way as a single party majoritarian government in Westminster, passing an extensive programme of legislation with virtually no effective opposition.
From 1999-2007 the coalition provided government strength in terms of its relationship with the Scottish Parliament. Its command of parliamentary seats was sufficient in both sessions. In 1999 it controlled 56% of the 129 seats (Labour 56 seats and 43.4%, Liberal Democrat 16 (plus the Presiding Officer), 12.4%). In 2003 it controlled 52% (Labour 50, 39% and Liberal Democrat 17, 13%). The coalition enjoyed a majority in plenary and used it to secure a majority in all select committees. Its impressive party whip and the high degree of voting cohesion within the coalition also ensured stability. There was no equivalent in Scotland to the series of rebellions by Labour MPs in Westminster, partly because Labour MSPs were screened before their selection and because Labour ministers held meetings with Labour MSPs before committee meetings. There were also few instances of Liberal Democrat dissent (and none which threatened the coalition’s Partnership Agreement). The coalition gave Labour the sense of control that they feared would be lost if they formed a minority government and were forced to cooperate on a regular basis with other parties. Instead, the coalition produced successive partnership agreements that tied both parties to a detailed programme of legislation and towards supporting the Scottish Executive line (and collective cabinet responsibility) throughout. The effect of coalition dominance was dramatic. It controlled the voting process in both committees and plenary. The parties were able to dictate which of their members became convenors of committees and even which MSPs sat on particular committees. As a result, the independent role of committees was undermined as MSPs were subject to committee appointment and then whipped, while committee turnover was too high to allow a meaningful level of MSP subject expertise.
The Scottish Executive presided over a punishing legislative schedule, producing a sense in which committees became part of a ‘legislative sausage machine’ rather than powerful bodies able to set the agenda through the inquiry process. While there is some evidence of parliamentary influence during the scrutiny of government legislation, the Scottish Executive produced and amended the majority of bills and the government-versus-opposition atmosphere undermined any meaningful sense of power sharing between executive and legislature. The Scottish Parliament and its committees enjoyed neither the resources with which to scrutinise government policy effectively, set the agenda and initiate legislation, nor the independence from parties necessary to assert their new powers. Overall, the experience was heartening for a Scottish Labour party that prized above all else a ‘settled programme’ and feared the prospect of political embarrassment from political ambushes led by the SNP that they feared and loathed so much.
Identifying strength and stability within the coalition is a separate matter. The price that Labour paid for a settled legislative programme was systematic cooperation, and the need to compromise, with the Liberal Democrats. The process of compromise was made easier by the ideological closeness between the parties, but a number of issues demonstrate the unpredictability of outcomes. On the one hand, the overall experience shows that the Liberal Democrats, as the smaller party, were willing to live with major policy compromises to secure a small number of key aims. For example, although it favoured the abolition of higher education tuition fees, it accepted the abolition of up-front fees combined with a reduction in the graduate contribution or ‘endowment’ (£2000 for 4 years at University). It also accepted from 2003 a shift in direction of justice policy towards populism and an agenda on tackling anti-social behaviour, despite the fact that it had secured from 1999-2003 (during Deputy First Minister Jim Wallace’s term as Justice minister) a different approach and key differences with the UK on issues such as freedom of information. In part, it did so to secure its aim of PR in local government elections (note that Labour agreed to legislate to make this possible from 2007; in the UK the deal is merely to allow a referendum on AV, with Conservative MPs free to argue against it).
On the other hand, the example of free personal care for older people demonstrates the potential instability of coalition government. In this case, Scottish Labour decided initially to follow the UK Government by rejecting the Sutherland report’s recommendation of free care (not least because Labour ministers put pressure on them to do so). Yet, the Liberal Democrats favoured the policy and threatened to break ranks and join forces with the SNP and Conservatives to pursue the matter through legislation. The outcome was a Labour reversal, with Henry McLeish (First Minister) famously appearing on Newsnight Scotland to claim the decision for himself. The example demonstrates that coalition governments can survive such periods of instability, although it is difficult to know how far these matters can go before the coalition breaks down. In this case, Scottish Labour was sympathetic to Sutherland and backed down to ensure governing stability. In other cases, such as the future of nuclear power, the parties agreed to defer a decision beyond their period of government because they could not agree.
The wider process of cooperation involved systematic policy coordination, in which both parties were to be consulted routinely on major policy decisions and decisions made by ministers within individual departments, requiring extensive information sharing and permission-seeking between civil servants in all departments. At face value, this requirement may seem rather appealing. A major theme in UK policymaking is that, despite a commitment to sharing information, the government consists of a series of policy silos organised around departments. Each department has its own aims, constituencies and policy networks and joined up government has often remained elusive, despite attempts by the New Labour Government to pursue its ‘modernization’ agenda through cross-cutting targets coordinated from No.10 and then by the Treasury through public service agreements. Yet, the Scottish experience does not give a clear sense that a UK coalition government will improve policy coordination. In part, this is because Scottish negotiations took place in a different context (not only because the Executive is smaller, with fewer responsibilities). The legacy of the Scottish Office (the pre-devolution UK government department) arrangement, in which there were few ministers, is that ministerial responsibilities spanned multiple government departments. The greater potential for joined up government was already there. However, there was still evidence that policy silos existed (for example, higher education or agricultural networks were not altered significantly when combined with other issues in new departments), while the cross-departmental arrangements often produced evidence of confusion over which agencies or quangos were responsible to particular ministers. The classic example arose when the Scottish Qualifications Authority failed to produce reliable exam results and no-one knew exactly which minister to hold accountable. In other words, Scotland may be better at providing a cautionary tale: a coalition government’s increase in reporting and accountability arrangements may exacerbate the sense of diminished individual ministerial responsibility that we now find in the era of multi-level governance.
The Scottish experience can also provide lessons on the limits to collective cabinet responsibility. On the whole, the partnership agreement combined with a commitment to cooperate, ensured that few major issues of public disagreement arose (indeed, Labour party dissent and in-fighting was more worrying than disagreements between the parties). In theory, the convention is that when a decision has been reached by Cabinet, all members are obliged to defend it publicly. In practice there are always grey areas and the conventional limits take time to define. For example, the first major test in Scotland involved ministers addressing constituency matters on an issue (specific hospital closures) that had an indirect link to government policy (the centralisation of certain NHS services). A minister expressed opposition to the hospital reorganisation plans of a health board (approved by the Scottish Executive) but voted with the Scottish Executive in Parliament and remained in government; a Ministerial Parliamentary Aide voted against the Executive and resigned. Thus, the parliamentary vote appears to be the line in the sand. This conclusion was reinforced during similar debates such as the firefighter dispute in 2003. It is also supported by the outcome of debates on reserved issues such as Trident, the Iraq War and ‘dawn raids’ on failed asylum seekers. While ministers were relatively free to criticise UK government policy (since they were not bound to CCR as members of the UK cabinet), they were still expected to resign if they voted against the Executive in a Scottish Parliamentary motion. For example, Malcolm Chisholm remained a Labour minister after criticising directly, on TV, the UK Government policy on asylum, but resigned when voting with the SNP on a motion to oppose Trident bases in Scotland. In most cases, the convention was breached by Labour and not, as expected, Liberal Democrat MSPs. In some cases, we can perhaps relate it to the feeling among members of the largest party that their message is being diluted through coalition. The sense of exclusion caused by coalition may produce more tensions within a party than across them.

The strength and stability of minority governments
The Scottish experience of minority government from 2007 provides fewer direct lessons for the UK, but it highlights to some extent a trade-off between strength and stability in Parliament versus strength and stability in government. The SNP minority government commands only 47 seats (36%) and, whilst vulnerable to motions of no confidence (a simple majority is required to oblige the executive to resign), has not faced any. It has lasted well beyond the international average and should complete a full 4-year term. Its minority status has made it relatively ‘weak’ in terms of its relationship with the other parties in Parliament (in both plenary and committees) but there have been surprisingly few instances of real problems that threaten its governing status (particularly since there is still a strong government-versus-opposition tone in plenary and the opposition parties often suggest that SNP ministers are lying in Parliament).
The SNP has had to drop some legislation for which it does not have parliamentary support. Most significantly, it dropped its commitment to introduce a bill to produce a referendum on independence when the three other parties refused to support it. It also dropped its plans to pursue a local income tax to replace the council tax when it could not secure the support of the Liberal Democrats (there were also problems related to the loss of council tax benefits, amounting to £4-500m). However, it has had some high profile successes, including a bill to abolish the graduate endowment (and, less importantly, to abolish bridge tolls). Overall, it has produced a respectable number of bills (it will likely produce 40 in 4 years, compared to 50 and 53 in previous sessions) in the context of its commitment to reduce legislation (there was a widely held perception in the Scottish Parliament that there was too much from 1999-2007) and govern competently rather than seek innovation constantly. Its ability to pass so many bills reflects the fact that a large proportion of government business in Parliament is rather innocuous. There is little incentive for the opposition parties to oppose the principles of, for example, a bill reforming flooding policy. The SNP also inherited many bills from its predecessor government (on issues such as the need to prepare for the commonwealth games, reform the judiciary and courts, reform public health law, and revise the law on sexual offences).
The SNP loses many parliamentary motions, but most are non-binding motions that merely set the agenda for the Scottish Government. Indeed, following a motion in 2007 calling on the Scottish Government to fund the Edinburgh Airport Rail Link and tram project, Alex Salmond drew on comments made by former First Minister Donald Dewar to suggest that he was not bound by parliamentary motions (the trams were funded but EARL was not). SNP whips and business managers have since sought to avoid similar confrontations by negotiating the wording of motions with their counterparts in other parties and acting on many motions. It is more vulnerable to opposition party amendments to its legislation, but ‘wrecking’ amendments are subject to stricter rules than in Westminster amendments’ (amendments that threaten the spirit and tone of the bill are rejected by the Presiding Officer or committee convenors) and, in some cases, there is a limit to the overall cost of a bill’s provisions.
Overall, the approach taken by the other parties is that the SNP may often be doing the wrong thing but it has the right to try. A common or ideal image of minority politics suggests that parties take a positive attitude towards cooperation; they find reasons to pursue common policy ground. While parties will disagree on many issues overall, a minority government should be able to form a series of deals with different parties at different times. The Scottish Parliament may not live up to this consensus democracy ideal, but parties in the majoritarian mould do the next best thing: they work within the confines set by minority government, taking on the traditional Westminster role of parliamentary scrutiny and opposition without initiating much legislation or representing an alternative source of policy initiation, even in high profile cases with significant policy distance between the Scottish Government and Parliament. For example, while the three opposition parties were heavily critical of the Scottish Government’s decision to release the Lockerbie bomber on compassionate grounds, they did not seek to overturn the decision.
Some of the stability of minority government can also be traced to the informal coalition between the SNP and the Scottish Conservative party. The Conservatives have voted with the SNP on a staggering 72% of parliamentary motions since 2007 (compared to 94% agreement between Scottish Labour and Liberal Democrat from 2003-7). The effect of Conservative support has varied because it is not sufficient to command a parliamentary majority (the the Conservatives have 16 MSPs plus the Presiding Officer), but it represents an important source of support in exchange for policy concessions. The best indicator of its effect can be found in the annual budget bill process. In the first budget, the Conservatives secured a greater commitment to funding new police officers and revisit drugs policy. In the second, they secured a reduction in business rates. In the third, they secured an independent review panel on future budgets and an agreement to publish online items of government expenditure of £25,000 or above. In two of three years, Conservative support proved to be sufficient because Labour (46 seats) abstained in 2008 and the Liberal Democrats (16) abstained in 2010. Only in 2009 did both vote against the bill on the assumption that this would not lead to its failure (most expected the two Green MSPs (and Margo MacDonald) to vote with the SNP in exchange for increased funding for home insulation). This failure was followed very quickly by a new bill, passed in a few weeks, that was almost identical to the old.
The SNP’s relative lack of strength and stability within the Scottish Parliament contrasts to some extent with its position within government. Its period in office has been relatively straightforward. Its cabinet of six (compared to 12 in the coalition and over 20 in the UK) provides the potential for more meaningful cabinet decision making. There have been no major tensions in policy aims comparable to those faced by the Scottish and UK coalitions. Its single-party status reduces the need to coordinate policymaking to the nth degree. This lack of internal problems allows it to exploit the asymmetrical relationship between the Scottish Government and Parliament. While the SNP has had to reduce its major legislative commitments, it has found that it can pursue many agendas without recourse to Parliament. Numerous policy aims (on intergovernmental relations, the civil service, capital finance projects, public service targets, curriculum reform, prescription charges) can be pursued without using legislation, while others can be pursued using the legislation that exists (i.e. with secondary legislation and regulations much less subject to parliamentary scrutiny).
Further, most of the conditions associated with majority government still apply. Small committee size and MSP turnover still undermine the abilities of committees to scrutinize government policy and the huge gulf in resources remains. While the opposition parties, if united (and bearing in mind that the Conservatives have been supportive on over 70% of motions), may be able to oppose certain measures, they do not have the resources to scrutinise policy in great detail or provide meaningful alternatives. This situation is not altogether surprising because, despite the range of Scottish Parliament ‘powers’, it was not designed to be a policy initiating body. Rather, the institution represents an attempt to improve on the scrutiny powers of Westminster without marking a profound change in the executive-legislative relationship. Committees have the power to hold ministers and civil servants to account, to make sure they consult properly and to initiate legislation as a last resort if MSPs believe that government policy is inadequate. Yet, they are also instructed by the Consultative Steering Group (the group set up to produce the Scottish Parliament’s standing orders) to let the government govern, encouraged to play a minimal pre-legislative role and, in the case of the budget, not equipped to develop alternative legislation. The Scottish Parliament even lacks Westminster’s equivalent of a ‘scrutiny reserve’ for EU issues.
The Scottish experience has given the parties a new impression of minority government that may influence party strategies in 2011. For the two large parties, Labour and SNP, minority government represents an attractive option. Minority government may allow a party to make up for its weakness in plenary with its strength in staffing resources and a reduced need to make compromises within government. Further, unlike in coalition, defeats on parliamentary motions can be brushed off with relative ease. However, it is difficult to identify enough policy influence for opposition parties to give them an incentive to eschew public office when it is available. This is not really an issue for the Conservatives who are not likely to be offered the chance to form a government and will therefore benefit more from minority government (note that there is no equivalent in the UK to the Scottish Conservative position). However, the lack of policy influence enjoyed by the Liberal Democrats since 2007, compared to its coalition experience, seems to diminish the probability that it will accept minority government in the future. If the Liberal Democrats in the UK (the only powerful smaller party) take notice of the Scottish experience, we may expect coalition government to be much more likely than minority.
There are several additional reasons to expect more coalitions in the UK than Scotland. First, UK policy responsibilities are more significant and the stakes are higher. In Scotland there are fewer fundamental issues to polarise party opinion and produce damaging defeats. The Scottish Parliament is not responsible for the big economic decisions on fiscal and monetary policy or taxation and redistribution. Further, there is no Scottish equivalent to the agenda on welfare reform that is likely to divide the parties, or many other potential hot button topics that could produce significant conflict, such as defence policy and the future of Trident. Second, the effect of a perception of instability is more marked at the UK level. For example, there is no equivalent in Scotland to the idea that governing uncertainty ‘spooks the markets’. Third, the UK has a second chamber and the lack of a majority in Westminster may affect its relationship with the House of Lords (the extreme example would be a reduced ability to threaten to use the Parliament Act). In each case, the larger party may be as likely to seek coalition as the smaller. Fourth, the UK cannot draw on a developing culture of cooperation. In Scotland, PR elections produce an expectation that parties will always have to cooperate to some degree. In the UK, we have no such clear expectations, even if we expect modern voting patterns to produce more hung parliaments than in the past.
Yet, such differences may be exaggerated. For example, under a plurality system the opposition parties have the chance to force an extraordinary election to further their positions following a short period of unsuccessful of government. However, no party wants to be blamed for an extra election, particularly during a time of economic crisis. Further, minority government is by no means limited to situations like Scotland’s where the stakes are relatively low. Rather, according to Strom, it can be found in one-third of all parliamentary democracies.
Conclusion: Lessons for the UK
There are three main lessons to arise from this discussion. First, coalition government secures government strength in Parliament but may make the task of government more complicated. The Scottish Executive coalition operated effectively as a single party majoritarian government in the Westminster mould. It dominated plenary and select committees, allowing it to pursue a wide variety of policy aims through legislation. However, the need for compromise and systematic cooperation provides the potential for weaker governing arrangements. The process of coordination among parties can become rather convoluted, while the increase in reporting or accountability arrangements (to both ministers and parties) may exacerbate the diminished sense of accountability in one individual that we now encounter in an era of ‘governance’. A majoritarian government is able to make decisions and initiate policy change quickly, without significant opposition. A coalition or minority government may have to settle for one and not the other.
Second, coalition arrangements may produce stability in Parliament but exacerbate tensions within parties. In Scotland, the coalition majority, combined with a strong party whip, ensured a ‘settled programme’; the Executive passed virtually all of its legislation without any significant opposition or radical amendment and it suffered only a handful of defeats on non-binding motions over eight years. At the same time, the need to produce a formal compromise produces occasional dissatisfaction, particularly among members of the larger party faced with a new obstacle to policy influence. Given the slimness of the Conservative/ Liberal Democrat majority in Westminster, it will not take much of a rebellion to threaten the coalition’s position.
Third, the Scottish experience suggests that minority government presents a realistic alternative to coalition, particularly when a party in opposition is willing to provide consistent parliamentary support in exchange for policy concessions. However, the UK context may be more complicated. The UK has no equivalent to the Scottish Conservatives: content to make deals in opposition because it has a minimal chance of being part of government (and because it may help the party’s profile in Scotland). Instead, it has a single kingmaker in the shape of the Liberal Democrats, which might analyse the Scottish experience and find no incentive to remain in opposition. The stakes are also higher in the UK, producing in parties a desire to seek stability in coalitions (particularly since they have no history of cooperation to draw upon).
However, whether or not any lessons will be learned is another matter. The general picture of lesson drawing in the UK is that the UK government prefers to learn policy lessons either from the US or from countries such as France or Germany that are of a similar size and face comparable problems. It tends not to learn from the devolved territories. Yet, there are still shared concerns that point to the potential for shared ideas. In particular, no party in the UK or devolved governments seem prepared for government formation. Perhaps the association of a hung parliament with instability will change if the rules of government formation change or, more accurately, if the UK introduces some rules.

