Tuesday, 12 March 2013

Complexity Theory and Policymaking

This blog will appear shortly on the CIPFA Scotland website to run alongside my talk at their annual conference. I will then amend the blog after discussions during the two days (informing my round-up talk on the second day).  The CIPFA site will also host comments.  Some discussions can be followed on Twitter #cipfascotlandconference


CIPFA Scotland Annual Conference 2013:  ‘Edge of chaos: leading to new possibilities’

Paul Cairney, Professor of Politics and Public Policy, University of Stirling p.a.cairney@stir.ac.uk

Complexity Theory and Complex Adaptive Systems

The theme running through this year’s conference is: ‘adaptive system thinking … how adaptive public finance and its finance function and people are’.  There are three key sources of background for the discussions:
  1. Economic crisis. The UK and devolved governments are addressing a new age of austerity associated with economic crisis, rising government debt and plans to reduce public spending.  The reductions may be so significant, in some areas, that they prompt a complete rethink of the way that governments plan and deliver services (or new ways to identify, understand and seek to solve policy problems). In some areas, governments may simply cut budgets and encourage other bodies to decide how to adapt.
  2. Targets and rules.  How can targets and rules ensure the delivery of public services?  This is a perennial topic in the study of government. For CIPFA in particular, the issue may relate to the need to follow rules to ensure that the spending of public money is properly accounted for.  We may ask ourselves if current rules and targets produce the right sort of behaviour or if they encourage rigid rule following (or game playing) which might cause unintended consequences. 
  3. Organisational Change in Scotland. Since 2007, the Scottish Government has made some important changes to the Scottish public sector – centralising some areas (such as the police and fire services) and decentralising others (such as local authorities). Its new relationship with local authorities has the potential to place more responsibility on local actors to identify and solve problems rather than implement policies made from the ‘top’.  The Scottish Government’s approach may also be contrasted with that of the UK Government (associated with a more extensive and punitive targets/ inspection regime).

A combination of all three elements draws our attention to the importance of adapting and responding to crises, perhaps by taking a flexible approach to existing rules to ensure that they are not overtaken by events and new problems. Such decisions may increasingly be taken at a local level, often without central government direction; they may fall increasingly to particular branches or professions within larger governmental organisations, often without explicit or detailed government direction.  This is a situation that may be particularly worrying to a profession built on demonstrating financial accountability to the public through government and Parliament.

In this context, one aim of the conference is to find the right balance between following proper rules properly and adopting a flexible approach: to use discretion to secure outcomes for which policies may have been designed; and, to interpret rules in the right way to secure the right outcomes.  This process is subject to uncertainty; it is difficult to know how to use rules flexibly.  Indeed, even the language we might use to describe it – such as ‘stretching’ rules – implies that it is inappropriate.  So, while most of the sessions are devoted to how accountants and other actors in the public sector might become more creative in their contribution to the use of public money, this blog (and my first brief lecture) is devoted simply to the question: how can we justify the flexible use of government rules?   

If put bluntly, the main message that we could take from the policymaking literature is that:
  1. No government can control the public sector, its outputs or the subsequent outcomes.
  2. Many governments exacerbate this problem by imposing a large number of too-rigid targets backed up by a punitive inspection regime, producing unintended consequences.
  3. Giving more discretion to local public sector employees allows them to adapt to local circumstances in a way that central governments cannot anticipate.

A classic discussion of this problem can be linked to key texts in the policymaking literature, including:
  • Lipsky’s idea of ‘street level bureaucracy’. He suggests that there are so many targets, rules and laws that no public agency or official can be reasonably expected to fulfil them all.  In fact, many may be too vague or even contradictory, requiring ‘street level bureaucrats’ to choose some over others.  The potential irony is that the cumulative pressure from more central government rules and targets effectively provides implementers with a greater degree of freedom to manage their budgets and day-to-day activities.
  • Hjern’s focus on intra-departmental conflict, when central government departments pursue programmes with competing aims, and interdependence, when policies are implemented by multiple organizations. Programmes are implemented through ‘implementation structures’ where ‘parts of many public and private organizations cooperate in the implementation of a programme’. Although national governments create the overall framework of regulations and resources, and there are ‘administrative imperatives’ behind the legislation authorizing a programme, the main shaping of policy takes place at local levels.
  • The more recent focus on ‘governance’ as an alternative to the idea of ‘government’ (not to be confused with a discussion of ‘corporate’ or ‘good’ governance).  While such problems of central government control have prompted governments in the past to embrace New Public Management (NPM) and seek to impose order through hierarchy and targeting, local implementation networks (with members from the public, third and private sectors) may not be amenable to such direct control

