I am co-authoring a 2nd edition of Scottish Politics with Neil McGarvey (2013). It includes a revised chapter on "Money and Power: Public Expenditure in Scotland". It still argues that nothing much has changed regarding the system used to determine the Scottish Government's budget. Of course, what has changed is that there is less money now than before - but, come on now, let's be careful with this sort of statement. As the chapter remarks:
"Overall, the real rise in spending in Scotland from 2000-11 has been 53% – a figure that gives some important context to current discussions of economic austerity below (but note that the cash rise, close to 100%, is a very (and increasingly) misleading figure often used by elected politicians to reinforce the importance of the Union dividend). The first drop in real spending (2010-11) follows a series of very large real rises in annual budgets since devolution".
Now, if you don't plan to read the whole thing, note that this is a discussion of all identifiable spending in Scotland, not the Scottish Government budget.
I will copy and paste the introduction below and you can find the rest here -
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1XJYv-6Lj1bMY06oTHqTluO6KjWOA4bHETY3afNE8hfo/edit . If you have any polite comments on my numerical skills, please make them politely. Thanks to Richard Ashcroft (the academic, not the singer) for helping with the equations necessary to work out future spending using the GDP deflator in table 11.2 (although I don't show my working in the chapter).
"In this chapter we discuss what may be the most important area of Scottish politics. Public finance is a key aspect of the political process, and the issues raised in this chapter inform most of the themes discussed in this book. Yet, despite the importance of finance to Scottish politics, and long running debates producing calls for reform, the system of raising and distributing money has not changed since devolution. Post-devolution Scotland contin¬ues to receive almost all of its funding for public expenditure from the UK Treasury in the form of a block grant. The arrangements for the transfer of this money are almost identical to those which existed pre-1999 and reflect the continued use of the Barnett formula to alter the block grant at the margins.
[Barnett formula: A mechanism used by the Treasury to determine the adjustment in devolved public expenditure (Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland) following changes to expenditure in England (in certain policy areas).]
This formula, and its history, is the main focus of the chap¬ter since it is central to an understanding of power relations between Scotland and the UK. These relations are often linked to the idea of Scotland’s ‘financial advantage’ compared to the rest of the UK and the ability of the Scottish Government to spend, but not raise, its money (the issue of finance also informs our discussion of power within Scotland, but the Scottish Government relationship with the Scottish Parliament and local authorities is discussed in chapters 5 and 10).
There are perhaps two main threats to the current settlement. First, the debate on constitutional change has produced renewed calls for some form of fiscal autonomy even if Scotland does not vote for independence. Chapter 12 examines such future proposals in more depth. All we note just now is that, despite this new agenda, the Barnett formula remains. Second, the global economic crisis has contributed to the UK’s new ‘age of austerity’ and a reduction in UK and Scottish public expenditure. Consequently, devolution has been marked by significant rises in Scottish funding settlements approximately for the first eight years, followed by minimal rises and then reductions in the Scottish Government budget. This chapter:
• discusses the issues of fairness, advantage and power in relation to Scottish public finance;
• outlines in detail what the Barnett formula is and why it was adopted;
• considers why the Barnett formula has endured to this day and what this tells us about power and IGR;
• highlights the role of the Treasury, examining Scotland’s unusual inability to determine its budget but discretion on how it is spent;
• highlights trends in Scottish Government spending.
• examines the consequences of the global economic crisis and the UK’s new ‘age of austerity’."
Friday, 14 September 2012
Tuesday, 11 September 2012
Pressure Politics and the 'Scottish Policy Style' Explained
Well, what better way to celebrate Andy Murray's US Open win than to read about group-government relations in Scotland after devolution? I am co-authoring a second edition of 'Scottish Politics' with Neil McGarvey. It will appear in 2013. It includes a significantly revised chapter on 'pressure politcs', updated to include the post-2007 SNP era. The main argument is that, while we can identify a 'Scottish Policy Style', we should not assume that Scottish and UK policymaking processes necessarily differ. Or, if they do, it may be more to do with Scotland's size and the Scottish Government's capacity than a new culture of openness or Scotland's 'consensus democracy' institutions. It focuses on Scotland, but has some things to say about the often-mistaken assumptions we make about UK policymaking (a point expanded on, for example, here - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1478-9302.2011.00233.x/abstract)(email me if you are struggling for access to the article).