(endnotes)
Bache, I. and Flinders, M. ‘Multi-level Governance and the Study of the British State’, Public Policy and Administration, 2004, 19, 1, 31-51
Muller, W. and Strøm, K. eds. Coalition Governments in Western Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p.1
McGarvey, N. and Cairney, P. Scottish Politics, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2008
Rose, R. Learning from Comparative Public Policy: A Guide to Lesson-Drawing, London: Routledge, 2006
Strøm, K. Minority Government and Majority Rule, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990
Cairney, P. ‘Coalition and Minority Government in Scotland’, paper to Political Studies Association annual conference, Edinburgh, April 2010
Keating, M. The Government of Scotland 2nd ed., Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010.
Cairney, P. The Scottish Political System Since Devolution, Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2011.
MacGregor, S. ‘Voting Behaviour in the Scottish Parliament’, Paper for the Elections, Public Opinion and Parties Annual Conference, Essex, September 2010
Cairney, P., Keating, M. and Hepburn, E. ‘Policy Convergence, Transfer and Learning in the UK under Devolution’, ESRC Seminar on Policy Learning and Policy Transfer in Multilevel Systems, Edinburgh, January 2010

Global Nations? Paper on Coalition and Minority Government in Scotland

2009-10-29T10:00:00.000-07:00

Paper to Global Nations? Irish and Scottish Expansion since the 16th Century, University of Aberdeen, October 2009

Paul Cairney, University of Aberdeen paul.cairney@abdn.ac.uk

Coalition and Minority Government in Scotland

Abstract
While there is a long tradition of minority government in Ireland it is a rather alien concept in the post-war UK. Further, although Wales flirted with the idea in 1999 and 2005, the formation of an SNP government in 2007 provides the first full test of the effect of a prolonged period of minority government since devolution. This paper explores the difference that minority government makes when compared to coalition government. It suggests that the first eight years of devolution were marked by a form of majoritarian coalition government that would not seem out of place in the UK. This, combined with the inheritance of a partisan, government-versus-opposition, culture from Westminster suggests that ‘new Scottish Politics’ did not depart from ‘Old Westminster’ in the way that many expected. Therefore, the advent of minority government was accompanied by renewed calls for new politics in the spirit originally envisaged, and by renewed interest in comparisons with countries displaying a longer tradition of minority government. The early evidence suggests that the SNP was initially reluctant to enter minority government and has often disengaged from the Scottish Parliament. Most opposition parties have also failed to come to terms with their new role. Therefore, the Parliament is still not a policy-making body. Yet, the set-up has proved surprisingly stable and minority government has the potential to become the norm in Scottish politics, allowing parties to adapt to their new roles in the future.

New Party, New Politics?
The formation of a minority SNP government in 2007 produced the potential for a radically different form of politics in Scotland. Yet, this statement may seem ironic to the ‘architects of devolution’ because ‘new politics’ was supposed to begin in 1999! The use of (mixed member) proportional representation for Scottish Parliament elections suggests that no party will gain overall control. Yet, devolution initially produced the closest thing to majoritarian government: two four-year parliamentary sessions of coalition government formed by the largest party, Scottish Labour, and its junior partner, the Scottish Liberal Democrats. In 1999, Labour won 56 seats and the Liberal Democrats 17, producing a majority - 73 (57%) of 129 seats (minus one seat held by Liberal Democrat Presiding Officer David Steel). This was followed in 2003 by a reduced but still significant majority - 67 (52%) seats produced by Labour’s 50 and the Liberal Democrats’ 17 (the Presiding Officer role was taken on by the SNP’s George Reid). Crucially, the Scottish Executive coalition also commanded a majority in every Scottish Parliament committee. This control of the parliamentary arithmetic, combined with a strong and successful party whip (particularly within Labour), produced a form of majoritarian government that would not seem out of place in the UK.

In 2007 the potential for coalition was not as straightforward. The SNP won 47 seats (from 27 in 2003 and 35 in 1999) compared to Labour’s 46 but, given the nature of the overall result (the Conservatives won 17, Liberal Democrats 16, Green 2 and Margo MacDonald 1) it could not form a majority coalition with one other party. Although there was some scope for cooperation between the SNP and the Greens (based on the same attitude to Scottish independence and an SNP commitment to certain environmental issues), its potential links to the other parties were problematic. Formal coalition between the SNP and Liberal Democrats proved impossible when the latter insisted that the former drop its plans for an independence referendum as a condition of coalition. Further, a formal coalition with the Conservatives would be politically damaging for the SNP in the short term (the Conservatives are still tainted by 18 years of unpopular government in Scotland from 1979-97; the SNP is to a large extent a left-wing social democratic party) and the long term (if the Conservatives win the UK general election in 2010, the SNP may campaign for independence by highlighting the re-emergence of a ‘democratic deficit’ in Scotland and minimal support for a Conservative government ruling Scotland).

Therefore, the key point to note is that the SNP was initially reluctant, but effectively obliged, to go it alone and form a single party minority. This suggests that the renewed rhetoric on the scope for ‘new politics’ that minority government affords was only spoken loudly after the options for coalition had been exhausted and rejected. The SNP subsequently made a ‘virtue out of necessity’ (Mitchell, 2008: 79) but was uncertain about its ability to make legislative progress (or at least present an image of governing competence – Paun, 2009) and was not confident about its ability, or the ability of any minority government, to stay in office for the four-year period. This reflects two main factors.

First, despite Strøm’s (1990) best efforts, it supports a strong ‘conventional view’ of minority government that ‘associates it with instability, inefficiency, incoherence and a lack of accountability’ (Mitchell, 2008: 73; in Scotland there is also the occasional charge, regarding the SNP’s independence agenda, that minority government is unrepresentative – McIver and Gay, 2008). This is particularly true in the UK with very limited, unhappy experience of minority Westminster government in the mid and late 1970s. For Mitchell (2008: 74) this suggests that the perception is ‘historically bounded’ because minority government coincided with a traumatic period of Labour rule. There are also two more recent experience of minority government in Wales. First, it followed the first Welsh Assembly election that gave Labour 28 of 60 seats and prompted it to try minority government from May 1999. However, the process was problematic (and helped produce a vote of no-confidence in leader Alun Michael in February 2000 – Osmond, 2000: 3), in part because the institutions were new and the clarity of roles between executive and legislature were relatively unclear in the NAW. When the ‘approach failed .. a formal coalition was negotiated with the Liberal Democrats in October 2000’ (Seyd, 2002: 124). Minority government was avoided until 2005 when the withdrawal of Labour’s Peter Law - for both health (Law was diagnosed with brain tumour) and political reasons (Law objected to all-women shortlists) – reduced Labour’s number from 30 to 29 AMs (Seaton and Osmond, 2005: 8-9). This experience also accentuated the negative picture of minority government, producing a willingness of the opposition parties to ‘cooperate in wounding Labour’ by delaying the Assembly budget for months (Wyn Jones and Scully, 2006) and overturning Welsh Assembly Government policy on tuition fees (Cairney, 2009a) rather than to cooperate in a positive way to achieve concessions.

The picture of instability caused by inevitable partisanship continued following the election results in 2007 and a process of ‘disarray’ (Mulholland, 2007) before Labour chose to form a historic coalition majority with Plaid Cymru rather than go it alone (although it was sold in many quarters as a bold move to provide further policy distance from New Labour in London). The common factor in these cases is that the main parties associate minority government with turmoil and have striven to avoid the possibility ever since. It is rare for governments in the UK and devolved territories to go down this route through choice.

Second, there is a strong, longstanding culture or set of assumptions held by most parties in Scotland in favour of the value that a majority provides. Minority equates with instability not opportunity; potential opposition and disarray, not opportunities for new politics. Although the ideas associated with a new style of politics and policymaking (that would arguably make minority government desirable as well as possible) were in good currency before devolution, they were rejected in 1999 by a Labour party more likely to favour stability as a basis for its legislative programme, and accepted very reluctantly by a Scottish National Party with little room for manoeuvre. In this light, the two years of minority government have been marked not only by calls (eventually) for the return of new politics, but also by the remarkable turnaround of the image of minority government in Scotland with or without the new politics in evidence (for a so-called ‘insider view’ on this development, see Harvie, 2008).

New Politics Revisited
‘New politics’ became a ‘rallying call for the architects of devolution’ and, as such, a lens through which most evaluations of Scottish political success have been measured ever since (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 14). It was promoted for two main reasons. First, it became linked to the unsuccessful referendum on Scottish devolution in 1979 followed by a long spell of Conservative government which increased attention to the ‘democratic deficit’ (in which Scotland voted for one party of government, Labour, but received another). The new campaign for devolution took shape following the set-up of the Scottish Constitutional Convention (SCC) - a collection of political parties (primarily Labour, Liberal Democrat and Green), the Scottish Trade Union Congress, Scottish Council for Voluntary Organizations, religious leaders, local authorities and civic organizations - in 1989 (2008: 34). The SCC sought to reinvigorate elite, media and popular support for devolution by addressing the concerns associated with previous devolution proposals and articulating a new vision of Scottish politics based on narratives of its past. This rhetoric became inextricably linked to dissatisfaction with the democratic deficit and a feeling that devolution could have saved Scotland from the worst excesses of Thatcherism (McCrone and Lewis, 1999: 17). Indeed, the SCC vision was developed at the same time that many of its participants were acting as the unelected opposition to Conservative government rule. Thus, the remote, top-down and unitary UK state was contrasted with a vision of consensus for Scotland based on a narrative of Scotland’s political tradition and longstanding propensity for the diffusion of power, combined with popular and civic participation in politics (Cairney, Halpin and Jordan, 2009). The SCC (1990; 1995) articulated hopes for: ‘participatory democracy in which the Scottish population would seek to influence decisions made in Scotland directly rather than through a ballot box which seemed so remote; pluralist democracy, in which interest and social groups would seek to counter policies ‘unsuitable’ for Scotland at all levels of implementation; and deliberative democracy, in which a separate level of debate about the direction of UK policies implemented in Scotland could take place’ (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 244).