A more recent contribution comes from the modern study of complexity theory.  As Marco Thiel’s discussion on Friday suggests, complexity theory has been applied to an incredibly wide range of activity, from the swarming behaviour of bees, the weather and the function of the brain, to social and political systems.  The argument is that all such systems have common properties or are subject to the same arguments, including:
  • A complex system is greater than the sum of its parts; those parts are interdependent - elements interact with each other, share information and combine to produce systemic behaviour.
  • Some attempts to influence complex systems are dampened (negative feedback) while others are amplified (positive feedback). Small actions can have large effects and large actions can have small effects.
  • Complex systems are particularly sensitive to initial conditions that produce a long-term momentum or ‘path dependence’.
  • They exhibit ‘emergence’, or behaviour that results from the interaction between elements at a local level rather than central direction.  
  • They may contain ‘strange attractors’ or demonstrate extended regularities of behaviour which may be interrupted by short bursts of change.

As you might expect from (what seems like) a theory of all things, the language is vague and needs some interpretation in each field. In the policymaking field, the identification of a complex system is often used to make the following suggestions:
  • Law-like behaviour is difficult to identify – so a policy that was successful in one context may not have the same effect in another.
  • Policymaking systems are difficult to control; policy makers should not be surprised when their policy interventions do not have the desired effect.
  • Policy makers in the UK have been too driven by the idea of order, maintaining rigid hierarchies and producing top-down, centrally driven policy strategies.  An attachment to performance indicators, to monitor and control local actors, may simply result in policy failure and demoralised policymakers.
  • Policymaking systems or their environments change quickly. Therefore, organisations must adapt quickly and not rely on a single policy strategy.

On this basis, there is a tendency in the literature to encourage the delegation of decision-making to local actors:
  1. Rely less on central government driven targets, in favour of giving local organisations more freedom to learn from their experience and adapt to their rapidly-changing environment.
  2. To deal with uncertainty and change, encourage trial-and-error projects, or pilots, that can provide lessons, or be adopted or rejected, relatively quickly.
  3. Encourage better ways to deal with alleged failure by treating ‘errors’ as sources of learning (rather than a means to punish organisations) or setting more realistic parameters for success/ failure.
  4. Encourage a greater understanding, within the public sector, of the implications of complex systems and terms such as ‘emergence’ or ‘feedback loops’. 

In other words, this literature, when applied to policymaking, tends to encourage a movement from centrally driven targets, rules and performance indicators towards a more flexible understanding of rules and targets by local actors who are more able to understand and adapt to rapidly-changing local circumstances.

Of course, you may still end up feeling that the advice is a bit vague (and perhaps not completely convincing), but it provides a starting point for discussion, followed by various conference presentations on how to use, creatively or flexibly, new forms of discretion in the public sector.  There will be the usual forums for participation – including Q&A sessions after lectures and smaller seminar groups – as well as a live twitter feed throughout (#cipfascotlandconference). 

 
For more detail, and further references, see:

Cairney, P. (2012) ‘Complexity Theory in Political Science and Public Policy’, Political Studies Review, 10, 346-58 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1478-9302.2012.00270.x/abstract (or email Paul for a copy)

See also Robert Geyer on Complexity and the Stacey Diagram - http://vimeo.com/25979052 

 

Monday, 11 March 2013

Should You Play the Citation Game?



 
This blog asks the simple but super-loaded question to academics: should you try, as much as possible, to make sure that proxy measures of your performance put you in a good light?

There are many, generally convincing, reasons to avoid getting sucked into metrics as proxy measures of performance.  Waiting times/ lists as a measure of health service performance is perhaps the best example, although league tables of school exam results give it a run for its money.  In higher education, we have the often-criticised reputation ranking for Universities, alongside other league tables on research performance and teaching reputations.  The professional academic equivalent may be a department’s record of research achievement, measured in terms of grant income and publication output according to external assessment (and the reputation of the journals and book publishers).

