I wrote this last year for Holyrood Magazine but forgot to post it (or check if went in the magazine):
Inheritance before choice in Scottish Government policy
In the light of the SNP’s election avalanche, are we looking forward to 5 years of remarkable policy innovation and change, driven from the top down? We might be tempted to say ‘yes’. We associate majority government with power. A majority government is a strong government, able to formulate policy unencumbered by opposition and without the need to gain agreement. In Scotland, this argument might feel particularly strong following 12 years in which the Scottish Parliament has provided minimal opposition and, even during the minority years, often little change to the Scottish Government's position. However, the answer from the public policy literature is 'no', for the following reasons:
Inheritance before choice. All governments inherit massive policy commitments from their predecessors, which leaves them very limited room for manoeuvre. In fact, they can only hope to change overall spending commitments by perhaps 5% in a full term. In Scotland, those commitments include spending on free personal care, tuition fees, the NHS and the wages of doctors, nurses and teachers (even if some wages will be reduced). Lower budgets means fewer choices in terms of policy innovation, but more tough decisions on how to reduce service provision (returning us to the idea of 'doing less, better'.)
'Bounded rationality'. Ministers only have the ability to pay attention to a tiny proportion of the issues for which they are responsible. So, they pay disproportionate attention to a small number of issues at the expense of all others. This limitation is offset to some extent by the unusual ability of Scottish ministers to work together, but it still remains.
Policy communities. Most other issues are devolved to civil servants who, in turn, maintain close working relationships with interest groups and other organisations (most notably local authorities). Such relationships endure because civil servants seek information from the most expert and interested participants and because securing their involvement leads to fewer problems of opposition.
Multilevel policymaking. Many policy decisions may be fully or partly out of Scottish Government control. In some cases, such as agriculture, fishing and the environment, policy has been Europeanised, with limited ability of the Scottish Government to have influence. In others, such as defence and most key economic decisions, it is primarily a UK decision. In others, the Scottish Government has devolved responsibility to local authorities and quangos, with limited means to intervene. The Scottish Government also relies on nongovernmental bodies such as the private sector to fulfil its economic objectives - an area made more difficult by the Scottish Government’s very limited economic levers.
Unexpected events. Serendipity plays a huge role in policymaking and many decisions are made very quickly following a series of events that command attention. Therefore, we may not be able to predict the Scottish Government agenda in many cases. The Edinburgh trams crisis may prove to be a good example. This is a project that the SNP Government did not want to fund or manage, but it is still obliged to pay a disproportionate amount of attention to the issue.
Formulation is not implementation. This point has been particularly true during the new SNP era. The Scottish Government seems relatively content to set high level strategic priorities and provide budgets for key initiatives, then leave the detailed implementation to bodies such as local authorities. This is 'bottom up' not top down policymaking.
These factors make measuring policy success very difficult. Indeed, evaluations of success have become be key battleground in party politics. The issue of class sizes is a classic example. The idea of reducing class sizes at key stages was established well before the SNP's term, but remains a key commitment. It is also high profile, presenting the SNP with a dilemma that it has yet to resolve: how to look committed to a policy without enforcing its implementation. The opposition parties have used this issue in particular to try to make the Scottish Government look weak and ineffective, while the SNP has continued (very successfully) with the idea that it is governing competently by pursuing consensus and/ or building trust with implementing organisations.
The 2011 election result suggests that its strategy is working remarkably well so far. The next key test is majority government. People may have expected compromise during minority rule but perhaps they expect something different now, particularly during an era in which tough choices have to be made about existing commitments. Yet, there is little evidence so far of a change of approach, and rightly so. Top-down policymaking is often politically expensive; it attracts unwelcome opposition and reduces the ability of governments to secure ‘ownership’ among the most interested and powerful groups necessary to produce long term policy success. This was a chance that the Thatcher government often seemed willing to take, but the SNP government is a different beast. The best example so far is the Offensive Behaviour at Football bill, which the SNP introduced for a ‘quick win’ before withdrawing from the emergency bill process in favour of lengthy consultation. The alcohol minimum pricing bill is more controversial in party political terms, but the Scottish Government has strong support from the medical and public health professions. The rest of the programme is a combination of worthy, inoffensive and low key (perhaps with the exception of police and fire service reform), which suggests that the SNP will choose its battles wisely to maintain its image of governing competence.