Second, it followed a perceived crisis of popular disenchantment with politics, producing the potential for a Scottish Parliament to be seen as yet-another layer of bureaucracy or source of yet-another pool of self-serving politicians with no meaningful link to, or care for, their populations. In both cases, the devolution agenda embodied hopes for a new style of politics far removed from ‘Old Westminster’ as the main source of discredited policymaking. While some attention was paid by the architects of devolution to the ‘consensus democracies’ (and Nordic politics in general), most was devoted to making sure that old politics was left behind.

New politics was therefore based on a range of perceived defects of the UK system, including, primarily, an electoral system that exaggerates government majorities, excludes small parties, concentrates power within government rather than Parliament and its committees, contributes to parliamentary ‘overload’ and encourages adversarialism between government and opposition (2008: 12-3). This concentration of power and ‘winner takes all’ attitude may also extend to the government’s top-down relationship with interest groups (more likely to compete rather than cooperate with each other) and its remoteness from the population that it is supposed to represent (at least according to the new politics rhetoric; see also Lijphart, 1999 and Cairney, 2008a). Thus, new politics referred in part to the selection of a proportional electoral system and all that this produces, including the strong likelihood of coalition, the need for parties to bargain and cooperate and, hopefully, a consequent reduction in partisanship and rise in consensual forms of politics.

To foster a sense of ‘power sharing’ between government, parliament and the public, the parliament was not only set up as a hub for popular participation (including a new public petitions process) but also vested with an unusual range of powers (when compared to other West European legislatures). In particular, while the Consultative Steering Group (a cross-party group with members drawn from the SCC, established by the UK Labour Government and charged with producing the standing orders of the Scottish Parliament) recognised the ‘need for the Executive to govern’, or produce most legislation and make most expenditure decisions, it also envisaged a much stronger parliamentary role (Scottish Office, 1998; McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 90). It recommended: the fusion of Westminster’s standing and select committee functions, to enable members scrutinising legislation to develop subject based expertise; the ability of select committees to call witnesses and oblige ministers and civil servants to attend; and, the ability to hold agenda-setting inquiries and to initiate legislation if dissatisfied with the government response. Crucially, the select committees were also charged with performing two new roles to ‘front-load’ the legislative process and make up for the fact that, in the absence of the House of Lords, there would be no revising chamber. First, they would have a formal pre-legislative role, charged with making sure that the government consults adequately with its population before presenting legislation to parliament (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 91; 104). Second, they would consider both the principles of legislation and specific amendments to bills before they were discussed in plenary.

Coalition Government from 1999-2007
The first eight years of devolution proved that new powers and institutions were not effective on their own. Rather, the implementation of new politics also required a cultural change among MSPs and political parties (Cairney, 2006). To a large extent, we know this now because no profound cultural change took place. Rather, we witnessed a curious mix of institutions based in part on the consensual democracies operated by politicians in the Westminster tradition (note that 15 of 129 MSPs in 1999 had previously been MPs – Keating and Cairney, 2006: 52). Although the parties betrayed a limited degree of ideological polarisation, they reproduced a form of government-versus-opposition politics that Westminster parties would be proud of. In particular, the Labour-SNP relationship in the Scottish Parliament reflected a ‘reactionary mentality’ in which ‘some Labour MPs were so paranoid about the Nationalists that any idea emanating from the SNP was immediately rejected because of its source’ (Dennis Canavan MSP in Arter, 2004: 83). Similarly, the opposition parties were quick to exploit government weaknesses on issues such as ‘Lobbygate’ (when Labour ministers were linked to the ‘cash for access’ row), the cost of the Scottish Parliament building, and Scottish Executive coalition tensions regarding flagship policies such as free personal care and the abolition of student fees (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 40; 122; 205; 242).

The Scottish Parliament was primarily driven by parties rather than ‘independent-minded MSPs’ (Mitchell, 2008: 77). Most importantly, the coalition formed between Labour and the Liberal Democrats, while providing “superficial evidence of ‘new politics’” arguably ‘marked the end of the possibility’ of the more meaningful political style envisaged by its architects: ‘a minority single-party Labour cabinet obliged to work in the Scandinavian manner with the opposition parties to get legislation through, would have vested parliament with significant policy influence and constituted ‘new politics’ in a real sense’ (Arter, 2004: 83). Instead, the parties formed a governing majority. This gave Labour the sense of control that they feared would be lost if they were forced to cooperate on a regular basis with the SNP: ‘We have to have a settled programme rather than a programme where we could be ambushed every time’ (Maureen Macmillan, Labour MSP, in Arter, 2004: 83). Further, the parties produced successive partnership agreements that tied both to a detailed programme of legislation and towards supporting the Scottish Executive line (and collective cabinet responsibility) throughout.

The effect of the strong party role was dramatic. The coalition controlled the voting process in both committees and plenary, with Labour demonstrating a particularly strong whip in both parliamentary sessions - caused in part because their MSPs were screened rigorously before their selection (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 85; Mitchell, 2008: 77) and because Labour ministers held regular meetings with Labour MSPs before any committee meeting in which a significant vote or decision was likely to take place (although this can occasionally be used to exert committee power – see Cairney, 2007a: 79). There were similarly few instances of Liberal Democrat dissent (and none which threatened the coalition’s Partnership Agreement overall). The parties were also able to dictate which of their members became convenors of committees (although the numbers of convenors are allocated proportionately) and even which MSPs sat on particular committees. As a result, the independent role of committees was undermined as MSPs were subject to committee appointment and then whipped, while committee turnover was too high too allow a meaningful level of MSP subject expertise (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 99; Scottish Council Foundation, 2002; Arter, 2003: 31–2).

The experience from 1999-2007 suggests that it would be wrong to equate the formal capacity of legislatures with their power or influence over policy outcomes (Arter, 2006; Cairney, 2006; McGarvey and Cairney, 2008). Rather, this is largely an empirical question based not only on the formal roles of institutions (and actors within them), but also their resources and willingness and ability to exercise power in particular instances. In many (if not most) cases the powers of certain legislatures only look impressive when compared to other legislatures, not their executives. This was certainly the case when the Scottish Executive coalition dominated the legislative process, passing the vast majority of an extensive legislation programme which undermined the ability of Parliament to set the policy agenda through inquiries. The Scottish Executive presided over a punishing legislative schedule, producing the sense in which committees became part of a ‘legislative sausage machine’ rather than powerful bodies able to set the agenda through the inquiry process (Arter, 2002: 105). While there is some evidence of parliamentary influence during the scrutiny of government legislation (Shephard and Cairney, 2005; Cairney, 2006), the Scottish Executive produced and amended the majority of bills (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 106; reinforcing the rule of thumb by Olson, in Arter, 2006: 250, that the executives initiate 90% of legislation and gets 90% of what they want). There was also a trend from 2003 towards increased Scottish Executive dominance, perhaps following the honeymoon period of the first session (and despite the new makeup of the Parliament in which more small parties were represented) but also because the Scottish Executive used legislation (which was often unnecessary; it could have pursued the policy with non-legislative means) to set the Scottish Parliament’s agenda.

Overall, the Scottish Parliament and its committees enjoyed neither the resources with which to scrutinise government policy effectively nor the stability or independence necessary to assert their new powers. Further, although members and committees have the ability to initiate legislation, the same rules apply: members are constrained by party affiliation and limited resources, while committees rarely find the time or inclination to legislate. Therefore, after a honeymoon period in the first parliamentary session, the Scottish Parliament produced a level of non-executive legislation comparable in number and scope with Westminster (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 103). From 1999-2003, 50 Scottish Executive, 1 committee and 8 member’s bills were passed while from 2003-7 the split was 53, 1, and 3. From 1999-2003 166 inquiries were conducted (Arter, 2004: 77), but this fell to 99 in 2003–07 (of which 11 were short or one-day inquiries). In short, ‘while the Scottish Parliament’s powers are extensive in comparison to most West European legislatures, it is much more difficult to demonstrate the effects of their powers in relation to the Government in the first two parliamentary sessions’ (2008: 108). The evidence of new politics and the effects of the new institutions were thin on the ground (at least in the context of initial expectations).

Therefore, it is understandable that May 2007 was seen by many as a new beginning. However, while newly-elected Presiding Officer Alex Fergusson used his acceptance speech to call for the return of new politics (Scottish Parliament Official Report 14.5.07 col. 13), most commentators did not know what to expect. There is no accepted way for the parties to gauge the success or failure of the new arrangements.

Minority Government Since 2007: Is this what new politics looks like?
There are many ways to measure the importance of minority government. In particular, we may wish to separate, analytically, issues of governing legitimacy and the interactions between parties and institutions from policy outcomes. For example, in broad terms, many of the omens did not look good: there is still a culture of government-versus-opposition and minority government was a necessity rather than a choice. In other words, Scottish politics lacked a factor key to minority government success: a feeling that it is a desirable way to engage in politics. On the other hand, it is striking how quickly minority government has become the norm in Scotland in the sense that, while the SNP Government is challenged regularly on its policies or governing record, its right to govern is not. There are similar contradictions throughout party politics. Although the SNP rarely voted against Labour policies when in opposition, it was generally critical of them (Mitchell, 2008: 76). Although the new and outgoing First Minsters, Alex Salmond and Jack McConnell, both made positive noises about their new relationship (SPOR 16.5.07 cols. 32-7), it is difficult to ignore the bruising tone of Labour’s election campaign followed by its shock and then apparent unwillingness to accept defeat (Cairney, 2009b).

Such tensions are reflected in one of the longest running sores in the new session: the use by opposition MSPs of points of order to question the veracity of ministerial statements. While we may accept and even enjoy a degree of partisanship during the theatre of First Minister’s Questions, this has been taken to the extreme by allegations of ministerial misconduct when making untruthful or misleading statements to Parliament (see Cairney, 2009c: 30). This prompted two actions (on top of a belated revision to the Scottish Ministerial Code). First, Alex Salmond took the unprecedented step of referring complaints about his conduct to the new independent advisory panel consisting of the two former Presiding Officers David Steel and George Reid (which ruled in both cases that he did not mislead Parliament – Cairney, 2009e: 32-3; Cairney, 2009f: 41). Second, Alex Fergusson reiterated a belief held variously by all Presiding Officers (and reflected in Standing Orders) that he should not become the arbiter of the truthfulness of comments made by any MSP in Parliament. Instead, he asked the Standards committee to investigate the use of points of order. In turn, the committee endorsed Fergusson’s view, proposed that it produce new guidance on the party political use of points of order and called for a joint protocol between Scottish Government and Parliament on their respective roles (Cairney, May 2009e: 32). Thus, over two years into the new relationship, there is still a sense of learning by doing.

In most other cases it is difficult to separate issues of executive-legislative relationships from their policy effects. Most important is the extent to which the Scottish Government invites the Scottish Parliament to examine its policies (or the extent to which the Parliament asserts its right to scrutinise Government policy). While the main measure of this activity is the extent to which it publishes draft legislation for parliamentary scrutiny, there is no agreement about how much primary legislation (and of what degree of substance) should be brought to Parliament in one session. Although we know there has been too much in the past, we do not quite know what is too little.

With regards to the former, a key outcome of the 1999-2007 sessions was a widespread sense that too much legislation had been produced and that a new government should slow down (Cairney, 2007b: 83; 2007c: 24; Mitchell, in correspondence). This was a feature of the ‘legacy’ reports produced by committees in 2007 that suggested they were unable to perform their scrutiny and inquiry functions properly because there was too much legislation to consider (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 102). Minority government certainly had an effect on part of this process. The SNP Government, already committed in its manifesto to a reduction in legislative volume (and faced with a tight budget that precluded expensive policy innovation), has found that it does not have the votes to pass legislative measures that it would certainly have introduced if it enjoyed a majority (the SNP also modified its ‘1st 100 days’ commitments considerably). Indeed, the independence referendum bill may be the only one introduced when the SNP knows that it will likely fail (and this outcome is still uncertain). While this reduction of legislative activity is a welcome development, it produces a key question: does the reduction in legislation demonstrate the power of the Scottish Parliament or the Scottish Government?

The choice of the latter is in part based on criticism that the pendulum has swung too far in the opposite direction. Legislative diarrhoea has been replaced by constipation. Some of this criticism can be explained away by party politics, particularly when voiced by members of the former Scottish Executive parties. For example, the SNP’s first legislative programme was dubbed by opposition parties as ‘legislation lite’ (Cairney, 2007b: 83), while Labour’s business manager, Michael McMahon, recently labelled Alex Salmond as a ‘work-shy First Minister leading a group of idle ministers’ because the Scottish Government had passed seven pieces of legislation in two years (Peterkin, 2009; note that opposition party criticism of the legislative programme has always been an annual event). Although this has been addressed to some extent by a recent flurry of activity – there were 15 Scottish Government bills by September 2009 - there may still be a residual sense that the strategy of the SNP Government has been to distance itself as far as possible from the Scottish Parliament and pursue its policy aims without recourse to legislation (Cairney, 2007b: 83; although the counterargument is that the excessive production of legislation in the first eight years exaggerated the drop since 2007).

The ability of the SNP to maintain policy distance reflects the consistent imbalance of power in Scotland between executive and legislative institutions regardless of the type of government and party balance. The Scottish Government has the vast majority of policy capacity and many of its policy aims (on intergovernmental relations, the civil service, capital finance projects, public service targets, prescription charges) can be pursued without using legislation, while others can be pursued using the legislation that exists (i.e. with secondary legislation and regulations much less subject to parliamentary scrutiny). Further, most of the conditions associated with majority government still apply. Small committee size and MSP turnover still undermine the abilities of committees to scrutinize government policy and the huge gulf in resources remains (Cairney, 2008b: 17).