It may also relate to the growth in the assessment of individuals, through the income and output routes, but also using metrics on things like citations.  This focus on citations can relate to, for example, the ‘impact factor’ of the journal as a guide for submissions – a proxy that appears to have become almost taken for granted in many Universities/ disciplines, but one that is under increasing criticism (for example, Google ‘lse blog impact factor’). It can also relate to an individual’s h-index, which relates to the number of publications cited a number of times (for example, an h of 16 means that 16 of author’s outputs have been cited at least 16 times). 

We can come up with an incredible number of good reasons to question the value of individual citations measures, including:
  1. People may be cited as examples of rubbish academia, or as methods/ approaches to avoid.
  2. People may be able to inflate their citation scores by engaging in self-citation and (perhaps more importantly) group-citation, in which a group decides (explicitly or implicitly) to cite each other regularly.
  3. Some disciplines and sub-fields will generate a smaller amount of citations (such as in large parts of historical research which follow a long-research-low-output-but-high-quality model) and some will produce a higher amount, such as the life and natural sciences with a tendency to low word count, high output and co-authored papers.

However, I still think you should, as sensibly as possible, play the game, for the following reasons:
  1. You may get the impression from the (truly depressing) THE, and from departmental discussions, that we are all against these measures; that we have worked out their weaknesses and everyone else has too.  This would be a mistake.  Many people secretly (and some people openly) think that they are decent measures and act accordingly. For example, there are people like me who make sympathetic noises in discussions, then go off and play the game.
  2. More importantly, in my experience, they are favoured most by senior managers (and/ or important disciplines in universities).  The general point is that: (a) policymakers always work in an environment of uncertainty and ambiguity, with limited measures of performance and a limited ability to make sense of the available information; and, (b) they still have to make choices.  Specifically, they often make what we think are the wrong choices – but they make such decisions from a different vantage point.
  3. In my experience of promotions panels, someone’s h is discussed and debated quite naturally in the natural, physical and life sciences.  In fact, on a panel of about 10, you might have 4 people with their laptops out, debating the size and significance of applicants’ scores (with, for example, an h of 20 the figure they hope for in a professor).  It may not be the deciding factor, but it really counts. 
  4. At least one of those 4 people is likely to be a senior manager.    This is crucial for a discussion of the use of h in the arts, humanities and social sciences.  This is where you get the biggest opposition to h scores and you might have panels that reject them as measures of performance.  However, that senior manager may also be on the panel, applying the same mindset.  More importantly, they might not hold as much sway in this committee, but the recommendations may then go to a more senior committee on which they sit.
  5. The same might be said for appointments panels.  You may not be aware of the importance of the h, but there could be at least one person sitting there who has done the background work.  Or, that person is waiting for the recommendations and may use h as a way to argue against them.

So, if I was asked by a new colleague about the importance of h, I could not simply recommend that they ignore it and just focus on good quality research (which is a bit misleading anyway – I am with Silvia on this one).  Instead I would recommend four things:
  1. Get on top of the way that your h is measured.  Senior managers tend to use something like ‘Publish or Perish’ which, in my experience, can bring your h down (particularly with books). Or, people in meetings start debating the right number instead of your application. Instead, I began to put on my promotion and application documents a link to my Google Scholar page, which is the list of my citations that I think is the most accurate. 
  2. Present a convincing narrative of your h, not just in terms of how misleading the measure is.  Often, this is about pointing out that, for example, your articles have been published very recently (too recent to take off) or, for example, that your citation rates for particular journals are higher than the 5-year median (the measure now used by Google scholar to rank journals). This would sit alongside the usual narrative on your outputs and the quality of journals. My preference is to focus on the h trajectory: it is this high now, which means that we can reasonably expect it to get this high in 5 years.
  3. Don’t be a self-flagellating non-citer of your own work for the sake of principle.  If it makes sense to cite your own work, do it.  Reviewers and editors will soon tell you if it is too much.   
  4. We operate within a highly-critical profession in which constant rejection and criticism is something that we have to put up with to get ahead.  So, enjoy the occasional pat on the back that Google Scholar gives you.  Sign up for the service that allows you to receive an email when you are next cited – it is one of the very few boosts to the ego on which academics can rely.

