A path dependent run around the lake

Here is a story of how I managed to inadvertently (or accidentally or mistakenly) run a two-thirds marathon mostly in the dark when all I wanted to do was run a 5k in daylight.  There is a (n albeit tenuous) academic link, since it was during a work trip that it happened and I will segue neatly into a discussion of path dependence at the end of the story.  I went to the Australian Political Studies Association conference to give a public policy paper (as part of the UK-Australia PSA exchange, host Richard Eccleston) in Hobart, then up to Brisbane to give a policy paper at the University of Queensland (host:  Alastair Stark) and, finally, to give a paper on Scottish minority government at the Australian National University in Canberra (hosts: Ian Marsh and John Wanna). This thing happened on my first night in Canberra. 

I was staying one night at the Diplomat hotel in Canberra before heading to University House at the ANU (yes, it sounds warm, but think Scottish weather on this day). I went for a run from the hotel down by the lake (Lake Griffin Burley).  So far so good.  I ran past some black swans (which, of course, always remind the (pretentious ) me of Popper) and then ran past what I think is the national portrait gallery (which is a lovely looking building surrounded by flags; on this day there was a wedding taking place inside and out).  I was generally marvelling at how beautiful the lake and its surroundings were.  So, my 2-3k each way run soon turned into maybe 6k, one way, so far.  Then I got to a sign which said that I could run on a nice loop round a part of the lake.  It was called the ‘west’ loop.  The sign told me that I had 2 main choices: run the west loop on its own (a mere 16k, or 10 miles in old money) or the whole lake, consisting  of the west, central and east loops (28k).  I had been to the gym to do some weights, so decided to keep it short.  The sign told me that the ground was marked with the distance (good, because I didn’t take my GPS watch) and, I thought, since I had already run about 6k along the west route,  I only needed to run another 10k to do the full loop (incorrect).  When I got to the marked 10k spot, I initially thought ‘any minute now’ but the distance kept going up and up.  It was also dark by now. To cut a long story a bit less long, it turned out that the 6k I had already run was on the central loop, meaning that I had to run the 6k, then the 16k, then the 6k back to the hotel.  This is about two-thirds of a marathon.  Perhaps the only saving grace is that it was not 32k (20 miles), which is the point at which my legs generally start to give up (it was also cold, so good for keeping the sweat down).

Here are the various thoughts that went through my head on this route (think maybe 3 hours of running – I am not quick – with one hour of light and the rest in fading light then darkness punctuated by a full moon):

1.      This is really nice.

2.      What a beautiful lake.

3.      Hey, black swans (must remember to tweet something about Popper).

4.      Hey, nice flags at that museum (and it that a wedding?  How uplifting – maybe run some more to celebrate life).

5.      Hey, an interesting loop with landmarks and signs telling you what they are.  Why not?  I’m on my own and no-one is waiting for me to get back (yes, that is a double edged sword).

6.      Those birds are beautiful – bright blue and red.

7.      Oh dear, those other birds look like vultures and they sound pretty vicious (I am told they were probably cockatoos).

8.      It’s getting dark, but I should be OK – nearly there (I wasn’t).

9.      Oh, there’s Government House.  It’s almost dark but I wonder if can go in (no.  At this point I also daydreamed about a secret service officer offering me a lift to my hotel, but that didn’t happen either).

10.  10K?  I should be back by now.

11.  Why does the map say that I am getting further away? Should I turn back (yes, but I didn’t)?

12.  It is really dark now.  Thank goodness for the moonlight.

13.  Can I really hear lions roaring (yes, I was running past the zoo – but it is only less worrying in retrospect)?

14.  Well done, Paul – all that marathon training is coming in handy now, eh?

15.  Tut – another interesting landmark. Another  museum. So what? I want to go home.

16.  Why can I only see hills – where did all the lights and buildings go?

17.  Quick pee while no one is around (yes)?

18.  I wonder how long it takes for your body to give up on your hands/ arms and just heat up the rest.

19.  I wonder if I can get a blog out of this (yes).

20.  Oh good, there’s something that looks like CN Tower (it turns out you can see this from anywhere in Canberra, so not as much help as I thought).

21.  People cycling past with lights on – good sign.

22.  A guy running past me at twice the speed – even better sign (this is usually quite dispiriting, but not tonight).

23.  Another gallery or library?  Yes, very interesting.

24.  Oh, so that’s where the ANU (Australian National University ) is.

25.  I have definitely run too much.  Brainwave – I must have run along the central route, so it’s 16k and the rest.

26.  Oh good, there’s the central route.  22k down and only 6k to go.

27.  There are the flags.

28.  Is that really a disco going on, on the boat going round the lake (yes – I think it was part of the life-affirming wedding)?