Consequently, the Parliament has not filled the legislative gap. There has not been a perceptible rise in successful legislation initiated by committees or MSPs since 2007 (from May 2007-September 2009 the split was 15, 1, and 3). While there was some talk by Labour regarding their alternative legislative programme (Cairney, 2008e: 97; 2009e: 31), this has not taken off (and seems to consist of four member’s bills ). While committees have more time to set the policy agenda through inquiries, few committees have used their newly-granted time effectively and found enough common ground to pursue a long-term inquiry in any meaningful way, while others have merely exploited the chance to make party political points with short, headline grabbing, inquiries (Cairney, 2008b: 16 discusses the inquiry into Donald Trump’s development in the Menie estate; see also 2008c: 17-18; 2008d: 20-1; for more recent evidence that committees are able to find areas of common interest, see Cairney, 2008d: 21; 2009c: 37-8; 2009f: 45-8). In the first two years there were approximately 40 inquiries or reports which were not conducted in response to draft bills or legislative consent motions – with at least 10 related to Scottish Parliament procedures, not government policy.

There is also unclear evidence on the tangible effect of the new parliamentary arithmetic on Scottish Government legislation. While we can reasonably expect more government defeats and amendments coming from opposition parties, the effect on the substance of legislation does not seem particularly significant (analysis of this effect by Steven MacGregor is ongoing). Similarly, although there may be evidence that civil servants are now more likely to anticipate the reactions of opposition parties when developing policy (Paun, 2009: 52), there is less evidence to suggest that this has affected that policy substantively. Instead, civil servants appear to be committed to implementing SNP policy and, in some cases, defending that policy and the Scottish Government’s record in public (Paun, 2009: 52; Cairney, 2009g: 53). Further, the process is nothing like coalition government in which civil servants had to clear policy with two parties (Paun, 2009: 52). Therefore, if anything, the Scottish Parliament has become a policy-stifling forum acting as a deterrent to some policy initiation, slowing down the legislative sausage machine without using the extra time to any great effect. It is therefore tempting, still, to conclude that most policy activity is going on elsewhere – particularly since the new concordat between the Scottish Government and local authorities allows a significant degree of discretion over policy priorities (such as class sizes in schools) that the opposition parties have a keen interest in but a lack of powers to direct.

This situation is not altogether surprising because, despite the range of Scottish Parliament ‘powers’, it was not designed to be a policy initiating body. Rather, the institution represents an attempt to improve on the scrutiny powers of Westminster without marking a profound change in the executive-legislative relationship. Committees have the power to hold ministers and civil servants to account, to make sure they consult properly (i.e. they are not expected to undertake large consultations themselves) and to initiate legislation as a last resort if MSPs believe that government policy is inadequate. Yet, they are also instructed by the CSG to let the government govern, arguably encouraged to play a minimal pre-legislative role and, in the case of the budget, not equipped to develop alternative legislation (although see Cairney, 2009f: 47-8 for a discussion of the Finance Committee inquiry and new Financial Scrutiny Unit). The Scottish Parliament also lacks Westminster’s equivalent of a ‘scrutiny reserve’ for EU issues, while the recent process surrounding the release of the Lockerbie bomber suggests that it has no role to play before such Scottish ministerial decisions are made (see Cairney, 2009f: 40-1). Further, the resources of committees and opposition parties are too thin on the ground to provide anything more than scrutiny and criticism (and there appears to be no appetite to boost the resources of committees). It would therefore take much more than minority government to solve the wider problem of parliamentary constraint.

Relatedly, Scottish Parliament committees still do not provide the ‘motor of a new politics’, particularly since Labour’s front bench does not sit on them and Labour has not yet fully engaged with them (in part because the former Scottish Executive does not want to scrutinise its own policies). Rather, key debates are played out and negotiations are conducted in plenary. Indeed, there seems to be a rise in the propensity to overturn decisions reached in committee in plenary (although the research, by Steven McGregor, is still in progress). In the 1999-2003 session the key indicator of respect for committee decisions was the non-Executive amendment of Executive legislation - less than 80% of these were reversed by a Scottish Executive (which had the majority to reverse them all), in part because committee assertiveness was linked to at least one vote by an MSP from a Scottish Executive party (Cairney, 2006: 203). Now, the parliamentary arithmetic is such that a Scottish Government bill may be amended against its wishes at stage 2 merely because the Scottish Government and its supporting party do not have enough votes, only for this to be reversed in plenary at stage 3 when they do (see e.g. The Herald, 2009). Or, in the case of the Graduate Endowment Abolition (Scotland) Bill, the whole bill may be rejected in committee only to be approved in plenary (Cairney, 2008b: 23). In many cases this is linked to the post-2007 abandonment by convenors of the status quo convention. Instead, many are using their casting vote politically, in turn undermining the less established convention that committee decisions are respected in plenary.

There may be some cases, such as the climate change bill, in which we see the best of minority government or the potential for new politics; a genuine attempt by the SNP to pursue a partly ideological policy and a willingness to negotiate the details, combined with opposition party willingness to cooperate and give the necessary support in exchange for concessions (although more research is required to determine how many concessions are merely ‘handout’ amendments from the Scottish Government). Yet, such examples do not seem to be common.

This fact alone may not be enough to provoke opposition parties to ‘go nuclear’ and cooperate to undermine the government (at least while the SNP remains popular). Rather, greater concern has been expressed that the government has deliberately sought to subvert the role of Parliament by ignoring its wishes when expressed through parliamentary motions (Davidson, 2008). The first such event followed the motion passed by the opposition parties in favour of continued funding for the Edinburgh Airport Rail Link and Edinburgh tram project. Both John Swinney and Alex Salmond were then accused on bending the will of Parliament, with Swinney citing irresolvable problems in EARL and Salmond quoting Donald Dewar to suggest that he was not bound by parliamentary motions (Cairney, 2007c; 22; Mitchell, 2008: 80). However, even in this case there is evidence of a negotiated position (the trams project did go ahead) and ministers generally seek to avoid unnecessary confrontations (particularly since they produce opposition party pressure to resign – see the case of Kenny MacAskill and court reform – Cairney, 2009d: 52). Instead, SNP whips and business managers seek to avoid confrontations by negotiating the wording of motions with their counterparts in other parties (Cairney, 2008c: 18; 2009c: 35-6) and acting on many motions (Cairney, 2008b: 21), including the decision to drop plans for a flagship bill introducing a local income tax. Few motions force the hands of the Scottish Government. Far more motions either demonstrate a lack of united opposition or merely (in examples such as police numbers or rural schools), ‘seek to reinforce existing Scottish Government policies and place them higher on its agenda’ (Cairney, 2009e: 38). This semi-agenda-setting role is also a feature of the better committee inquiries (Cairney, 2009f: 45-8). Overall, this may be what new politics looks like in practice.

The Annual Budgets
The annual budget bill process has taken on a new significance under minority government. It is the most important legislative test so far, in part because there is an obligation for both sides to agree on the bill. Effectively, for minority government to continue the Scottish Government must seek agreement for its budget and the opposition parties must find a way to reach a negotiated settlement. This process has shown the best and worst aspects of minority government. First, it is certainly more significant than under coalition government when it was rather routine. Yet, there are still similarities: only government ministers may amend the bill, while committees still tend to focus on limited aspects of the budget (reflecting a lack of information and resources with which to conduct effective scrutiny). Second, there have clearly been concessions, although their overall importance is debatable (they do not contradict SNP policy but do force it to make choices; they may represent less than 1% of the overall budget, but the SNP government also has minimal control of the budget beyond the margins). In the first budget, the Conservatives secured a greater commitment to funding new police officers and revisit drugs policy, independent Margo MacDonald secured special funding status for Edinburgh and the Greens secured a commitment to carbon assessments of spending plans (Cairney, 2008c: 16). In the second, the Conservatives secured a reduction in business rates, Labour secured funding for modern apprenticeships and the Liberal Democrats secured a vague commitment for the SNP to involve Parliament more in budget planning and engage with the Calman Commission on fiscal autonomy (the Greens lost a larger commitment to fund home insulation when their votes were no longer required). Third, most parties have yet to take a consistent negotiating positions. The Conservative party has been the only consistent actor, seeking concessions in exchange for support; the Greens surprised many by voting against the second bill despite securing concessions; and the Liberal Democrats have opposed the bill in both years, only to support the second bill when revised marginally. Labour has been the most confused, abstaining in year one for fear of causing the bill to fall (causing hilarity rather than relief on the SNP front benches), then opposing in year two (on the assumption that the SNP had secured Green support) and contributing unwittingly to the bill’s failure. A similar example of Labour and Liberal Democrat bafflement and miscalculation regarding the effects of its negative role can be found in the failure of the Creative Scotland Bill (Cairney, 2008d: 15).

Finally, the failure of the second budget bill did not deserve the incredible amount of Scottish and UK attention it attracted. Rather, the process eventually showed that the parties could work together very effectively when faced with an apparent crisis, and a new bill (almost identical to the defeated one) was passed the following week. The budget crisis showed that there is little appetite among the opposition parties for an impromptu election, particularly while Alex Salmond remains popular. It is also the most significant example of SNP-Labour cooperation which may prove crucial to the long term success of minority government. This may be reinforced both by the SNP’s new willingness to pursue its ‘flagship’ alcohol policy primarily through parliamentary-influenced legislation and Scottish Labour’s apparent willingness to support most measures (Maddox, 2009a; 2009b; Cairney, 2009g: 57). So does this suggest that minority government in Scotland can become stable and a phenomenon that is repeated beyond 2011?

Will Minority Government Become the Norm? Lessons from Elsewhere
It is relatively easy to explain the occurrence in 2007 of minority government in Scotland as a one-off: despite favouring a coalition with the Liberal Democrats, the SNP was not willing to make the key concession – dropping its plans for a referendum on independence – that the Liberal Democrats (who appeared to some extent to be disenchanted with 8 years in government) put forward as a condition of coalition. Further, a coalition with other parties was either not politically desirable (Conservatives) or possible (Labour, the main competitor). It is more difficult to predict whether or not this process will be repeated. One way to explore the durability of minority government in Scotland is to extrapolate lessons from two types of comparative literature – studies which suggest universal rules for government formation and more detailed studies of individual countries.

According to Strøm (1990: 21) the problem of predicting that minority governments will become regular or the norm is that they ‘violate many basic assumptions of how parliamentary democracy works … They are a counterintuitive phenomenon’. The ‘conventional’ view is that minority governments form in ‘unstable and conflictual political systems, whose party systems may be highly fractionalized. Such cabinets are suboptimal and unstable solutions, which are resorted to only when all else fails’ (Strøm, 1990: 15). They do not follow the rational decisions of political parties and are associated in this literature with ‘malaise, irrationality and poor performance’ (1990: 21).

Drawing on Strøm’s (1990: 11-20) review of existing theories it is difficult to equate the Scottish experience with this literature:

1. Political crisis and instability. In this case, minorities arise because there is a systemic crisis that precludes coalition or a specific crisis that undermines coalition forming in one time period. However, in both cases the process is underspecified (1990: 10). It would be difficult to explain the SNP’s minority in crisis terms since a coalition with the Liberal Democrats was possible and at some stages seemed likely. Rather, for both parties this resembles more of a strategic calculation rather than one forced upon them (although there is a deadline to elect a First Minister in 28 days).
2. Political culture and heritage. Luebbert (in Strøm, 1990: 11-2) explains minority formation in terms of two characteristics of the political regime: (1) the degree of regime legitimacy; and (2) the extent to which opposition parties engage in consensus-building legislation. If both are high, this is a consensual democracy. If both are low, this is a conflictual democracy. In consensual democracies minorities form because there is no incentive to form a coalition majority. In conflictual democracies they form because not enough parties can agree enough to form a coalition. It is possible that 1 may be high but 2 low – this is a competitive system - but Luebbert suggests that this is rare. Yet, the UK political culture that Scotland inherited appears to be competitive and it combines cultures or norms based on conflict (e.g. an adversarial system of government versus opposition) and consensus (e.g. there was a widespread understanding between the parties of the unwritten rules of government formation - that the SNP had the right to try to form a coalition or minority government first because it had the most seats). Therefore, both coalition and minority governments may both be the logical consequences of negotiations in Scotland; the incentives to form a coalition and the extent of party agreement vary over time.
3. Party system fractionalization. Sartori (in Strøm, 1990: 12-3) associates minority government with ‘moderate pluralism’, which describes a system with 3-5 significant parties and the inability of any to maintain a majority (‘polarized pluralism’ has more parties at more extreme ends of the left-right scale). The rational position for at least one party is that the largest minority should not be allowed to govern alone when it can oblige that party to share power in a coalition. Thus, minorities result when parties do not act rationally or when, for example, they miscalculate their negotiating positions. Strøm (1990: 13) links this position to explanations based on the ‘fractionalization’ or fragmentation of party systems, in which the more parties there are and the more they split the electorate then the more difficult it is to form a majority. This has direct relevance to Scotland at a basic level, in that the introduction of PR has produced moderate pluralism rather than single party majority government. Yet, it is difficult to explain fully the Scottish position in terms of fragmentation and miscalculated negotiations. The decision by the SNP and Liberal Democrats not to form a coalition was based to a large extent on a basic ideological difference (and, for the latter, ambivalence about re-entering government) rather than a miscalculation. Perhaps both overestimated the extent to which each would compromise or back down to secure power, but both also seemed to revert to a position that was not particularly unfavourable to them – the idea of minority status for the SNP and outsider status for the Liberal Democrats grew on them both. Further, when compared to other systems elected under PR, Scotland does not display a particularly high degree of fragmentation – there are only two parties with the ability to form the majority of a coalition, competing with two smaller parties. While in 2003 parties such as the Greens and Scottish Socialist party enjoyed more seats, Labour and the Liberal Democrats also enjoyed a majority.
4. Cleavage conflict and polarisation. In this case, minorities form because the parties are too divided ideologically to form an agreement. Instead, one party takes on a ‘caretaker’ status (Powell in Strøm, 1990: 14), suggesting that the expectation is that the minority will not continue beyond the next election. To some extent we can see this ideological divide between the SNP and the other major parties. Strøm (1990: 65; 270) characterises the SNP as ‘extremist’ and therefore less likely to enter into negotiations. However, the waters are muddied to some extent by the SNP’s new position that it will only seek a referendum on independence. This is something that all parties could sign up for (the others in the hope that the referendum would be unsuccessful). Further, there is not a tangible sense of the SNP becoming a caretaker rather than full-term government, particularly since it passed non-routine legislation to abolish higher education tuition fees less than a year after taking office.
5. Proximate Conditions. Minority governments form when all other options have been exhausted or when no other options exist; they ‘represent failed interparty negotiations (Strøm, 1990: 15). This is most associated with rational choice explanations of coalition building, with minority government rarely seen as the rational outcome or positive equilibrium. Rather, it is ‘commonly explained through reference to constraints, limited choice, failure of negotiation, and lower-order preferences, conditions that are often tied to the negotiation process itself’ (1990: 15). Normally it follows a high number of failed coalition attempts. We can see this potential for failure in these terms because the unusual party arithmetic meant that a coalition between two parties (bar SNP and Labour) would not have been enough and even if the SNP had secured Liberal Democrat support, it also needed help from the 2 Green MSPs who were only willing to provide limited and conditional support. Yet, few coalition negotiations took place and minority government did not follow a failed coalition. Further, while the focus on failed negotiations could be used to explain minority government in Scotland, it is difficult to see why the outcome should be seen as a failure rather than the rational decisions of parties making choices based on their preferences.