 

Wednesday, 27 February 2013

Potted History of Needs Assessment and Barnett

This is an excerpt from a forthcoming book (Cairney, P. and McGarvey, N. (2013) Scottish Politics 2nd ed (Basingstolke: Palgrave) used to answer a question (about the Needs Assessment exercise conducted by the Treasury in the 1970s) posed by  Peter Matthews ‏@urbaneprofessor in a recent twitter conversation (I think the 1st ed. has a longer discussion).  The real knowledge on this is held by David Heald http://www.davidheald.com/

....
"Life before Barnett

The modern history of funding settlements demonstrates the incremental and almost accidental side of Scottish politics. This began in 1888 with the Goschen formula, named after the then Chancellor of the Exchequer. The formula is a by-product of the attempts by Goschen to link local revenue to local spending and separate it from funding designated for Imperial finance. Although this overall project failed, the formula itself lasted over 70 years as a means of determining Scottish entitlement from the UK exchequer (Mitchell and Bell, 2002). The figure of 11/80 of England and Wales was a rough estimate of Scotland’s population share at that time, based loosely on Scotland’s contribution to probate duties (taxes levied on the estate of the deceased), but was never recalcu­lated to take Scotland’s (relative) falling population into account.

As the size of the UK state grew, so did the size of the Scottish Office, with the Goschen formula more or less at the heart of its budget settlement. Indeed, although the formula was not used formally from 1959, the culture of accepting Scotland’s existing share as a starting point and adjusting at the margins became well-estab­lished. Therefore, what began as a formula which initially advantaged per capita spending in England and received minimal Scottish support, eventually became a system redistribut­ing money to Scotland as its share of the UK population fell (McLean and McMillan, 2003: 50).

The long-term use of the Goschen formula reinforces the idea of incrementalism and inertia in politics: the existing or default position is difficult to shift. Fundamental change is expensive and likely to undermine a well-established negotiated settlement between competing interests. While the Goschen formula is not something that would have been chosen from scratch by a comprehensively rational decision-maker or a more open process of decision-making, as a default position it was diffi­cult to challenge. We may then ask why this process was eventually replaced. The answer is that a ‘window of opportunity’ (see Kingdon, 1984) came in the 1970s with the prospect of political devolution which drew attention to Scotland’s share of public expenditure.

Barnett and needs assessment 

The high level of UK attention to Scotland’s financial status (particularly among English MPs representing constituencies with ‘comparable needs’) was such that it prompted governmental action. The ‘window of opportunity’ was opened by the prospect of a referendum on devolution. This contributed to the ‘reframing’ of the policy problem - from a technical process to ensure Scotland’s share of resources to a political process providing advantage to Scotland. The Treasury’s response was to commission a Needs Assessment Study to estab­lish the share that each UK territory was ‘entitled’ to (based on indicators of need such as proportions of schoolchildren and older people and population sparsity). This would be used in negotiations with the newly-formed Scottish Assembly, perhaps allowing the issue to return, eventually, to its low-salience status (although Barnett himself disputes this motivation - see Twigger, 1998: 8).

In retrospect we may say that the needs-assessment exercise was doomed to failure (in that it was not officially adopted) for three reasons. First, there is no common definition or consensus on the concept of need. More money spent on one ‘need’ means less on another; it is a political issue involving winners and losers, not a technical issue in which everyone’s problems can be solved. Second, there were problems with the quality of information and its implications.  For example, even when ‘objective factors’ (e.g. population sparsity or age) were taken into account it was never clear if any extra spending would refer to inputs (e.g. number of doctors), outputs (number of operations) or outcomes (equality in levels of health). Third, the outcomes from a needs assessment will always require a political decision which takes into account not only the ‘facts’ but also factors such as the public reaction.  The report itself represented only one aspect of that process. In particular, while the Treasury report in 1979 suggested that Scotland’s greater need was 16% (when at that time the level of extra spending was 22%) there was no rush to close this perceived gap.

Instead, the Barnett formula was introduced on an interim basis. Then, following the negative referendum vote, the needs-assessment agenda was dropped. The Treasury was not inclined to impose a system with little more benefit than the Barnett formula in the immediate aftermath of a refer­endum process seen by many in Scotland as an attempt by the UK Government to thwart home rule. Effectively, the end result was the replace­ment of the Goschen formula with a very similar Barnett formula.