I have copy and pasted the introduction below and you can find the rest here:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1aMXonCigJvVTLQyw83Hp5Xcx9w7AdZHfoF8S0Qiad20/edit
"Chapter 5 suggests that the Scottish Parliament did not foster new and effective forms of deliberative and participatory democracy. It highlights the similarities between the Westminster and Holyrood systems and argues that, in both, most policy is formulated outside the legislative arena following regular consultation between govern¬ments and pressure participants such as interest groups. This chapter examines the extent to which that process of policymaking is distinctive in Scotland following devolution. In other words, is there a ‘Scottish Policy Style’? Policy style refers simply to the ways in which governments make and implement policy (Richardson, 1982). It has two dimensions: the way that governments make policy, in consultation with pressure participants; and, the way that they implement policy in partnership with organizations such as local authorities (discussed at more length in chapter 10).
We can identify some hopes for ‘new politics’ in this area, linked to the idea that Scotland is a ‘consensus’ rather than a ‘majoritarian’ democracy (box 7.2). The SCC proposed, albeit in a rather vague way, a new type of pluralist democracy in which consultation with affected interests would be as wide as possible, not only with established interest groups but also previously excluded groups with a limited voice and ability to organise. This push for broader consultation is associated with a monitoring role performed by Scottish Parliament committees who may oblige the Scottish Government to consult far and wide until they are satisfied that all groups have ‘had their say’. This would perhaps help produce a new and improved consultation process between the Scottish Government, Scottish Parliament and a wide range of representative organizations in the community, voluntary sector, professions and business. This inclusion of hitherto excluded sections of society would come at some expense to the ‘usual suspects’, or the larger and better resourced groups which tend to dominate consultation time with government.
The tone of much of these recommendations is based on the idea that new forms of consultation would take Scotland further away from UK policymaking which is relatively ‘top-down’ and based either on a lack of proper consultation or consultation restricted to a small number of powerful groups that squeeze out the competition. Yet, much of the policymaking literature suggests that this image of the UK is a caricature based on minimal evidence. Scotland may have its own policy style, but this is often related to factors unrelated to ‘new politics’ (such as Scotland’s size and the scale of its responsibilities). The recommendations are also perhaps based on the assumption that there can be a Scottish-specific arena in which pressure participants can engage. Rather, organised groups must consider how best to influence policy in an era of ‘multi-level governance’ in which many levels and types of government are involved, from the European Union to local authorities (chapter 9). Further, the role of local authorities has changed since 2007 (chapter 10), prompting many groups to reassess their lobbying strategies.
This chapter discusses:
• The meaning of ‘pluralist democracy’ and the SCC hopes for a new Scottish Policy Style.
• The nature of pressure politics in Scotland.
• The evidence of a difference between Scottish and UK policy styles.
• The strategies of interest groups in Scotland who are faced with uncertainty in the era of multi-level governance.
• The impact of SNP Government since 2007."
I have copy and pasted the introduction below and you can find the rest here:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1aMXonCigJvVTLQyw83Hp5Xcx9w7AdZHfoF8S0Qiad20/edit
"Chapter 5 suggests that the Scottish Parliament did not foster new and effective forms of deliberative and participatory democracy. It highlights the similarities between the Westminster and Holyrood systems and argues that, in both, most policy is formulated outside the legislative arena following regular consultation between govern¬ments and pressure participants such as interest groups. This chapter examines the extent to which that process of policymaking is distinctive in Scotland following devolution. In other words, is there a ‘Scottish Policy Style’? Policy style refers simply to the ways in which governments make and implement policy (Richardson, 1982). It has two dimensions: the way that governments make policy, in consultation with pressure participants; and, the way that they implement policy in partnership with organizations such as local authorities (discussed at more length in chapter 10).
We can identify some hopes for ‘new politics’ in this area, linked to the idea that Scotland is a ‘consensus’ rather than a ‘majoritarian’ democracy (box 7.2). The SCC proposed, albeit in a rather vague way, a new type of pluralist democracy in which consultation with affected interests would be as wide as possible, not only with established interest groups but also previously excluded groups with a limited voice and ability to organise. This push for broader consultation is associated with a monitoring role performed by Scottish Parliament committees who may oblige the Scottish Government to consult far and wide until they are satisfied that all groups have ‘had their say’. This would perhaps help produce a new and improved consultation process between the Scottish Government, Scottish Parliament and a wide range of representative organizations in the community, voluntary sector, professions and business. This inclusion of hitherto excluded sections of society would come at some expense to the ‘usual suspects’, or the larger and better resourced groups which tend to dominate consultation time with government.