It is not surprising that such theories fail to fully account for the Scottish outcome, since Strøm (1990: 15) suggests that they are fairly ad hoc and inadequate explanations, not backed up by empirical evidence, for a phenomenon that is by no means exceptional. Minority government accounts for approximately one-third of all post-war parliamentary governments and 28% of government tenure, with only 11% of minority governments accompanied by formal agreements with supporting parties (1990: 59; 95; 116). Further, while coalition government (rather than single-party majority) is the most common in parliamentary democracies (Muller and Strøm, 2003: 1) and they last approximately 25% longer than minority governments (17-18 months compared to 13-14; for a majority party it is 30), they are also more likely to dissolve as a result of ‘crisis’ and to produce a negative incumbency effect. Therefore, minority government may be an attractive proposition for parties (Strøm, 1990: 130).

On this basis, Strøm’s (1990: 38; 69) alternative is to argue that the choice of minority government is rational in many cases, in part by questioning the assumptions of coalition formation - that majority status is necessary for effective government formation, that party leaders are motivated solely by the pursuit of power rather than policy objectives, and that one must hold government office to have policy influence (although the degree of non-governmental influences varies by party and polity) – and highlighting the balance between long term and short term rationality. In particular, the incumbency effect suggests that the longer term pursuit of election success may be consistent with a short term absence from office or damaged by a period office (particularly if a condition of office is accepting and promoting policies that undermine the relationship between the party and its core electorate). In other words, the crucial condition for minority stability is that other parties do not seek to force a coalition. If those parties ‘value policy influence and electoral success, government participation need not be their best strategy … [instead they may] wait for more favourable circumstances’ (1990: 56; 69). This is based on the assumption that elections are ‘decisive’: parties present clear alternatives, elections produce significant fluctuations in the share of seats held by parties, parties are less likely to be in office when they lose seats, and cabinets are formed soon after elections (1990: 73-4).

Strøm’s argument is that minority government is more likely when opposition parties are happy to remain outside of government. In turn, this is more likely when they can exert influence in opposition while biding their time waiting for the next election to reduce the incumbent government’s standing and increase their own. In other words, there is a clear long term gain associated with opposition that a rational party leader would recognise when considering the short term benefits of office as the smaller party within a coalition. This is a probabilistic argument: the more scope for opposition influence that the political system affords, and the more decisive an election is, then the more likely that minority governments will form.

In these broad terms we can identify many of the key Scottish Parliament dynamics. First, and most importantly, it is increasingly clear that minority status does not preclude effective government formation (particularly since the election of a First Minister requires only a plurality of the vote and the subsequent approval of ministers is effectively a formality). Rather, it constrains the nature or volume of legislation that will be accepted by the Scottish Parliament, which is not the same thing when a government can pursue policy through non-legislative means. While the SNP may not pass some bills which are central to the delivery of its manifesto, it still enjoys the power to control the resources of the Scottish Government and pass most of its proposed legislation and has yet to face a motion of no confidence. Further, by forming a single party government it benefits from the lack of detailed policy compromises that a majority coalition (or formal minority government agreement with a supporting party) would entail. It has also survived two defeats on its proposed legislation (and regular defeats on non-binding motions). Second, we can detect in the Liberal Democrats (to some extent) a desire to return to opposition to reclaim ideological distance from other parties, while in the Conservatives we can see a clear strategy of exchanging support for policy influence (particularly during budget negotiations). Finally, in Labour we can detect the realisation that the short term pursuit of office would have a longer term effect on its popularity (particularly since it is also tied to an unpopular UK Labour Government). Thus, minority government formation may be more likely in Scotland than in other countries that do not have parties playing these roles.

However, our findings are heavily qualified when we explore Strøm’s measure of opposition influence (there is also not, as yet, a negative incumbency effect for the SNP government). While Strøm (1990: 42) identifies ‘very significant policy influence’ in studies of Italian, French and Norwegian legislatures, we may struggle to identify the same level of direct and positive influence in Scotland (without considering the extent to which opposition parties benefit from the passage of policies consistent with their aims). Indeed, if we were to use Arter’s (2006: 251) four measures, it would be difficult to demonstrate with existing output measures that the Scottish Parliament is more powerful than Westminster (which represents, in comparative studies, the government dominated legislature). Significantly, this is despite the fact that the Scottish Parliament enjoys virtually all of the powers that, in Mattson and Strøm’s (2004: 100–1) work, point to unusually high committee strength (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 97) and, for Strøm, denote high opposition influence (it has at least 10 committees with fixed jurisdictions, select committees linked to ministerial departments, and committee chairs allocated proportionately by party). It is also despite the relative ease with which the opposition parties could pass a vote of no confidence (for Strøm, 1990: 108, a key factor of minority stability in Denmark). In others words, the Scottish case reinforces the need, explored in Arter’s (2006) edited volume, to challenge the idea that some legislatures are powerful because they appear to have the capacity to be powerful (and, as Cairney, 2006 argues, this is power compared to other legislatures, not its government). The high formal capacity of legislatures does not necessarily produce opposition party influence.

In part this may be because although the institutions were designed to be ‘inclusive’ as in Norway, the culture is adversarial as in Westminster (see Strøm, 1990: 90). There also seems to be reluctance among many parties to try to exercise policy influence (in part because, unlike in some legislatures, there is no requirement of the government to achieve parliamentary approval in advance for its legislative programme). Further, the Scottish committees not only lack resources in the form of staff but also their own members (most post-2007 committees have 8), since the pool of recruitment is much smaller than Westminster which also offers a clearer alternative career route for MPs. Overall, an important caveat in Scotland is that the payoffs seem to be far greater for the governing party than those seeking influence through opposition (there is a high ‘policy influence differential’). Despite Strom’s expectations based on formal legislature capacity (rather than more direct measures of influence such as the impact of legislatures on government legislation), opposition parties do not enjoy significant influence in the Scottish Parliament. Thus, this is not as useful a prediction as it first appeared.

Instead, in some ways the more useful explanation of minority status is the very existence of moderate pluralism caused by the electoral system, combined with party decisions based on their previous experiences. Perhaps we can say that the Liberal Democrats anticipated that Strom’s prediction would be realised; that opposition parties would become more influential under minority conditions. If this imbalance of power is now known (and wasn’t in 2007 when the parties had only experienced coalitions), it may affect the strategies of parties in 2011, with the SNP and Labour perhaps more likely to seek minority but the Liberal Democrats more likely to seek coalition (the Conservatives will generally struggle to find a partner in Scotland – more so than in Wales - and so may act accordingly) when they reflect on their lack of influence in opposition (and that, although the 2007 election had a profound effect on small parties and the balance of power between SNP and Labour, its Scottish Parliament results are fairly consistent). Yet, we cannot be certain until more research is conducted to determine MSP perceptions of success, since most opposition parties often seem content with their limited involvement in the details of policy. This may be because it increases their ability to step back and criticise it to increase their own standing. It may also reflect the longer term parliamentary culture, in which the government governs and the opposition scrutinises, that did not disappear when coalition government ceased.

In any event, universal theories of minority government only take us so far and this reinforces the need to supplement them with detailed case studies of individual countries and comparisons with others. For example, as Mitchell (2008: 81) suggests, there are lessons to be learned from the Danish case. While minority government has been the post-war norm, it can be usefully divided into before and after the ‘earthquake’ election in 1973 which not only granted new representation to three parties and re-established two more, but also produced a fragmented and polarised party system (Green-Pedersen, 2001: 57-8), characterised by ‘intense electoral competition and policy dispersion among multiple dimensions’ (Strøm, 1990: 107). Attempts to form a majority coalition from the non-socialist parties failed, allowing the Danish Social Democrats the chance to form a minority government. This proved ineffective in the short-term because the Social Democrats were the big losers of the 1973 election and did not adapt well to the need for the increased scale of concessions required to make effective agreements with other parties. Minority government via the non-socialist bloc in 1980s also fared badly at times, in part because its economic policies were opposed by the Social Democrats and, effectively, there were no other parties to negotiate with (Green-Pedersen, 2001: 59). However, from 1994 (following a year of majority coalition government), the Social Democrats began a period of successful coalition minority government, because: (a) it had adjusted to its new role; and (b) it could now negotiate with three different parties to produce different policies, who (c) had more incentive to cooperate than bring the government down (because the alternative for left-wing parties was non-socialist minority government); and (d) could engage in cooperation without undermining their electoral profile (2001: 64-5). Most parties have recognised that minority government is still the long-term norm and have adapted accordingly: the ruling minority by making concessions to many parties, and formerly extreme parties adapting to their new policy-influencing rather than oppositional roles. The post-1973 rejection of the norm that a government that loses a vote in parliament must resign has also aided minority stability (Seyd, 2002: 128).

While this adaptation took over twenty years to materialise in Denmark, a country with a long tradition of minority government, there are several reasons to think it could happen quicker in Scotland. First, in contrast to the polarisation of parties in Denmark, the Scottish party system is better characterised as a form of moderate pluralism (Bennie and Clark, 2003). There are no far right parties, while the far-left Scottish Socialist Party has never enjoyed enough representation to sway a parliamentary vote. In other words, there is no need (at least yet) for a minority government to make concessions to a wide range of disparate parties. Second, there may be fewer fundamental issues to polarise party opinion. Although the issue of independence sets the SNP apart from the three other major parties, the sub-national Scottish Parliament is not responsible for the big economic questions (fiscal and monetary policy; redistribution and benefits), or many other big issues that could produce significant conflict (such as defence policy). Third, the biggest loser, Labour, has had time to prepare and adjust to its new position through eight years of coalition majority government. Although it has yet to find a clear role in opposition (in part because of its complex ties to a UK Labour government), it appears more open to the prospect of its own period of minority government (particularly if Labour loses the UK election in 2010). Finally, the Conservatives (with no real prospect of forming a government) and, to a lesser extent, the Liberal Democrats (keen to ‘rediscover themselves’) appear increasingly comfortable with the idea of influence in opposition. In short, minority government could quickly become the norm in Scottish politics and Scottish parties could adapt relatively easily (particularly if compared to the UK).

On the other hand, Strøm (1990: 106) relates the durability of minority government in Denmark to a process in which the government makes a series of policy-specific and significant legislative concessions to various parties in exchange for their support (see also Qvortrup, 2000 who links this ‘search for consensus’ to the ability of the Folketing to refer a bill to referendum if the move receive supports from one-third of its membership). While we can see some evidence of this process in Scotland during the annual budget, the amount of negotiation appears to be low and it is not replicated across the board. Rather, the opposition parties wait for government legislation to appear and then engage in the same kind of scrutiny performed from 1999-2007. There is little evidence of pre-legislative negotiation or scrutiny. In these terms, it is difficult to see Scotland emulating Denmark’s propensity for minority government if its parties (and the Liberal Democrats in particular – see Paun, 2009: 54) seek policy influence as well as electoral success.

Conclusions
New politics is in some senses a heavy chain around the neck of Scottish politics, producing unrealistic expectations and therefore skewed evaluations of the success of new political practices. In the absence of such expectations, this paper may have come to different conclusions about the first eight years of coalition government which provided some examples of new parliamentary influence, the ability of committees to be ‘businesslike’ and the ability of Scottish Executive ministers to negotiate and compromise rather than dominate Parliament. Similarly, we should be careful not to judge the early experience of minority government too harshly. Although ‘new politics’ as originally envisaged has not materialised (again), the arrangements have so far proved to be relatively stable, while the SNP has demonstrated an impressive degree of policy coherence and governing competence. Minority government is likely to last for at least the full parliamentary term, while there is a significant chance that it may become the norm. Many teething troubles have healed – and maybe this is what stable minority government really looks like. The main caveat is that the first two years were marked by high SNP popularity, suggesting that it would not currently be in the interests of the opposition parties to destabilise minority government. It is therefore difficult to attribute the new system to a powerful new norm when an explanation based on party self-interest is just as convincing.