Sadly, one other thought was this: ‘this would be a good way to explain the idea of path dependence’ (often discussed by scholars studying historical institutionalism).  Probably the most cited article on this is by Paul Pierson, who describes the idea of increasing returns; that an initial policy decision may have long term consequences; institutions develop and it becomes increasingly valuable to maintain that policy rather than reject it and begin again (a relatively costly process).  Or, as I say in Understanding Public Policy: “Path dependence suggests that when a commitment to an institution has been established and resources devoted to it, over time it produces ‘increasing returns’ and it effectively becomes increasingly costly to choose a different path. 

To use the usual example, as soon as the QWERTY keyboard became popular, better options were not adopted because it would be a too-expensive process to replace the current stock and persuade people to use something else. The term ‘path dependence’ is apt, because it highlights an image of going down a path and finding it difficult to consider going back in the opposite direction.  This is exactly what I was doing – questioning at various points if I should just turn round and go back, but always answering to myself that it would be better to keep going forwards.  Note the psychological aspect to this process.  I was invested in this particular path and would, at least, have felt silly for going against my original decision.  At various stages, it would have made sense to go back, but I never did, so I ended up running 28k to get back.  In policymaking or institutional terms, there may not be the equivalent sense of personal investment in a chosen path (in fact, a change of government might often produce the opposite effect), but institutions are really collections of rules and norms which maintain some sort of commitment to an initial policy decision.  This is often akin to a personal investment in an outcome (indeed, many members of organisations may reproduce rules to maintain their own position). Consequently, they are often difficult or costly to challenge and the initial decision is costly and difficult to reverse (particularly if organisations reproduce rules and behaviour without many people paying attention).   After a few days, I went to the same lake and did a quick 5k in the sunny daylight, but I’m afraid I don’t know what theory or concept that would demonstrate (policy learning?).

Scottish Public Expenditure Explained

I am co-authoring a 2nd edition of Scottish Politics with Neil McGarvey (2013).  It includes a revised chapter on "Money and Power: Public Expenditure in Scotland".  It still argues that nothing much has changed regarding the system used to determine the Scottish Government's budget.  Of course, what has changed is that there is less money now than before - but, come on now, let's be careful with this sort of statement.  As the chapter remarks:

"Overall, the real rise in spending in Scotland from 2000-11 has been 53% – a figure that gives some important context to current discussions of economic austerity below (but note that the cash rise, close to 100%, is a very (and increasingly) misleading figure often used by elected politicians to reinforce the importance of the Union dividend).  The first drop in real spending (2010-11) follows a series of very large real rises in annual budgets since devolution". 

Now, if you don't plan to read the whole thing, note that this is a discussion of all identifiable spending in Scotland, not the Scottish Government budget. 

I will copy and paste the introduction below and you can find the rest here -
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1XJYv-6Lj1bMY06oTHqTluO6KjWOA4bHETY3afNE8hfo/edit .  If you have any polite comments on my numerical skills, please make them politely.  Thanks to Richard Ashcroft (the academic, not the singer) for helping with the equations necessary to work out future spending using the GDP deflator in table 11.2 (although I don't show my working in the chapter). 

"In this chapter we discuss what may be the most important area of Scottish politics. Public finance is a key aspect of the political process, and the issues raised in this chapter inform most of the themes discussed in this book. Yet, despite the importance of finance to Scottish politics, and long running debates producing calls for reform, the system of raising and distributing money has not changed since devolution. Post-devolution Scotland contin¬ues to receive almost all of its funding for public expenditure from the UK Treasury in the form of a block grant. The arrangements for the transfer of this money are almost identical to those which existed pre-1999 and reflect the continued use of the Barnett formula to alter the block grant at the margins.


[Barnett formula: A mechanism used by the Treasury to determine the adjustment in devolved public expenditure (Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland) following changes to expenditure in England (in certain policy areas).]

This formula, and its history, is the main focus of the chap¬ter since it is central to an understanding of power relations between Scotland and the UK. These relations are often linked to the idea of Scotland’s ‘financial advantage’ compared to the rest of the UK and the ability of the Scottish Government to spend, but not raise, its money (the issue of finance also informs our discussion of power within Scotland, but the Scottish Government relationship with the Scottish Parliament and local authorities is discussed in chapters 5 and 10).