The tone of much of these recommendations is based on the idea that new forms of consultation would take Scotland further away from UK policymaking which is relatively ‘top-down’ and based either on a lack of proper consultation or consultation restricted to a small number of powerful groups that squeeze out the competition. Yet, much of the policymaking literature suggests that this image of the UK is a caricature based on minimal evidence. Scotland may have its own policy style, but this is often related to factors unrelated to ‘new politics’ (such as Scotland’s size and the scale of its responsibilities). The recommendations are also perhaps based on the assumption that there can be a Scottish-specific arena in which pressure participants can engage. Rather, organised groups must consider how best to influence policy in an era of ‘multi-level governance’ in which many levels and types of government are involved, from the European Union to local authorities (chapter 9). Further, the role of local authorities has changed since 2007 (chapter 10), prompting many groups to reassess their lobbying strategies.
This chapter discusses:
• The meaning of ‘pluralist democracy’ and the SCC hopes for a new Scottish Policy Style.
• The nature of pressure politics in Scotland.
• The evidence of a difference between Scottish and UK policy styles.
• The strategies of interest groups in Scotland who are faced with uncertainty in the era of multi-level governance.
• The impact of SNP Government since 2007."
Monday, 10 September 2012
Scottish Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) Explained
I am co-authoring a second edition of 'Scottish Politics' with Neil McGarvey. It will appear in 2013. It includes a reasonably revised chapter on IGR, updated to include the post-2007 SNP era and developments since 2010 (Conservative-led UK Government). The argument is still very much that IGR is generally informal and that there are perhaps far fewer major public disputes than we might expect (perhaps with the usual exception of the independence debate). The chapter can be found here - https://docs.google.com/document/d/1cixHY2OFXWiQmABedXiPE1YjVBh8aGHdL3NIJSlW25g/edit .
Friday, 7 September 2012
Comparing Devolved Governance
I have just managed to pad out a book review (Comparing Devolved Governance Derek Birrell, Palgrave, 2012, 296 pp. ISBN: 978-0-280-27820-7) to 3000 words in Parliamentary Affairs. The first section is copy and pasted below and you can read the rest here if you are an academic or a rich personal subscriber. If you are neither, and want to read the rest, send me an email and we can arrange to meet in a dark alley with brown envelopes.
"The study of politics in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland is not something guaranteed to attract a wide academic audience, even in the UK. Further, that attention tends to be about specific things, such as the prospect of independence in Scotland, further devolution in Wales or levels of political conflict and violence in Northern Ireland. At a push, it might extend to the analysis of different electoral results and party systems. Yet, the devolved government experience has much more to offer, providing a rich source of evidence to inform policy learning among governments or simply to provide a comparative analytical and empirical framework within the UK. This can be done in two main ways: comparing the UK's increasingly complicated governance arrangements with other countries; and, comparing UK and devolved government behaviour. The latter has much potential even though the devolved territories and governments are markedly different from England and the UK Government. This difference can often be a good thing for comparative analysis because any similarities in political behaviour and policy outcomes may be remarkable, while the differences help us tell a story about why things are done this way in the UK. Indeed, the Scottish and Welsh context is particularly important because devolved ‘new politics’ was often sold as a departure from ‘old Westminster’ (the Northern Ireland narrative was based more on power sharing and domestic politics). Scotland in particular was perhaps designed to be a consensus, not majoritarian, democracy. In this context, the devolution literature highlights a wide range of interesting sources of comparison.
New politics and political crisis: the expenses scandal in Westminster in 2009 prompted much soul searching on issues such as the role and value of representative government, trust in politics and the extent to which MPs were responsible representatives. The latter prompted further …"
"The study of politics in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland is not something guaranteed to attract a wide academic audience, even in the UK. Further, that attention tends to be about specific things, such as the prospect of independence in Scotland, further devolution in Wales or levels of political conflict and violence in Northern Ireland. At a push, it might extend to the analysis of different electoral results and party systems. Yet, the devolved government experience has much more to offer, providing a rich source of evidence to inform policy learning among governments or simply to provide a comparative analytical and empirical framework within the UK. This can be done in two main ways: comparing the UK's increasingly complicated governance arrangements with other countries; and, comparing UK and devolved government behaviour. The latter has much potential even though the devolved territories and governments are markedly different from England and the UK Government. This difference can often be a good thing for comparative analysis because any similarities in political behaviour and policy outcomes may be remarkable, while the differences help us tell a story about why things are done this way in the UK. Indeed, the Scottish and Welsh context is particularly important because devolved ‘new politics’ was often sold as a departure from ‘old Westminster’ (the Northern Ireland narrative was based more on power sharing and domestic politics). Scotland in particular was perhaps designed to be a consensus, not majoritarian, democracy. In this context, the devolution literature highlights a wide range of interesting sources of comparison.