Equally unclear is the effect that minority government has on public policy. Eight years of coalition government largely produced a policy agenda driven by the government. Two years of minority government has produced a new relationship between the Scottish Government and Parliament, but this is not based on the eagerness on either side to mark a profound shift in responsibility for policy formulation and implementation. The drop in legislative activity from the Scottish Government has not been met with an equivalent rise from Parliament. Committees have not produced more agenda setting inquiries. Rather, the Parliament has become a forum for limited policy concessions based largely on the (usually uncontroversial) Government legislative agenda and the limited ability of the opposition parties to monitor Government policy activity that is not brought to parliament for regular approval. We may find evidence of parliamentary power in other areas – such as in the anticipated reactions of the SNP when deciding which bills to pursue and when civil servants developing policy pay heed to what they perceive to be the parliament’s (as well as the minister’s) ‘mind’. However, this is an area of public policy that has not been researched in great depth either in Scotland or in the comparative literature (instead, the focus is on negotiation between parties). From the limited evidence that we have, it is difficult to identify enough policy influence for opposition parties to give them an incentive to eschew public office when it is available. This is not really an issue for the Conservatives who are not likely to be offered the chance to form a government and will therefore benefit more from minority government. However, the lack of policy influence enjoyed by the Liberal Democrats since 2007 seems to diminish the probability that it will accept minority government in the future.

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Scottish Devolution Moniting Report September 2009

2009-10-29T09:56:00.000-07:00

Paul Cairney reveals the findings of the September 2009 Scotland Devolution Monitoring Report which covers events from May to September. For the full report see http://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/research/devolution/devo-monitoring-programme.html or email paul.cairney@abdn.ac.uk

In the introduction, Paul Cairney reports that this is a period dominated by Kenny MacAskill’s decision to release the Lockerbie bomber, Abdelbaset al-Megrahi, from Greenock Prison on compassionate grounds. Indeed, it is difficult to think of any other ‘Scottish’ issue that would command such international attention or prompt so much analysis on the SNP’s governing competence on the world stage. The issue is multi-faceted and still unfolding in the public domain. As such, we have witnessed a classic media process in which attention lurches from one aspect of the story to another: how MacAskill conducted his inquiry; if he would struggle to meet the deadline for a decision; whether or not al-Megrahi would drop his appeal; the extent to which MacAskill would be subject and vulnerable to a wide range of political pressure; how this relates to wider forms of parliamentary political pressure on MacAskill following the recent prospect of a vote of no confidence in Parliament; the Scottish-UK intergovernmental issue (or lack thereof) and the degree of Scottish ministerial autonomy; the silence of Gordon Brown; the (un)popularity of the decision; Al-Megrahi’s welcoming reception in Libya; and, the intense international reaction.

Lockerbie has overshadowed the other main issue in this period: the publication of the Calman report. In The Scottish Constitutional Debate, Paul Cairney argues that, given its limited remit and the tone of its interim report, the final report of the Calman Commission is surprisingly ambitious. Its recommendations on finance, the further devolution of powers, intergovernmental relations and the role of the Scottish Parliament are substantive, providing the potential for further changes in the future. Most significant is the proposal to make the Scottish Parliament more accountable for income taxation (although it produces a half-way house between fiscal dependence and autonomy). Much of the report is consistent with SNP aims. This includes the call for more formal intergovernmental relations and to devolve responsibility for Scottish Parliament elections, airgun and drink-driving regulations. While it was received well by its main audience (the Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties), no party has made any firm commitment to implement its recommendations. Indeed, the irony is that the party most critical of the report (the SNP) is also the keenest to see some of it implemented immediately. While the National Conversation has been relatively low key in comparison, the Scottish Government has reaffirmed its commitment to an independence referendum bill. Cairney also discusses the House of Lords Select Committee on the Barnett Formula which has recommended Barnett’s abolition.

In Public Attitudes and Elections, John Curtice reports that there has been no marked movement in favour of independence. In fact, some recent polls record a significant decline. However, there is majority support for a referendum on constitutional change (including the implementation of Calman’s recommendations). Although the SNP’s wording would increase the ‘yes’ vote in a yes/no independence referendum, there is still not enough support. Indeed, people still do not think that independence is likely in the next twenty years. The most popular choice in a multi-option referendum would be ‘devolution with some tax powers’. Curtice then discusses evaluations of devolution. While many more people think devolution has had a positive rather than a negative impact, most believe it has made no difference. Since the election of the SNP, more people think that they are better represented in the Union and receive a fair share of UK spending. This may be ironic for a party seeking to foster a strong sense of grievance that might provide the basis of increased support for independence. Devolution also continues not to have any long-term impact on national identity. Finally, Curtice discusses the fortunes of parties and their leaders. Although the release of al-Megrahi was unpopular, it has created fewer difficulties for the SNP than some opposition politicians anticipated. The SNP still enjoys a lead over Labour in voting intentions for the Scottish Parliament (while the Greens may again emerge as an electoral force in 2011). There is also some prospect of significant SNP gains in Westminster in 2010 (and little sign that the Conservatives are making the gains we see in England). Labour’s showing in the European Parliament elections was disastrous and its vote was down from 2007 in local government by-elections. In contrast, the SNP’s share of the vote increased in both. Alex Salmond is still the most popular leader in Scotland and more popular than Gordon Brown and David Cameron

In The Scottish Parliament and Parties, Paul Cairney reports on a range of developments: the Scottish Parliament was only permitted to debate the release of al-Megrahi after the decision was made; Alex Salmond has again been cleared of misleading the Scottish Parliament; the draft annual budget has been published and although there are many likely flashpoints, previous experience of the budget crisis may reduce conflict this year; most of the major parties have struggled to maintain an image of unity during their party conferences and in the lead up to by-elections; few motions in the Scottish Parliament have put pressure on SNP policy; and, the Westminster expenses scandal continues to cast a shadow over Holyrood. Cairney also argues that Scottish Parliament committees are still not the ‘motor of a new politics’. They favour headline-grabbing short inquires over high-impact long term inquiries. One of the notable exceptions is the agenda on parliamentary scrutiny of the annual budget. Further, the number of Scottish Government bills has risen to 15, but many are short and only 6 can be traced directly and meaningfully to the SNP manifesto.

In Scottish Government and Public Policy, Cairney reports that: the neutrality and conduct of senior Scottish Government civil servants has come under considerable opposition party scrutiny; the agendas on public spending and expenses have focused attention to the size and cost of the Scottish public sector; there is still a clear difference in the UK and Scottish Government approaches to target setting for the public sector; the recession (and Diageo affair) has further exposed the limited levers the Scottish Government enjoys over the economy; the swine flu pandemic has exposed intergovernmental disagreement over treatment funding; the Scottish Government continues to build on tobacco controls and further the agenda on alcohol regulation; the parties continue to disagree over short term sentencing and progress made on police numbers, but have worked well together on sexual offences legislation; the SNP seems at its most vulnerable when defending its record on education; blame-avoidance may be more likely than earlier intervention in social work cases; the Climate Change Act introduces new targets to reduce emissions; Scottish crofting policy remains unresolved; new council housing may not be enough to address bigger problems of affordable and social rented housing; and, the new ‘Scottish Six’ may come from the STV, not the BBC

Finally, in Government Beyond the Centre, David Scott reports that, while relations between Scotland councils and the Scottish Government continue to be positive there is unease over policies like classroom sizes. He then considers key proposals published on affordable housing and the concern over the availability of sufficient funding, the Bill on local government elections that will allow the poll to be held on a separate day from Scottish Parliament elections and Scottish Government pilot plans for the first direct elections to health boards. Audit Scotland has published reports on public sector purchasing and asset management as well as Best Value audit reports on individual councils; and a Bill on public service reform aims to reduce the number of public bodies by eight and simplify the structure of the public sector.

The Scottish Constitutional Debate September 2009

2009-10-07T07:55:00.000-07:00

This is chapter 1 of the Scottish Devolution Monitoring Report September 2009, but with added references at the end. For the full reports see http://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/research/devolution/devo-monitoring-programme.html

Key Points

Given its limited remit and the tone of its interim report, the final report of the Calman Commission is surprisingly ambitious.
Its recommendations on finance, the further devolution of powers, intergovernmental relations and the role of the Scottish Parliament are substantive, providing the potential for further changes in the future.
Most significant is the proposal to make the Scottish Parliament more accountable for income taxation
Much of the report is consistent with SNP aims. This includes the call for more formal intergovernmental relations and to devolve responsibility for Scottish Parliament elections, airgun and drink-driving regulations
While it was received well by its main audience (the Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties), no party has made any firm commitment to implement its recommendations.
Indeed, the irony is that the party most critical of the report (the SNP) is also the keenest to see some of it implemented immediately.
While the National Conversation has been relatively low key, the Scottish Government has reaffirmed its commitment to an independence referendum bill
The House of Lords Select Committee on the Barnett Formula has recommended Barnett’s abolition

1.1 The Calman Report’s Recommendations[1]
The Calman Commission’s final report was published on June 15th. While most headlines will be reserved for its substantial recommendations on fiscal accountability and the further devolution of powers, there are also some interesting recommendations to improve intergovernmental relations (IGR) and the legislative process of the Scottish Parliament. The main thrust of the report is that the constitutional side of devolution has been a success but that change can improve the settlement. Of course, the proposed level of change falls short of any prospect for independence because the report was established by the SNP’s opposition parties – Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat – and the UK Government to provide competition for the National Conversation.

Fiscal Autonomy
The most significant change can be found in its recommendations regarding the funding settlement. It argues that it would be difficult to maintain the Union if the UK Government granted full fiscal autonomy to Scotland. Therefore, macro-economic policy must remain reserved. While this is a defendable unionist position, it presents considerable problems when formulating further fiscal powers. The report also notes the limitations that it faces when making recommendations on the Barnett formula. Overall, we have a half-way house between fiscal dependence and autonomy (supplemented by its argument there should also be a common sense of social citizenship and minimum welfare rights, but only when the UK and Scottish Parliaments agree their scope). Barnett has the advantage of providing stability during devolution’s first decade and should be maintained, but only until the UK Government commissions a needs assessment to determine a more equitable system of funding. There should also be more accountability for money spent in Scotland. Therefore, there should be a devolution of certain economic powers – the Stamp Duty on property transactions, the Aggregates Levy, Landfill Tax and the Air Passenger Duty - when differences would not undermine overall macroeconomic policy (in part because they largely affect local populations, with relatively little prospect of exit).

More importantly, the Scottish Parliament should be obliged to make a positive and more visible decision about its level of taxation in relation to the UK rather than benefiting from the relatively hidden status quo position in which it accepts the same levels by not using the tartan tax. Calman therefore recommends reducing UK income tax in Scotland by 10p in the pound (for the lower and higher income tax thresholds, with no ability to tax one but not the other) and reducing Scotland’s grant accordingly, meaning that the Scottish Parliament would have to set the Scottish rate at 10p to stay the same as the UK (assuming that this would raise the same amount from a Scottish base). However, the Scottish Government would not be able to make the bigger decisions about the mix of tax bands or the overall structure of taxes set at the UK level. Therefore, this is effectively the introduction of a greater appearance of accountability but primarily for assigned revenues (this is to be extended to a notional share of income tax on savings, to remove the administrative burden of identifying Scottish savers). There is also not a full link between accountability and economic policy in part because there is still a limited incentive for the Scottish Government to increase its own tax revenue by using economic levers to foster growth. There is a limited ability to compete to attract businesses or individuals through the modification of taxes. Overall, the measures may open up the old north/ south debate on UK macro-economic policy. While Scotland’s GDP per capita is higher than most English regions, it is significantly lower than the south-east of England which brings overall English GDP per capita to a level higher than in Scotland. Therefore, the 10p tax rate in Scotland is likely to produce a slightly smaller overall level of revenue, perhaps prompting the Scottish Government to wonder why it should be accountable for the tax when it can not determine the amount fully.

On the other hand, the recommendations may mark the beginnings of a substantive shift in fiscal arrangements since the 10p would be based on identified rather than notional Scottish incomes and, for the first time, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (the HMRC) would be obliged to work on behalf of Scottish ministers in collecting devolved taxes (Scottish Ministers would also be consulted on appointments of HMRC Commissioners). This comes on top of three further recommendations:

1. To keep benefits such as housing/ council tax reserved but give much more scope for Scottish Ministers to amend their use when developing their own policies. This may be seen as an argument that the UK government should not only not interfere in issues such as the local income tax, but also that the UK Government and HMRC should do all they can to minimise the unintended consequences by cooperating on the effects on benefits (although note its very clear recommendation to keep Attendance Allowance reserved as a gateway to other reserved entitlements).
2. To allow the Scottish Government, like local authorities, to borrow on a Prudential basis (i.e. based on its capacity to repay debt) through the National Loans Fund or Public Works Loans Board. This system would perhaps allow the Scottish Government to fund the Forth Road Bridge in a more straightforward way.
3. To consider further tax devolution – on VAT and a share of fuel duty – when these recommendations have ‘bedded in’. This suggests that, again, the recommendations do not mark the end of the Scottish ‘settlement’.

Devolved and Reserved Powers
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the report’s recommendations on devolved powers is that it has not avoided issues that could be embarrassing to its UK Government sponsor and advantageous to the SNP Government’s agenda. This includes a recommendation to devolve responsibility of the Scottish Parliament elections to the Scottish Parliament (following SNP criticism of the role of the Secretary of State in the ballot paper fiasco), allow Scottish ministers to appoint the Scottish member of the BBC Trust (although this falls far short of SNP calls for Scottish-specific broadcasting), devolve airgun regulation (an SNP demand which it partly inherited from the previous Scottish Executive) and drink-driving limits (in the context of SNP criticism of UK limits when promoting its overall, divergent, alcohol strategy). It also recommends devolving responsibility for the national speed limits, animal health funding, marine nature conservation (note that the issue of marine control has divided the UK and Scottish governments for some time), the Deprived Areas fund, discretionary elements of the reformed Social Fund and the prescribing of controlled drugs (e.g. heroin) to treat addiction (perhaps signalling, incidentally, a position on the balance between the medical and criminal treatment of illegal drug use).