Monday, 5 March 2012
Tuesday, 28 February 2012
Labour and LibDem Party Conference Article
I wrote this for Holyrood Magazine 27.2.12: http://www.holyrood.com/articles/2012/02/27/party-conference-special-state-of-the-parties/
Things were much simpler for both of these parties in 2007. Yes, Labour had suffered a shocking defeat in the Scottish Parliament election and this took some time to adjust to (perhaps four years in some cases) and, yes, the Liberal Democrats removed themselves from executive office for the first time in eight years.
However, both parties had to do little to survive and they largely took this to heart. As it turned out, the institutions of the Scottish Parliament did not require them to get involved in the day to day business of Scottish policymaking.
They seemed to cooperate little with the new SNP Government or take an active role in the committee process. Rather, they felt able to bide their time, waiting for the SNP to slip up and, at least in the case of Labour, return to government in 2011. Most importantly, the independence referendum issue gave them both an opportunity to assert their power. The ‘unionist’ parties commanded a majority of parliamentary seats and this majority, combined with cross-party agreement, would make sure that any independence referendum bill would fail. Further, the backdrop of the economic crisis provided the perfect justification for such an approach – the time is just not right; surely we can’t have the distraction of a referendum of independence when there is so much economic uncertainty! Instead, less dramatic constitutional change would come from the Calman Commission and then the new Scotland Bill, proposed by the UK Government and amended and approved by the Scottish Parliament.
Then the 2011 election changed everything.
It came as close as you might expect to wiping out the Liberal Democrats and reduced the once-dominant Labour to a party with almost no policymaking influence. Most importantly, neither Scottish party could play the same gatekeeping role on the independence referendum. Consequently, the annual conferences of both parties must surely be rather humbling and perhaps quite depressing experiences.
The Liberal Democrats may feel particularly bitter in Scotland, because they were the clear losers from the UK party’s ‘win’ in 2010 and its decision to enter the UK Government. They are also tied to some extent to the attitudes of the Conservative-led UK Government position on the independence referendum. Therefore, its main speakers will have to choose between a series of bland and vague speeches on the preservation of the Union, some relatively safe distractions on issues such as the legality of the referendum, or a clearly defiant tone expressing disbelief and frustration with the attempt made by the UK Government to control the timing and substance of the referendum process – an attempt perhaps made worse by the need to have a Liberal Democrat face attached to the day to day publicity and negotiations. Surely, in private, they are telling their UK colleagues that the only way to achieve a ‘yes’ vote is to annoy enough voters in Scotland by reminding them that the Conservatives, supported by the Liberal Democrats, are back in government and ready to interfere in Scottish affairs – but time will tell if they are also willing to say it in public. They have a similar quandary regarding the issue of a second question on further devolution. The Liberal Democrats were, in many respects, the most active party on constitutional change, producing the Steel Commission report in 2006 and calling for a fundamental review of the devolution settlement – along the lines of the original Constitutional Convention. Instead, what they got was a rather traditional UK Government-financed Calman commission and a Scotland Bill subject to little public influence.
In private, many may feel that the referendum gives them the opportunity to return to the more substantial debates on devolution that took place in the 1990s rather than simply be given the chance to reject independence for two years. Time will tell if they are willing to insist on this process in public rather than merely focus on what is wrong with the SNP’s plans or try to get attention by asking Alex Salmond if an independent Scotland will keep the Queen.
Things are perhaps simpler for Scottish Labour who are driven more by their scepticism regarding the need for further constitutional change and their general fear and hatred of the SNP. Perhaps surprisingly, Labour quickly became the most prominent ‘status quo’ party after devolution; one of the most likely to reject calls to revisit or change the devolution settlement. This is perhaps an understandable position when Labour was in office in Scotland until 2007 and in the UK until 2010. However, it seems to be less and less tenable as time goes on. UK Labour recognised recently that it needed a form of party devolution to give its Scottish leader the appearance of more autonomy in Scottish affairs – but this took years and years of pressure from MSPs in Scotland. They simply do not have the time to make such a grudging and gradual shift of approach to constitutional change. Johan Lamont has engaged recently in a new version of Wendy Alexander’s ill-fated ‘bring it on’ statement, trying to put pressure on the SNP to hold a referendum as soon as possible and portraying any ‘delays’ as a sign of Alex Salmond’s cowardice. Or, she has portrayed the issue as something to get out of the way; “to have the referendum now to confirm once again, that devolution is the settled will of the Scottish people and nothing else.” This strategy is a mistake. To some extent, it is a gamble that will pay off: a one-question referendum is unlikely to produce a ‘yes’ vote unless accompanied by a remarkable degree of SNP serendipity. Yet, it is also a gamble with costs since it reduces Labour, yet again, to a party that spends the bulk of its energies trying to persuade people to reject change rather than to present a more positive image of the party and devolution. The referendum lead-in provides unionist parties with the opportunity to present a more positive vision for the value and future of Scottish devolution; to debate its achievements and consider how it can improve or become more successful in the future. Instead, in the absence of demand for a second question, the unionist parties will be stymied by their need to hold the (largely UK-led) party line and to make simplistic statements about the dangers of separatism. All of the major parties know that independence from 2014 no longer means setting a country adrift from the UK and the rest of the world. Rather, the world is increasingly interdependent and further-devolution is becoming increasingly similar to modernindependence.