This formula remains in place today in large part because the existing process has several political advantages. First, it satisfies broad coalitions in Scotland and England. In Scotland, it maintains (at least in the short term) historic levels of spending. In England, the ‘Barnett squeeze’ gives the impression that, over time, this advantage will be eroded. Second, it satisfies many governmental interests. For the Scottish Government it traditionally provided a guaranteed baseline and a chance to negotiate extra funding. It allows Scottish control over domes­tic spending, with limited Treasury interference. For the Treasury, it provides an automatic mechanism to calculate territorial shares which represent a small part of its overall budget.

The adoption of the formula therefore represented successful agenda-setting - establishing the principle in fairly secret negotiations and then revealing the details only when the annual process could be presented as a humdrum and automatic process (allocating funding at the margins) which was efficient and had support from all sides within government. Indeed, the level of implicit support for Barnett was so high that there was no serious, sustained chal­lenge to this formula either before or after political devolution in 1999 (perhaps aided by the perception that the Barnett ‘squeeze’ was working – Cairney, 2011a: 208). In fact, the value of Barnett has been reinforced since 1999; the trend is towards determining a greater proportion of Scottish Government spend from this process."

Tuesday, 26 February 2013

Standing on the Shoulders of Giants?


My new year’s resolution was to make a blog entry for every academic article published from 2013, since the article may be behind a paywall (although if you contact me, I will see you right) and the article’s ideas may be expressed in a relatively inaccessible way (although we don’t all spew jargon-filled group-closure nonsense).  The aim is to get people interested enough to go from a short tweet to a larger blog to the high bar of reading (or the holy grail of citing) the article itself.

 

This article is called ‘Standing on the Shoulders of Giants’ because I wanted to give the impression that we are discussing the accumulation of scientific knowledge; our aim is to build on the insights and knowledge produced by others rather than start from scratch each time.  As stated, this is fairly uncontroversial and we might find that most people can get behind the project (in fact, they are already doing so, implicitly or explicitly).  The more problematic and debatable part of this task relates to the details: *how* do we do it? 

The article focuses on this task in the policy literature, but the themes extend to political, social and, in most cases, the so called ‘hard’ sciences.  In fact, for many of us, it may be reminiscent of postgraduate discussions of the philosophy of science, in which we consider the inadequacy of most explanations of how knowledge is accumulated (from the ‘strawman’ of inductivism to the often-caricatured position of Popper (on falsification), to the idea of paradigm shift made famous by Kuhn and the rather-misleading ‘anything goes’ description of the approach by Feyerabend – a discussion captured neatly by Chalmers).  Many of us will have concluded two things: (1) we believe that we are in the business of accumulating knowledge/ we know much more about the world now than we did in the past, and we have acted accordingly; but, (2) we have no idea *how* that has happened because all of the explanations of knowledge accumulation are problematic, while some suggest that one body of knowledge *replaces* another rather than building on it. 

In that broad context, the article (a) outlines three main ways in which scholars address this issue in policy studies and political science; and, (b) highlights the problems that may arise in each case:

 
1. Synthesis – we combine the insights of multiple theories, concepts or models to produce a single theory (in fact, the article discusses the difference between ‘synthesis’ and ‘super-synthesis’, but I don’t want to undermine my “we don’t all spew jargon-filled group-closure nonsense”).  One key problem is that when we produce a synthetic theory, from a range of other theories or concepts, we have to assume that the component parts of this new hybrid are consistent with each other. Yet, if you scratch the surface of many concepts – such as ‘new institutionalism’ or ‘policy networks’ – you find all sorts of  disagreement about the nature of the world, how our concepts relate to it and how we gather knowledge of it. There are also practical problems regarding our assumption that the authors of these concepts have the same thing in mind when they describe things like ‘punctuated equilibrium’.  In other words, imagine that you have constructed a new theory based on the wisdom of five other people.  Then, get those people in the same room and you will find that they will share all sorts of – often intractable - disagreements with each other.  In that scenario, could you honestly state that your theory was based on accumulated knowledge? 