The report recommends that many issues – such as charity law and regulation, food labelling and regulation, the regulation of all health professions and the UK Insolvency service - should remain reserved to preserve sensible administrative arrangements and levels of policy uniformity. In other cases it merely calls for better working arrangements to solve problems associated with devolved and reserved policy interaction or problems associated with the implementation of reserved issues in Scotland, including: the operation of the Health and Safety Executive; the scope for local variations in immigration law implementation; the issue of the wellbeing of children of asylum seekers; Welfare to work; and, the operation of Crown Estate. It strongly recommends that the UK Government maintains the principle of UK-wide Research Councils (which allow Scottish Universities to ‘punch above their weight’ and remain part of a wider pool of scientific funding) but also establish comparable ‘government-funded’ status for particular Scottish research institutions. Perhaps of most note is the absence of a recommendation to change the constitutional settlement regarding nuclear power. This may in part follow the UK Government’s acceptance of a Scottish veto on new nuclear power stations. It also follows a broader recommendation to accept that there will always be issues regarding devolved/ reserved boundaries and that they should be resolved through better intergovernmental relations.

Intergovernmental Relations
The report is critical of the informality of intergovernmental relations (IGR) between the Scottish and UK Governments and it makes recommendations for ministers, civil servants and the Parliaments. First, it argues that the Joint Ministerial Committee should become a body to foster close working and cooperation relationships (perhaps like the JMC Europe) rather than just dispute resolution. The JMC (Domestic) should meet at least annually, as should a new JMC Finance (to discuss macro-economic policy as well as taxation); and a JMCO (for senior officials). The JMC agendas should be published in advance to parliaments (and there should be an annual report). The JMC Europe should foster earlier and more engagement between Scotland and UK, with Scottish Ministers to be automatically part of UK delegation and to speak more on the agreed UK line. There should also be a greater expectation that Scottish MEPs attend Scottish Parliament committees. Second, it argues that there should be more training for UK civil servants to improve their knowledge of devolution and that the civil service code should be amended to ensure cooperation and mutual respect.

Third, although it suggests that the Sewel convention, in which Westminster will not normally legislate on devolved matter unless given permission by the Scottish Parliament, has been respected and works well, it must be used better to foster meaningful links between Parliaments (Sewel, or legislative consent, motions are primarily addressed through executives). The report makes a wide range of recommendations in this regard: the Sewel convention should be entrenched in standing orders of each House; there should be more parliamentary cooperation and discussion – perhaps by each passing motions for the other’s attention; Westminster should debate devolved implications and establish a regular ‘state of Scotland’ debate; a ‘standing joint liaison committee of the UK Parliament and Scottish Parliament should be established to oversee relations’; barriers to sharing information and inviting each other to committee meetings should be removed; the Secretary of State for Scotland should appear annually to a convenors’ (committee chairs’) group of the Scottish Parliament and in plenary to report on the devolved implications of the Queen’s speech; the First Minister should appear at Scottish Affairs Committee once per year generally and once per year to discuss how its legislation interacts with reserved matters; there should be Scottish MPs on any UK legislation that uses a substantive Sewel motion, followed by the potential for Scottish Parliament committees to invite the MPs to discuss their implications; and Scottish Parliament and Westminster committees should be given an answer on legislation as they would to their own committees. Further, Calman suggests that there should be a Westminster equivalent to the Sewel motion: ‘A new legislative procedure should be established to allow the Scottish Parliament to seek the consent of the UK Parliament to legislate in reserved areas where there is an interaction with the exercise of devolved powers’.

Scottish Parliament recommendations
Finally, Calman makes some recommendations to improve the scrutiny role of the Scottish Parliament. To deal with the lack of a second chamber and the relative finality of its stage 3 legislative process, it recommends giving the power to the Presiding Officer to refer novel, substantive amendments at stage 3 back to committee before bill is passed (to give MSPs and stakeholders chance to look at implications). Or, an amendment to proceed to stage 4 can be proposed by MSPs. It also recommends that committees seek to minimise their MSP turnover (although this is still largely the decision of the parties themselves) and that committees should be able to decide themselves when to create sub-committees to deal with scrutiny overload.

1.2 Reactions to the Calman Recommendations
In some respects the overall reaction to the Calman report has been odd. For example, the initial media reception was fairly warm, with many references to the report’s boldness.[2] Its immediate audience – the Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties – was also enthusiastic, with Jim Murphy keen to be photographed accepting the report from Calman and both the UK Labour and Conservative parties intimating that the report would find its way into their general election manifestos in some form.[3] Yet, things have been quiet since, with both parties suggesting that they need more time to digest the report and that its recommendations come as an overall, coherent package that would be difficult to implement incrementally. Of course, the more honest statement would be that constitutional reform in Scotland is way down the list of priorities for a UK Government.[4] The lack of progress appears to have frustrated Scottish Liberal Democrat leader Tavish Scott who has ‘lost patience’ with his colleagues in the other parties.[5] It has also produced an ironic turn of events: the party most critical of the report (the SNP) is now the keenest to see some of it (not surprisingly, the section recommending more devolved powers) implemented immediately.[6]

1.3 The National Conversation
The National Conversation itself (i.e. not including moves to introduce a referendum bill – see 1.4) has been relatively low key in this period, with the most notable development regarding opposition party criticism of its costs. This may arise again during negotiations on the annual budget (see 3.3).

1.4 The Referendum on Independence
The Scottish Government outlined in September its plans for a bill to enable a referendum on independence (as part of its overall legislative programme)[7]. Of course, whether or not this bill will be passed by the Scottish Parliament is another matter. The probability of this event has never been clear and it is no clearer now. While the main opposition parties were very quick to announce that they would not support the bill, whispers continue about various members of various parties being keen to see it go ahead. The parties may also have blundered by placing so much criticism on a discussion of constitutional change during a recession, suggesting that they may be more open to the prospect after an economic recovery.

1.5 The Barnett Formula
Media attention to the Barnett formula was raised briefly during the summer following a Lord’s report.[8] The report criticises the fact that a short-term measure has been in place for so long, with no real attempt to adjust the baseline according to population or to allocate money at the margins with reference to need rather than automatically. It recommends a needs assessment exercise followed by a system that provides clarity on how territorial funds are distributed. While David Cameron has in the past expressed similar aims, and the Treasury is in the process of reviewing the system,[9] a major reform is by no means inevitable because both have much higher priorities. Indeed, if there is anything that demonstrates the extent to which Scottish funding is small beer to the Treasury, it is the news that the effect of the recession is to reduce its tax take by more than the Scottish Government’s annual budget.[10]

Further references not in the SDMR
CALMAN REPORT/ CONSTITUTION
P. Jones 5.6.09 ‘Calman Commission says no to devolution of North Sea oil revenues’ The Times http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6434173.ece
T. Murden and T. Peterkin 7.6.09 ‘Calman set to support Barnett Formula’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Calman-set-to-support-Barnett.5342041.jp
D. Maddox 6.6.09 ‘'Too late' for Scotland to claim North Sea revenues’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/39Too-late39-for-Scotland-to.5340951.jp
R. Dinwoodie 6.6.09 ‘'Give Scotland borrowing powers and oil revenues'’ The Herald http://www.theherald.co.uk/politics/news/display.var.2512821.0.Give_Scotland_borrowing_powers_and_oil_revenues.php
H. Macdonell 15.6.09 ‘SNP pledge to use new powers to ban airguns’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/SNP-pledge-to-use-new.5364682.jp
B. Currie 15.6.09 ‘Major tax handover expected in Calman report’ The Herald http://www.theherald.co.uk/politics/news/display.var.2514334.0.Major_tax_handover_expected_in_Calman_report.php
D. Maddox 12.6.09 ‘Calman's Holyrood tax power plans 'don't go far enough'’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Calman39s-Holyrood-tax-power-plans.5359821.jp
D. Maddox 11.6.09 ‘Holyrood in line to get new powers over tax’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Holyrood-in-line-to-get.5354997.jp
L. Davidson 14.6.09 ‘Voters are denied referendum on Calman proposals’ The Times http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6499796.ece
D. Maddox 16.6.09 ‘Calman's bold proposals to empower Scotland’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Calman39s-bold-proposals-to-empower.5367751.jp
H. Macdonell 16.6.09 ‘Hamish Macdonell: Calman report a giant leap for Scots autonomy’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Hamish-Macdonell-Calman-report-a.5367750.jp
J. Curtice 16.6.09 ‘Analysis: Offering an alternative to the 'subsidy junkie' jibe’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Analysis-Offering-an-alternative-to.5367755.jp
16.6.09 ‘Steering group named to push Calman forward to next stage’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Steering-group-named-to-push.5367744.jp
16.6.09 ‘Making the parliament more effective’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Making-the-parliament-more-effective.5367801.jp
16.6.09 ‘Holyrood will have to foot bill for changes’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Holyrood-will-have-to-foot.5367792.jp
16.6.09 ‘A More Perfect Union’ The Times http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/leading_article/article6506345.ece
16.6.09 ‘Calman's vision could bolster Holyrood and end English cash grievances’ A. Macleod 16.6.09 ‘The Calman Commission: the main recommendations’ The Times http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6506637.ece
A. Young 16.6.09 ‘Grant formula may be seen as weapon against Scots’ The Herald http://www.theherald.co.uk/politics/news/display.var.2514564.0.Grant_formula_may_be_seen_as_weapon_against_Scots.php
R. Dinwoodie 16.6.09 ‘Should there be a referendum on flagship proposal?’ The Herald http://www.theherald.co.uk/politics/news/display.var.2514565.0.Should_there_be_a_referendum_on_flagship_proposal.php
16.6.09 ‘Lessons learned from abroad could keep Union intact’ The Herald http://www.theherald.co.uk/politics/news/display.var.2514569.0.Lessons_learned_from_abroad_could_keep_Union_intact.php
16.6.09 ‘Powers returned to Westminster’ The herald http://www.theherald.co.uk/politics/news/display.var.2514568.0.Powers_returned_to_Westminster.php
B. Currie 15.6.09 ‘Major tax handover expected in Calman report’ The Herald http://www.theherald.co.uk/politics/news/display.var.2514334.0.Major_tax_handover_expected_in_Calman_report.php
The Scottish Government 15.6.09 ‘Calman Commission’ The Scottish Government http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2009/06/15151304
D. Maddox 17.6.09 ‘Referendum challenge by SNP to choose independence or Calman’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Referendum-challenge-by-SNP-to.5371731.jp
D. Maddox 16.6.09 ‘Labour promises to deliver Calman reform in 10 months’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Labour-promises-to-deliver-Calman.5367818.jp
17.6.09 ‘Salmond springs surprise by including Calman in his referendum plans’ The Times http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6512703.ece
H. Mcleish 16.6.09 ‘Calman report is Westminster's golden chance to redefine devolution’ The Times http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6505111.ece
P. Jones 16.6.09 ‘Calman's vision could bolster Holyrood and end English cash grievances’ The Times http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6506637.ece
A. Macleod 16.6.09 ‘Gordon Brown backs Calman's 'bold' tax-raising proposals for Holyrood’ The Times http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6506644.ece
M. Wade 16.6.09 ‘'Holyrood has proved itself': Calman Commission wins over Scots’ The Times http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6505873.ece
A. Macleod 16.6.09 ‘The Calman Commission: the main recommendations’ The Times http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6505036.ece
A. Macleod 16.6.09 ‘Calman: give Scotland power to set speed and drink-driving limits’ The Times http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6505372.ece
J. Allardyce 21.6.09 ‘Former Labour ministers condemn Calman report’ The Times http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6544128.ece
A. Black 22.6.09 ‘What has devolution done for us?’ BBC http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/8111464.stm
18.6.09 ‘Change in devolution 'must come' ‘ BBC http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/8104879.stm
R. Dinwoodie 24.6.09 ‘Outnumbered, not outgunned: Murphy holds his own with SNP’ The Herald http://www.theherald.co.uk/politics/news/display.var.2516115.0.Outnumbered_not_outgunned_Murphy_holds_his_own_with_SNP.php
A. Macleod 23.6.09 ‘We hoped for a scrap, but the Murphy and Swinney show was pure comedy’ The Times http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6565537.ece
I. Swanson 24.6.09 ‘Ian Swanson: Ban on airguns finally looks to be in Holyrood's sights’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Ian-Swanson-Ban-on-airguns.5395232.jp
D. Maddox 26.6.09 ‘SNP urges political rivals to back key Calman proposals’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/SNP-urges-political-rivals-to.5404495.jp
E. Barnes 28.6.09 ‘Cameron sounds nuclear warning’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Cameron-sounds-nuclear-warning.5408397.jp
D. Maddox 29.6.09 ‘Foulkes calls for swift action on Calman proposals’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Foulkes-calls-for-swift-action.5408941.jp
A. Macleod 28.6.09 ‘Tory split over Calman threatens to go nuclear’ The Times http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6597796.ece
A. Macleod 28.6.09 ‘Implement Calman proposals now, Salmond urges Brown’ the Times http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6597698.ece
M. Howie 6.7.09 ‘Fresh bid to take control of gun laws’ he Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Fresh-bid-to-take-control.5430646.jp
D. Maddox 7.7.09’ Calman denies SNP claim that inquiry was 'nobbled'’ he Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Calman-denies-SNP-claim-.5434036.jp
6.7.09 ‘MPs grill Calman over comission findings’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/MPs-grill-Calman-over-comission.5432546.jp
R. Dinwoodie 8.7.09 ‘Gun law reforms in Scotland could provide model for UK’ he Herald http://www.theherald.co.uk/politics/news/display.var.2518719.0.Gun_law_reforms_in_Scotland_could_provide_model_for_UK.php
E. Barnes 30.7.09 ‘Calman accuses SNP of 'misrepresentation'’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Calman-accuses-SNP-of-39misrepresentation39.5506842.jp
R. Dinwoodie 10.8.09 ‘Calman's tax ideas 'would drag down Scottish economy'’ The Herald http://www.theherald.co.uk/politics/news/display.var.2524667.0.Calmans_tax_ideas_would_drag_down_Scottish_economy.php
A. Macleod 12.9.09 Cracks appear in unity over Calman reforms’ The Times http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6831647.ece
4.6.09 ‘SNP rejects Calman plan for future of devolution’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/SNP-rejects-Calman-plan-for.5332677.jp
16.6.09 ‘Brown urged to act quickly to extend Holyrood powers’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Brown-urged-to-act-quickly.5368569.jp
J. Purvis 25.6.09 ‘Tax-raising powers will change parties' ways of campaigning’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Taxraising-powers-will-change-parties39.5399206.jp
T. Peterkin 5.7.09 ‘'Rich will run' if new tax power brought in’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/39Rich-will--run39-if.5430060.jp
R. Dinwoodie 8.7.09 ‘Gun law reforms in Scotland could provide model for UK’ The Herald http://www.theherald.co.uk/politics/news/display.var.2518719.0.Gun_law_reforms_in_Scotland_could_provide_model_for_UK.php
15.6.09 ‘Calman Commission’ Scottish Government News Release http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2009/06/15151304
5.6.09 ‘Response to Calman Commission’ Scottish Government News Release http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2009/06/calman
T. Peterkin 19.8.09 ‘Steel backs tax powers’ he Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Steel-backs-tax-powers.5566016.jp
D. Maddox 17.6.09 ‘Economists condemn proposed reforms as 'recipe for instability'’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Economists-condemn-proposed-reforms-as.5371734.jp