There are perhaps two main threats to the current settlement. First, the debate on constitutional change has produced renewed calls for some form of fiscal autonomy even if Scotland does not vote for independence. Chapter 12 examines such future proposals in more depth. All we note just now is that, despite this new agenda, the Barnett formula remains. Second, the global economic crisis has contributed to the UK’s new ‘age of austerity’ and a reduction in UK and Scottish public expenditure. Consequently, devolution has been marked by significant rises in Scottish funding settlements approximately for the first eight years, followed by minimal rises and then reductions in the Scottish Government budget. This chapter:

• discusses the issues of fairness, advantage and power in relation to Scottish public finance;

• outlines in detail what the Barnett formula is and why it was adopted;

• considers why the Barnett formula has endured to this day and what this tells us about power and IGR;

• highlights the role of the Treasury, examining Scotland’s unusual inability to determine its budget but discretion on how it is spent;

• highlights trends in Scottish Government spending.

• examines the consequences of the global economic crisis and the UK’s new ‘age of austerity’."

Pressure Politics and the 'Scottish Policy Style' Explained

Well, what better way to celebrate Andy Murray's US Open win than to read about group-government relations in Scotland after devolution?  I am co-authoring a second edition of 'Scottish Politics' with Neil McGarvey. It will appear in 2013. It includes a significantly revised chapter on 'pressure politcs', updated to include the post-2007 SNP era.  The main argument is that, while we can identify a 'Scottish Policy Style', we should not assume that Scottish and UK policymaking processes necessarily differ.  Or, if they do, it may be more to do with Scotland's size and the Scottish Government's capacity than a new culture of openness or Scotland's 'consensus democracy' institutions.   It focuses on Scotland, but has some things to say about the often-mistaken assumptions we make about UK policymaking (a point expanded on, for example, here - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1478-9302.2011.00233.x/abstract)(email me if you are struggling for access to the article). 

I have copy and pasted the introduction below and you can find the rest here:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1aMXonCigJvVTLQyw83Hp5Xcx9w7AdZHfoF8S0Qiad20/edit

"Chapter 5 suggests that the Scottish Parliament did not foster new and effective forms of deliberative and participatory democracy. It highlights the similarities between the Westminster and Holyrood systems and argues that, in both, most policy is formulated outside the legislative arena following regular consultation between govern¬ments and pressure participants such as interest groups. This chapter examines the extent to which that process of policymaking is distinctive in Scotland following devolution. In other words, is there a ‘Scottish Policy Style’? Policy style refers simply to the ways in which governments make and implement policy (Richardson, 1982). It has two dimensions: the way that governments make policy, in consultation with pressure participants; and, the way that they implement policy in partnership with organizations such as local authorities (discussed at more length in chapter 10).



We can identify some hopes for ‘new politics’ in this area, linked to the idea that Scotland is a ‘consensus’ rather than a ‘majoritarian’ democracy (box 7.2). The SCC proposed, albeit in a rather vague way, a new type of pluralist democracy in which consultation with affected interests would be as wide as possible, not only with established interest groups but also previously excluded groups with a limited voice and ability to organise. This push for broader consultation is associated with a monitoring role performed by Scottish Parliament committees who may oblige the Scottish Government to consult far and wide until they are satisfied that all groups have ‘had their say’. This would perhaps help produce a new and improved consultation process between the Scottish Government, Scottish Parliament and a wide range of representative organizations in the community, voluntary sector, professions and business. This inclusion of hitherto excluded sections of society would come at some expense to the ‘usual suspects’, or the larger and better resourced groups which tend to dominate consultation time with government.

The tone of much of these recommendations is based on the idea that new forms of consultation would take Scotland further away from UK policymaking which is relatively ‘top-down’ and based either on a lack of proper consultation or consultation restricted to a small number of powerful groups that squeeze out the competition. Yet, much of the policymaking literature suggests that this image of the UK is a caricature based on minimal evidence. Scotland may have its own policy style, but this is often related to factors unrelated to ‘new politics’ (such as Scotland’s size and the scale of its responsibilities). The recommendations are also perhaps based on the assumption that there can be a Scottish-specific arena in which pressure participants can engage. Rather, organised groups must consider how best to influence policy in an era of ‘multi-level governance’ in which many levels and types of government are involved, from the European Union to local authorities (chapter 9). Further, the role of local authorities has changed since 2007 (chapter 10), prompting many groups to reassess their lobbying strategies.


This chapter discusses:

• The meaning of ‘pluralist democracy’ and the SCC hopes for a new Scottish Policy Style.

• The nature of pressure politics in Scotland.

• The evidence of a difference between Scottish and UK policy styles.