2. The ‘Complementary’ Approach. In this case, you accept that people have these differences and so you accommodate them – you entertain a range of theories/ concepts and explore the extent to which they explain the same thing in different ways.  This is a popular approach associated with people like Allison (who compared three different explanations of the Cuban missile crisis) and used by several others to compare policy events.  One key problem with this approach is that it is difficult to do full justice to each theory.  Most theories have associated methods which are labour intensive and costly, putting few in the position to make meaningful comparisons.  Instead, the comparisons tend to be desktop exercises based on a case study and the authors’ ability to consider how each theory would explain it.

3. The ‘Contradictory’ Approach.  In that context, another option is to encourage the independence of such theories. You watch as different research teams produce their own studies and you simply try to find some way to compare and combine their insights.  Of course, it is impossible to entertain an infinite number of theories, so we also need some way to compare them; to select some and reject others.  This is the approach that we may be most familiar with, since it involves coming up with a set of rules or criteria to make sure that each theory can be accepted (at least initially) by the scientific community.  You may see such rules described as follows:

  • A theory's methods should be explained so that they can be replicated by others.
  • Its concepts should be clearly defined, logically consistent, and give rise to empirically falsifiable hypotheses.
  • Its propositions should be as general as possible.
  • It should set out clearly what the causal processes are.
  • It should be subject to empirical testing and revision.

For me, this is where the task becomes very interesting because, on the one hand, most of us will find these aims to be intuitively appealing – but, on the other, they are incredibly problematic for the following reasons:

  • Few, if any, theories or research projects live up to these expectations.
  • The principles give a misleading impression of most (social?) scientific research which is largely built on trust rather than constant replication by others.
  • Many of the most famous proponents of this approach do something a bit different – such as when they subject their ‘secondary hypotheses’ to rigorous testing but insulate their ‘hard core’ from falsification.
  • The study of complex phenomenon may not allow us to falsify, since we can interpret our findings in very different ways.
  • Few theories are currently popular simply because they adhere to these principles.  In fact, science is much more of a social enterprise than the principles suggest. 

Of course, by now you may have identified a key problem with this argument: it is all beginning to sound a bit ‘postpositivist’ (which, in my mind, is still more of a term of abuse than ‘you, my friend, are a positivist’).  However, it does not need to be taken this way.  It is OK to highlight problems with scientific principles and admit that science is about the methods and beliefs accepted by a particular scientific community because, if you like, you can still assert that those principles and beliefs are *correct*. Many, many, people do.  In fact, perhaps we all do it, because we have to find a way to accept some theories, approaches and evidence and reject others.  We seek a way to produce some knowledge ourselves and find a common language and set of principles to make sure that we can compare our knowledge with the knowledge of others.  We seek a way to sift through an almost infinite number of ‘signals’ from our environment, to pay attention to very few and ignore most.  That task requires rules which are problematic but necessary. 

All I suggest we do (which is a bit of a bland recommendation) is to reject the unthinking and too-rigid application of rules that hold us all up to a standard that no-one will meet.  Rather, people in different disciplines might discuss and negotiate those rules with each other. This is more of an art than a science. 

I also argue that (a) if we are serious about these rules, and the need to submit theories and evidence to rigorous testing; but (b) we accept that most of this is done on trust rather than replication; then (c) we should take on some of that burden ourselves by subjecting our own evidence to a form of testing, in which we consider the extent to which our findings can be interpreted in different, and equally plausible, ways.   The article talks about producing different ‘narratives’ of the same evidence, but I won’t talk about that too much in case you confuse me with the presenter of Jackanory. 
 
Full reference: Cairney, P. (2013) 'Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: How Do We Combine the Insights of Multiple Theories in Public Policy Studies?' Policy Studies Journal, 41, 1, 1-21
 
 
TY  - JOUR
AU  - Cairney, Paul
TI  - Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: How Do We Combine the Insights of Multiple Theories in Public Policy Studies?
JO  - Policy Studies Journal
JA  - Policy Stud J
VL  - 41
IS  - 1
SN  - 1541-0072
DO  - 10.1111/psj.12000
SP  - 1
EP  - 21

Thursday, 31 January 2013

Independence: how no, eh?

I know that memes aren't cool anymore and that they shouldn't be generated by anyone over 21, but how else to commemorate the biggest news of the year - one guy from Biffy Clyro is maybe for independence, although he doesn't seem that bothered.