New politics and political crisis: the expenses scandal in Westminster in 2009 prompted much soul searching on issues such as the role and value of representative government, trust in politics and the extent to which MPs were responsible representatives. The latter prompted further …"
Wednesday, 1 August 2012
Scottish Parliament Explained
I am co-authoring a second edition of 'Scottish Politics' with Neil McGarvey. It will appear in 2013. It includes a very revised chapter which has a discussion of the Scottish Parliament and new forms of participative and deliberative democracy. The latter used to command its own chapter, but so little has happened (on things like civic forums and petitions) that there is very little to write about. The chapter can be found here - https://docs.google.com/document/d/12NRcU7r0YpBO5Fkl4Ms9lOzgelXnE4HnXSzYTewcm0A/edit?pli=1 . If, like me, you find Google Docs a bit slow and fiddly, you can just download the file from the site.
Friday, 6 July 2012
So what if many SNP voters don't support independence?
The latest story doing the rounds is that a large chunk of people who vote SNP do not support independence (see for example the Scotman and the Express). The coverage of this story is bothersome for at least four reasons:
1. The news is not new - we have known this for some time.
2. The difference between party-voting and referendum-voting attitudes can be identified in relation to most parties. While the numbers may be less newsworthy in other parties, there are Conservative, Liberal Democrat and Labour supporters who favour independence and SNP voters who support the status quo (a few might even favour the abolition of devolution).
3. This story could easily be spun in the opposite way - the SNP managed to persuade a large number of people, who don't support independence, to vote for them anyway. This seemed like a major feat as recently as May 2011 and it said a lot about their improving image of governing competence (at a time when attitudes to independence may not have changed).
4. It is being used, in a disingenuous way, by parties like the Conservatives to undermine support for independence without recognising the support for a referendum question on further devolution. The Conservative press release uses the figures as a segue to their argument that there should be a single yes/no referendum question and that Alex Salmond’s openness to a question on further devolution reveals his cowardice. Yet, it is using figures generated by Reform Scotland to demonstrate the high levels of support for ‘Devo Plus’ and to remind political parties that they are ignoring the most-popular option of further devolution in favour of polarising a debate on independence.
5. Most parties know this (1-4) and they do it anyway. This is an overly cynical and too-misleading way to engage in such an important debate.
1. The news is not new - we have known this for some time.
2. The difference between party-voting and referendum-voting attitudes can be identified in relation to most parties. While the numbers may be less newsworthy in other parties, there are Conservative, Liberal Democrat and Labour supporters who favour independence and SNP voters who support the status quo (a few might even favour the abolition of devolution).
3. This story could easily be spun in the opposite way - the SNP managed to persuade a large number of people, who don't support independence, to vote for them anyway. This seemed like a major feat as recently as May 2011 and it said a lot about their improving image of governing competence (at a time when attitudes to independence may not have changed).
4. It is being used, in a disingenuous way, by parties like the Conservatives to undermine support for independence without recognising the support for a referendum question on further devolution. The Conservative press release uses the figures as a segue to their argument that there should be a single yes/no referendum question and that Alex Salmond’s openness to a question on further devolution reveals his cowardice. Yet, it is using figures generated by Reform Scotland to demonstrate the high levels of support for ‘Devo Plus’ and to remind political parties that they are ignoring the most-popular option of further devolution in favour of polarising a debate on independence.
5. Most parties know this (1-4) and they do it anyway. This is an overly cynical and too-misleading way to engage in such an important debate.
Thursday, 5 July 2012
Crisis of the Union?
Here is a link to a paper I gave to a joint CIPOL/SPERI Workshop entitled "UK Institutions, Crisis and the Response" at the University of Sheffield, 29 June 2012. My paper is called "A Crisis of the Union? The Case of Constitutional Change in Scotland" and the introduction is below:
"The election of a majority Scottish National Party (SNP) Government in Scotland, following the election of a minority SNP Government in 2007, has the potential to reinforce a broader feeling of UK institutional crisis. The prospect of Scottish independence has triggered some concern about the potential emergence of a crisis of the Union in which Scottish independence forces the other devolved territories, and perhaps English regions, to reconsider the role and value of ‘the Union’ and what it stands for. However, this paper outlines three key qualifications to such arguments. First, the rise in support for the SNP has not been accompanied by a rise in support for independence (indeed, support for independence fell in 2007). Rather, the SNP’s popularity can be better explained in terms of valence politics factors such as its image of governing competence. Consequently, there may be a crisis of the union, but more in terms of an impending point of decision than a realistic possibility of a fundamental constitutional change.