NATIONAL CONVERSATION
6.7.09 ‘SNP defend cost of 'Conversation'’ The Herald http://www.theherald.co.uk/politics/news/display.var.2518332.0.SNP_defend_cost_of_Conversation.php
A. Philp 6.7.09 ‘SNP blasted for spending £500,000 on National Conversation’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/SNP-blasted-for-spending-500000.5430630.jp
N. Christian 19.7.09 ‘Conversation and Calman cost £1m’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Conversation-and-Calman-cost-1m.5473079.jp
J. Robertson 19.7.09 ‘SNP slams £600,000 Calman consultation’ The Times http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6719167.ece
10.9.09 ‘'Conversation' inquiry step’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/39Conversation39-inquiry--step.5634312.jp
R. Dinwoodie 17.6.09 ‘Eck's blether on the future’ The Herald http://www.theherald.co.uk/politics/news/display.var.2514775.0.Ecks_blether_on_the_future.php
S. MacDonald 5.7.09 ‘£450k cost of ‘talking shop’’ The Times http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6638327.ece
16.6.09 ‘National Conversation’ Scottish Government News Release http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2009/06/16111644
8.9.09 ‘National Conversation’ Scottish Government News Release http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2009/09/08115322
A. Macleod 9.9.09 ‘SNP plans to share diplomatic services under attack’ The Times http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6826845.ece
L. Cameron 21.9.09 ‘Salmond hits back at tycoon's 'Titanic' comments’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/scotland/Salmond-hits-back-at-tycoon39s.5663326.jp

Independence bill
T. S. Robertson 31.8.09 ‘'Futile' independence bill won't stand a chance, vows opposition’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/39Futile39-independence-bill-won39t-stand.5601876.jp
31.8.09 ‘SNP to reveal timetable for independence referendum’ The Herald http://www.theherald.co.uk/politics/news/display.var.2528203.0.SNP_to_reveal_timetable_for_independence_referendum.php
L. Davidson 31.8.09 ‘Scottish referendum Bill heads for defeat as parties close ranks’ The Times http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article6815627.ece
S. Johnson 30.8.09 ‘Alex Salmond to table independence referendum bill’ The Telegraph http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/scotland/6115897/Alex-Salmond-to-table-independence-referendum-bill.html
29.8.09 ‘MSPs to debate independence bill’ BBC http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/8228599.stm
31.8.09 ‘The big question’ The Herald http://www.theherald.co.uk/features/editorial/display.var.2528228.0.The_big_question.php
3.9.09 ‘Scottish independence: Salmond sets out plans for referendum’ The http://www.scotsman.com/latestnews/Independence-vote-Salmond-sets-out.5614676.jp
9.9.09 ‘SNP's paper on independence branded 'unforgivable' waste’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/SNP39s-paper-on-independence-branded.5629984.jp
J. Hjul 6.9.09 ‘Jenny Hjul: Treat SNP referendum talk with the ridicule it deserves’ The Times http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6823306.ece
A. Macleod 3.9.09 ‘Salmond to push ahead with referendum Bill’ The Times http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6820542.ece
A. Macleod 3.9.09 ‘Salmond to push ahead with referendum Bill’ The Times http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6820542.ece
A. Macleod 14.9.09 ‘Is Salmond serving up independence lite?’ The Times http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6834165.ece
R. Dinwoodie 17.6.09 ‘Salmond challenge on independence’ The herald http://www.theherald.co.uk/politics/news/display.var.2514774.0.Salmond_challenge_on_independence.php
16.6.09 ‘Referendum 'could look at powers' BBC http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/8103130.stm
28.9.09 ‘'Wrong time' to hold referendum’ BBC http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/8278045.stm
22.9.09 ‘Leader plays down talk on referendum’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/scotland/Leader-plays-down-talk-on.5667204.jp
21.9.09 ‘Scottish independence referendum: Lib Dem leader Clegg says vote would be 'wrong'’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Scottish-independence-referendum-Lib-Dem.5664441.jp
22.9.09 ‘Tavish Scott denies turnaround on Lib Dem independence referendum policy’ The Herald http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/politics/tavish-scott-denies-turnaround-on-lib-dem-independence-referendum-policy-1.921416
3.9.09 ‘SNP outlines plans for referendum’ BBC http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/8233788.stm
E. Barnes 23.9.09 ‘Lib Dems gag MSPs over independence referendum’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Lib-Dems-gag-MSPs-over.5670088.jp
G. peev 29.9.09 ‘Gray hints at policy U-turn with mention of referendum’ he Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Gray-hints-at-policy-Uturn.5685680.jp
A. Macleod 29.9.09 ‘Confusion as Gray hints at referendum’ The Times http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6852515.ece
T. Crichton 28.9.09 ‘Gray set to allow vote on SNP key mandate’ The Herald http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/politics/gray-set-to-allow-vote-on-snp-key-mandate-1.922839
G. Bowditch and S. MacDonald 27.9.09 ‘SNP denies Labour call for constitutional debate’ The Times http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6850844.ece
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6843080.ece
J. Allardyce 23.8.09 ‘Tory peer calls for independence poll’ he Times http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6806563.ece
L. Davidson 20.9.09 ‘SNP attacked over plan to lower voting age in independence poll’ The Times http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/article6841943.ece

BARNETT
17.7.09 ‘Lords call for an end to Barnett’ BBC News http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/8154374.stm
23.5.09 ‘Barnett formula 'lacks any logic'’ BBC News http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/8065250.stm
17.7.09 ‘Lords call for an end to Barnett’ BBC News http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/8154374.stm
S. Johnson 17.7.09 ‘'Unfair' Barnett formula should be scrapped say Lords’ The Telegraph http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/5843577/Unfair-Barnett-formula-should-be-scrapped-say-Lords.html

MISCELLANEOUS IGR
M. Settle 1.7.09 ‘Watchdog warned 'steer clear of reserved issues'’ The Herald http://www.theherald.co.uk/politics/news/display.var.2517430.0.Watchdog_warned_steer_clear_of_reserved_issues.php
R. Lydall 13.7.09 ‘Second 'dinner party summit' suggested to discuss recession’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Second-39dinner-party-summit39-suggested.5452152.jp
R. Lydall 19.7.09 ‘Salmond with your meal? PM wants a second 'dinner summit'’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Salmond-with-your-meal-PM.5473050.jp
J. Allardyce and J. Robertson 30.8.09 ‘SNP makes nuclear subs a prime target’ The Times http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6815068.ece
16.9.09 ‘Salmond to ask Westminster for more cash to kickstart recovery’ The herald http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/politics/salmond-to-ask-westminster-for-more-cash-to-kickstart-recovery-1.920225
S. McGinty 12.7.09 ‘SNP accused of 'hissy fits' over bombers' trial’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/SNP-accused-of-39hissy-fits39.5451501.jp
10.5.09 ‘MSPs 'must respect' Westminster’ BBC http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/8042617.stm
M. Williams 4.7.09 ‘MSPs: Stop cheating our troops out of their R&R’ The Herald http://www.sundayherald.com/news/heraldnews/display.var.2518269.0.msps_stop_cheating_our_troops_out_of_their_rr.php
C. Claire 5.7.09 ‘SNP demands change to stop military being 'cheated' out of holidays’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/SNP-demands--change-.5430114.jp
M. Settle 13.7.09 ‘Bombing 'hissy fits' by Salmond dismissed as nonsense’ The herald http://www.theherald.co.uk/politics/news/display.var.2519543.0.Bombing_hissy_fits_by_Salmond_dismissed_as_nonsense.php
J. Quinn 13.8.09 ‘Murphy fails to secure Scots visas for Pakistanis’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Murphy-fails-to-secure-Scots.5548938.jp
M. Settle and M. Williams 8.9.09 ‘Cameron calls for 10% cut in number of Scots MPs’ The Herald http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/home-news/cameron-calls-for-10-cut-in-number-of-scots-mps-1.918637
A. Macleod 8.9.09 ‘Civil servants accused of stoking conflict with UK’ The Times http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6825340.ece (big one)
P. Jones 21.6.09 ‘England and Scotland 'must learn to talk'’ The Times http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6549849.ece
L. Davidson 12.7.09 ‘Salmond 'exploited' Glasgow Airport terror attack’ The Times http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6695694.ece
A. Massie 12.7.09 ‘Alan Massie: The SNP’s nuclear option is to have no defence at all ‘ The Times http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6689227.ece
D. Maddox 18.6.09 ‘Row erupts over £20bn North Sea oil cash shortfall claims’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Row-erupts-over-20bn-North.5377356.jp
J. Quinn 22.6.09 ‘SNP to demand more powers from Scottish Secretary’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/SNP-to-demand-more-powers.5387055.jp
22.6.09 ‘SNP to demand powers in Scottish Secretary talks’ The Herald http://www.theherald.co.uk/politics/news/display.var.2515618.0.SNP_to_demand_powers_in_Scottish_Secretary_talks.php
E. Barnes 21.6.09 ‘Costs at Scotland Office 'out of control'’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Costs-at-Scotland-Office-39out.5386463.jp
B. Currie 19.6.09 ‘North Sea oil revenue would 'see Scotland in the black' The Herald http://www.theherald.co.uk/politics/news/display.var.2515217.0.North_Sea_oil_revenue_would_see_Scotland_in_the_black.php
R. Dinwoodie 29.6.09 ‘Salmond in clash with Cameron over Clyde Trident’ The Herald theherald.co.uk/politics/news/display.var.2517019.0.Salmond_in_clash_with_Cameron_over_Clyde_Trident.php
S. Johnson 28.6.09 ‘David Cameron warns Alex Salmond not to obstruct new Trident’ The Telegraph http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/scotland/5674436/David-Cameron-warns-Alex-Salmond-not-to-obstruct-new-Trident.html
27.6.09 ‘Tories were 'wrong' on devolution’ BBC http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/8122065.stm
D. Maddox 30.6.09 ‘General Sir Mike: Scotland safer in the UK than under independence’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/General-Sir-Mike-Scotland-safer.5412160.jp
R. lydall 30.6.09 ‘SNP angry at Tory leader's Trident vow’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/SNP-angry-at-Tory-leader39s.5411995.jp

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
B. Currie 20.7.09 ‘Swinney's Japan visit aims to bolster Scottish trade links’ The Herald http://www.theherald.co.uk/politics/news/display.var.2520890.0.Swinneys_Japan_visit_aims_to_bolster_Scottish_trade_links.php
M. Macaskill 2.8.09 ‘Malawi journalist tells Scotland to keep cash’ The Times http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6736133.ece

[1] Commission on Scottish Devolution (2009) Serving Scotland Better: Scotland and the United Kingdom in the 21st Century http://www.commissiononscottishdevolution.org.uk/uploads/2009-06-12-csd-final-report-2009fbookmarked.pdf

[2] G. Braiden 16.6.09 ‘Some reservations, but report widely praised’ The Herald http://www.theherald.co.uk/politics/news/display.var.2514567.0.Some_reservations_but_report_widely_praised.php; D. Maddox 16.6.09 ‘Critics confounded by radical reform plans’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Critics-confounded-by-radical-.5367796.jp
[3] A. Macleod and P. Jones 11.6.09 ‘Labour and Tories to back new tax-raising powers for Scotland’ The Times http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6482001.ece; A. Macleod 16.6.09 ‘Gordon Brown backs Calman's 'bold' tax-raising proposals for Holyrood’ The Times http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6506644.ece
[4] A. Macleod 26.6.09 ‘Scottish Conservatives step back from Calman Commission findings’ The Times http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6579498.ece; J. Allardyce and J. Robertson 12.7.09 ‘No new powers for Scotland until 2015’ The Times http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6689936.ece
[5] D. Maddox 18.9.09 ‘Labour and Tories not pulling their weight on devolution – Scott’ The Scotsman http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Labour-and-Tories-not-pulling.5658851.jp
[6] A. Macleod 28.6.09 ‘Implement Calman proposals now, Salmond urges Brown’ The Times http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6597698.ece

[7] 3.9.09 ‘Programme for Scotland’ Scottish Government News Release http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2009/09/02151308
[8]House of Lords Select Committee on the Barnett Formula (2009) The Barnett Formula, HL Paper 139 (London: The Stationery Office)
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldbarnett/139/139.pdf
[9] BBC News 10.9.09 ‘Funding rules 'unfairness' claim’ http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7606907.stm
[10] T. Crichton 21.7.09 ‘Tax take falls by £32bn amid economic downturn’ The herald http://www.theherald.co.uk/politics/news/display.var.2521111.0.Tax_take_falls_by_32bn_amid_economic_downturn.php