Alex Salmond prays - biffy clyro on independence: how no, eh?

Monday, 10 December 2012

University of Stirling

I will be moving to the University of Stirling on the 1st of February. I will post my new details, including my new email address, when I have them. 

UPDATE: I have now moved.  My new email is p.a.cairney@stir.ac.uk

Tuesday, 6 November 2012

Global Tobacco Control


I co-authored a book called Global Tobacco Control: Power, Policy, Governance and Transfer (Palgrave, 2012) with Donley Studlar and Hadii Mamudu. It raises two key questions: Why is there often such a wide gap between the size of the tobacco policy problem and the government response? Why, if the tobacco problem is the same across the globe, does policy vary so markedly across political systems?

It is hardback only, which means that it costs £57.50 to buy a physical copy. Or, it is a snip at £38 if you only want to own the words). Still, the chances are that you won’t own a copy and only libraries will stock it (perhaps reinforcing a not very good academic mantra: books are to be written, not read). Instead, you can read the introduction for free here or have it read to you in an annoying monotone here. This blog provides a summary of the whole argument.

The starting point for the study is to identify the size of the problem. For example, smoking represents the number one preventable cause of death and disease in the world. There are 1.35 billion smokers in the world, smoking is still rising in many countries, and it contributes to one in ten deaths worldwide (over six million per year and rising). The book discusses various ways in which we can express these figures, including breaking them down according to gender and comparing so called ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries (and discussing the ‘Tobacco Epidemic Model’ in that context – to follow up this point, see Thun et al’s revision) . The latter distinction is highly problematic (some prefer, for example, high-income countries, HICs, and low- and medium-income countries, LMICs) but also quite useful for our purposes (the United Nations Statistics Division lists developed countries as the US, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Australia and certain (generally Western, not ‘transitional’ Central and Eastern) European countries). Indeed, the well-discussed 'tobacco epidemic model' serves partly to describe the smoking equivalent of a ticking time bomb in many ‘developing’ countries.

Our aim is not to complain that governments are not doing enough to address this problem, or to claim that many government actors are in cahoots with tobacco companies to minimise tobacco regulation - largely because the public health literature (and sites such as the Legal Tobacco Documents Library) does a good job of that already. Further, we do not want to get sued and this paragraph is making me nervous enough already (I kid you not – I don’t even want to give the potentially-slanderous impression that tobacco companies are excessively litigious).

Instead, the study seeks to explain why different governments have responded to this problem so differently. Some countries – like Australia, Canada, Finland, Norway, Sweden, New Zealand, the UK and almost the US (it has more limited controls but, generally, played a huge part in the international tobacco control effort) - now have ‘comprehensive’ tobacco control, which means that they combine a large number of mutually-reinforcing policy instruments designed to reduce smoking in the population (see the WHO ‘MPOWER’ report which identifies six key tobacco control measures: 1) ‘monitor tobacco use and prevention policies’; 2) ‘protect people from tobacco smoke’; 3) ‘offer help to quit tobacco’; 4) ‘warn about the dangers of tobacco’; 5) ‘enforce bans on tobacco adverting, promotion and sponsorship’, and 6) ‘raise taxes on tobacco’). Others do relatively little to address the problem. For example, Germany and Japan are often described as ‘laggard’ developing countries while most developing countries (with exceptions such as Brazil, Singapore, Thailand and Uruguay) have relatively limited tobacco controls.

We also want to know why tobacco control in many countries is now so comprehensive when it was minimal until the 1980s. Many countries which now have comprehensive tobacco control regimes did very little to regulate tobacco until the 1980s. In other words, the gap between the initial identification of smoking (and then passive smoking) related ill health and the initiation of a major policy response was, in most cases, 20-30 years, followed by gradual policy change often over a similar period. The book identifies a history of minimal tobacco control, linked to the power of the tobacco industry (careful now), then charts the extent to which governments, aided by public health advocates, have regulated tobacco domestically and internationally in the modern era.

We explain ‘comprehensive’ change in ‘leading developed’ countries with reference to five key factors:

1. Institutional Change. Government departments, and other organisations focused on health policy, have taken the main responsibility for tobacco control, largely replacing departments focused on finance, agriculture, trade, industry and employment.