Second, to a large extent, the ‘crisis of the Union’ is 15-20 years out of sync with important aspects of the modern debate on crisis in the UK. For example, the ‘conservative conception of crisis’ outlined in the introduction, regarding the general notion that politics has failed, was a key part of the ‘new politics’ narrative in the run up to the devolution referendums in 1997. The now-almost-forgotten ‘new politics’ was already about a ‘crisis’ of representative government. Indeed, perhaps ironically, the modern Scottish experience may provide a corrective to the idea that traditional representative democracy in the UK is under threat. The Scottish experience shows us that ‘new politics’ was little more than rhetoric and the Scottish Parliament has operated along Westminster lines despite being designed as a ‘consensus democracy’ with participative and deliberative elements. In other words, counter to the argument presented in the introduction, the alleged ‘more participatory or deliberative models practiced elsewhere’, such as Scotland, do not ‘offer a sharp corrective to the UK tradition’. Instead, the comparisons show us that such images of crisis may be universal or, at least, not specific to the UK experience. The same can be said for the universal constraints to serious challenges to representative government or a rise in participation. For example, any perceived challenge to the idea of a central government ‘club’ is offset by the limitations to such challenges, not least in terms of the limited extent to which the population (or key parts of it) can pay attention to modern governments with huge resources and responsibilities. Instead, what we may be witnessing is an unprecedented level of attention to a very small proportion of government business.
Third, the same sorts of crises associated with UK politics and representative government can be found in Scottish politics, suggesting that constitutional change does not represent a solution to such problems. For example, the Scottish Parliament had its own expenses scandal and ‘lobbygate’ experience several years before Westminster and it also has representatives with similar levels of ‘politics facilitating’ backgrounds (Keating and Cairney, 2006). "
"The election of a majority Scottish National Party (SNP) Government in Scotland, following the election of a minority SNP Government in 2007, has the potential to reinforce a broader feeling of UK institutional crisis. The prospect of Scottish independence has triggered some concern about the potential emergence of a crisis of the Union in which Scottish independence forces the other devolved territories, and perhaps English regions, to reconsider the role and value of ‘the Union’ and what it stands for. However, this paper outlines three key qualifications to such arguments. First, the rise in support for the SNP has not been accompanied by a rise in support for independence (indeed, support for independence fell in 2007). Rather, the SNP’s popularity can be better explained in terms of valence politics factors such as its image of governing competence. Consequently, there may be a crisis of the union, but more in terms of an impending point of decision than a realistic possibility of a fundamental constitutional change.
Second, to a large extent, the ‘crisis of the Union’ is 15-20 years out of sync with important aspects of the modern debate on crisis in the UK. For example, the ‘conservative conception of crisis’ outlined in the introduction, regarding the general notion that politics has failed, was a key part of the ‘new politics’ narrative in the run up to the devolution referendums in 1997. The now-almost-forgotten ‘new politics’ was already about a ‘crisis’ of representative government. Indeed, perhaps ironically, the modern Scottish experience may provide a corrective to the idea that traditional representative democracy in the UK is under threat. The Scottish experience shows us that ‘new politics’ was little more than rhetoric and the Scottish Parliament has operated along Westminster lines despite being designed as a ‘consensus democracy’ with participative and deliberative elements. In other words, counter to the argument presented in the introduction, the alleged ‘more participatory or deliberative models practiced elsewhere’, such as Scotland, do not ‘offer a sharp corrective to the UK tradition’. Instead, the comparisons show us that such images of crisis may be universal or, at least, not specific to the UK experience. The same can be said for the universal constraints to serious challenges to representative government or a rise in participation. For example, any perceived challenge to the idea of a central government ‘club’ is offset by the limitations to such challenges, not least in terms of the limited extent to which the population (or key parts of it) can pay attention to modern governments with huge resources and responsibilities. Instead, what we may be witnessing is an unprecedented level of attention to a very small proportion of government business.
Third, the same sorts of crises associated with UK politics and representative government can be found in Scottish politics, suggesting that constitutional change does not represent a solution to such problems. For example, the Scottish Parliament had its own expenses scandal and ‘lobbygate’ experience several years before Westminster and it also has representatives with similar levels of ‘politics facilitating’ backgrounds (Keating and Cairney, 2006). "
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)