• The strategies of interest groups in Scotland who are faced with uncertainty in the era of multi-level governance.

• The impact of SNP Government since 2007."

Scottish Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) Explained

I am co-authoring a second edition of 'Scottish Politics' with Neil McGarvey. It will appear in 2013. It includes a reasonably revised chapter on IGR, updated to include the post-2007 SNP era and developments since 2010 (Conservative-led UK Government).  The argument is still very much that IGR is generally informal and that there are perhaps far fewer major public disputes than we might expect (perhaps with the usual exception of the independence debate).  The chapter can be found here - https://docs.google.com/document/d/1cixHY2OFXWiQmABedXiPE1YjVBh8aGHdL3NIJSlW25g/edit .

Comparing Devolved Governance

I have just managed to pad out a book review (Comparing Devolved Governance Derek Birrell, Palgrave, 2012, 296 pp. ISBN: 978-0-280-27820-7) to 3000 words in Parliamentary Affairs.  The first section is copy and pasted below and you can read the rest here if you are an academic or a rich personal subscriber.  If you are neither, and want to read the rest, send me an email and we can arrange to meet in a dark alley with brown envelopes.

"The study of politics in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland is not something guaranteed to attract a wide academic audience, even in the UK. Further, that attention tends to be about specific things, such as the prospect of independence in Scotland, further devolution in Wales or levels of political conflict and violence in Northern Ireland. At a push, it might extend to the analysis of different electoral results and party systems. Yet, the devolved government experience has much more to offer, providing a rich source of evidence to inform policy learning among governments or simply to provide a comparative analytical and empirical framework within the UK. This can be done in two main ways: comparing the UK's increasingly complicated governance arrangements with other countries; and, comparing UK and devolved government behaviour. The latter has much potential even though the devolved territories and governments are markedly different from England and the UK Government. This difference can often be a good thing for comparative analysis because any similarities in political behaviour and policy outcomes may be remarkable, while the differences help us tell a story about why things are done this way in the UK. Indeed, the Scottish and Welsh context is particularly important because devolved ‘new politics’ was often sold as a departure from ‘old Westminster’ (the Northern Ireland narrative was based more on power sharing and domestic politics). Scotland in particular was perhaps designed to be a consensus, not majoritarian, democracy. In this context, the devolution literature highlights a wide range of interesting sources of comparison.


New politics and political crisis: the expenses scandal in Westminster in 2009 prompted much soul searching on issues such as the role and value of representative government, trust in politics and the extent to which MPs were responsible representatives. The latter prompted further …"

Scottish Parliament Explained

I am co-authoring a second edition of 'Scottish Politics' with Neil McGarvey. It will appear in 2013. It includes a very revised chapter which has a discussion of the Scottish Parliament and new forms of participative and deliberative democracy.  The latter used to command its own chapter, but so little has happened (on things like civic forums and petitions) that there is very little to write about.  The chapter can be found here - https://docs.google.com/document/d/12NRcU7r0YpBO5Fkl4Ms9lOzgelXnE4HnXSzYTewcm0A/edit?pli=1 . If, like me, you find Google Docs a bit slow and fiddly, you can just download the file from the site.

So what if many SNP voters don't support independence?

The latest story doing the rounds is that a large chunk of people who vote SNP do not support independence (see for example the Scotman and the Express). The coverage of this story is bothersome for at least four reasons:


1. The news is not new - we have known this for some time.
2. The difference between party-voting and referendum-voting attitudes can be identified in relation to most parties. While the numbers may be less newsworthy in other parties, there are Conservative, Liberal Democrat and Labour supporters who favour independence and SNP voters who support the status quo (a few might even favour the abolition of devolution).

3. This story could easily be spun in the opposite way - the SNP managed to persuade a large number of people, who don't support independence, to vote for them anyway. This seemed like a major feat as recently as May 2011 and it said a lot about their improving image of governing competence (at a time when attitudes to independence may not have changed).

4. It is being used, in a disingenuous way, by parties like the Conservatives to undermine support for independence without recognising the support for a referendum question on further devolution. The Conservative press release uses the figures as a segue to their argument that there should be a single yes/no referendum question and that Alex Salmond’s openness to a question on further devolution reveals his cowardice. Yet, it is using figures generated by Reform Scotland to demonstrate the high levels of support for ‘Devo Plus’ and to remind political parties that they are ignoring the most-popular option of further devolution in favour of polarising a debate on independence.

5. Most parties know this (1-4) and they do it anyway. This is an overly cynical and too-misleading way to engage in such an important debate.