2. The Problem Is ‘Framed’ Differently. Tobacco was once viewed primarily as a product with economic value, and tobacco growing and manufacturing was often subsidised or encouraged. Now, it is largely viewed as a public health problem; an epidemic to be eradicated aggressively (or, at least, a problem to be minimised).

3. The Balance Of Power Has Shifted Between Participants. The tobacco industry was an ally of government for decades before and after WWII. When policy was coordinated by finance and other departments, tobacco companies were the most consulted. Now, public health or anti-tobacco groups are more likely to be consulted and tobacco companies are often deliberately excluded.

4. The Socioeconomic Context Has Changed Markedly. The economic benefit of tobacco production and consumption has fallen (for example, tax revenue is less important to finance departments once protective of the industry) and the number of smokers and opposition to tobacco control has declined.

5. The Role Of Beliefs And Knowledge. The production and dissemination of the scientific evidence linking smoking (and now passive smoking) to ill health has been accepted within most government circles. The most effective policies to reduce smoking are increasingly adopted and transferred across countries.

Change in these factors has been mutually reinforcing. For example, increased acceptance of the scientific evidence has helped shift the way that governments understand the tobacco problem. The framing of tobacco as a health problem allows health departments to take the policy lead. Tobacco control and smoking prevalence go hand in hand: a decrease in smoking rates reduces the barriers to tobacco control; more tobacco control means fewer smokers.

We explain the lack of policy change in other countries with reference to the same factors:

1. Health departments are often key players, but their voices are often drowned out by other departments, such as agriculture, finance and trade.

2. Tobacco policy arises on the policy agenda rarely and, when it does, the public health frame competes with attempts to frame tobacco as an economic good.

3. Tobacco companies are powerful and the capacity of anti-tobacco groups is often low.

4. Tobacco growing and manufacturing is an important source of jobs, exports and revenue and smoking prevalence is rising.

5. The medical-scientific knowledge has had less of an effect on the policy agenda. Domestic anti-tobacco groups have the motivation but not the resources to ensure the acceptance of tobacco control ideas within their political systems.

In this context, the book identifies the role of international action to close the gap between ‘leading’ and ‘laggard’ countries – a gap which is often linked specifically (but not exclusively) to the fortunes of developed/ developing countries. In particular, the World Health Organisation (WHO) Framework Convention for Tobacco Control has 175 ‘Parties’ (174 countries plus the European Union). The FCTC represents a significant short-term success, because it commits a huge number of countries to comprehensive tobacco control. However, we describe it largely as a tool for agenda-setting rather than a guarantee of long term policy implementation.

Our current work, based on the book and subsequent articles, highlights one of life’s ironies: the countries best placed to deliver on their treaty commitments are the ones which don’t need a treaty so much. They are already well on the road towards comprehensive tobacco control. In contrast, the countries that do need the treaty are the least likely to deliver its aims. This argument is backed up by statistics that we are currently gathering (ooh, the excitement of anticipation) and expert surveys like the one produced by Warner and Tam. We make this argument on the basis of the 5 factors outlined above, which help us identify an unfavourable environment in which to implement the FCTC.

Consider, for example, the experience of China as the world’s largest tobacco using and producing population (one third of the world’s smokers and 38% of tobacco production) (see a paper by Jin). It maintains a state monopoly over tobacco production which provides 8-11% of government revenue. Tobacco control is low on the domestic policy agenda and the health image competes with an unusually strong economic image based on the importance of its tobacco industry and economic growth to the legitimacy of the Chinese government. Tobacco policy (and the implementation of the FCTC) is led by an economic development agency which consults regularly with the tobacco industry, and the health ministry is ‘sidelined’. Public health groups are neither well resourced nor engaged. Public *and physician* knowledge of tobacco harm is low and smoking rates are very high among the police force held responsible for the implementation of bans on smoking in public places. If we combine these factors, we can reasonably expect much slower progress towards comprehensive tobacco control than in (say) the UK even though both have signed up to the same agreement.

Overall, we should not take comprehensive tobacco control for granted. If we live in countries like the UK we are starting to take it for granted, and may even come to accept new measures such as bans on smoking among foster parents and/ or in cars. If we travel elsewhere and smell smoke indoors, we should be quickly reminded that tobacco control varies markedly across the globe, and is likely to vary for decades to come.