Wouldn’t it be good to witness more sensible and less sensationalist debates between the main parties based on that understanding of the world?
Things were much simpler for both of these parties in 2007. Yes, Labour had suffered a shocking defeat in the Scottish Parliament election and this took some time to adjust to (perhaps four years in some cases) and, yes, the Liberal Democrats removed themselves from executive office for the first time in eight years.
However, both parties had to do little to survive and they largely took this to heart. As it turned out, the institutions of the Scottish Parliament did not require them to get involved in the day to day business of Scottish policymaking.
They seemed to cooperate little with the new SNP Government or take an active role in the committee process. Rather, they felt able to bide their time, waiting for the SNP to slip up and, at least in the case of Labour, return to government in 2011. Most importantly, the independence referendum issue gave them both an opportunity to assert their power. The ‘unionist’ parties commanded a majority of parliamentary seats and this majority, combined with cross-party agreement, would make sure that any independence referendum bill would fail. Further, the backdrop of the economic crisis provided the perfect justification for such an approach – the time is just not right; surely we can’t have the distraction of a referendum of independence when there is so much economic uncertainty! Instead, less dramatic constitutional change would come from the Calman Commission and then the new Scotland Bill, proposed by the UK Government and amended and approved by the Scottish Parliament.
Then the 2011 election changed everything.
It came as close as you might expect to wiping out the Liberal Democrats and reduced the once-dominant Labour to a party with almost no policymaking influence. Most importantly, neither Scottish party could play the same gatekeeping role on the independence referendum. Consequently, the annual conferences of both parties must surely be rather humbling and perhaps quite depressing experiences.
The Liberal Democrats may feel particularly bitter in Scotland, because they were the clear losers from the UK party’s ‘win’ in 2010 and its decision to enter the UK Government. They are also tied to some extent to the attitudes of the Conservative-led UK Government position on the independence referendum. Therefore, its main speakers will have to choose between a series of bland and vague speeches on the preservation of the Union, some relatively safe distractions on issues such as the legality of the referendum, or a clearly defiant tone expressing disbelief and frustration with the attempt made by the UK Government to control the timing and substance of the referendum process – an attempt perhaps made worse by the need to have a Liberal Democrat face attached to the day to day publicity and negotiations. Surely, in private, they are telling their UK colleagues that the only way to achieve a ‘yes’ vote is to annoy enough voters in Scotland by reminding them that the Conservatives, supported by the Liberal Democrats, are back in government and ready to interfere in Scottish affairs – but time will tell if they are also willing to say it in public. They have a similar quandary regarding the issue of a second question on further devolution. The Liberal Democrats were, in many respects, the most active party on constitutional change, producing the Steel Commission report in 2006 and calling for a fundamental review of the devolution settlement – along the lines of the original Constitutional Convention. Instead, what they got was a rather traditional UK Government-financed Calman commission and a Scotland Bill subject to little public influence.
In private, many may feel that the referendum gives them the opportunity to return to the more substantial debates on devolution that took place in the 1990s rather than simply be given the chance to reject independence for two years. Time will tell if they are willing to insist on this process in public rather than merely focus on what is wrong with the SNP’s plans or try to get attention by asking Alex Salmond if an independent Scotland will keep the Queen.
Things are perhaps simpler for Scottish Labour who are driven more by their scepticism regarding the need for further constitutional change and their general fear and hatred of the SNP. Perhaps surprisingly, Labour quickly became the most prominent ‘status quo’ party after devolution; one of the most likely to reject calls to revisit or change the devolution settlement. This is perhaps an understandable position when Labour was in office in Scotland until 2007 and in the UK until 2010. However, it seems to be less and less tenable as time goes on. UK Labour recognised recently that it needed a form of party devolution to give its Scottish leader the appearance of more autonomy in Scottish affairs – but this took years and years of pressure from MSPs in Scotland. They simply do not have the time to make such a grudging and gradual shift of approach to constitutional change. Johan Lamont has engaged recently in a new version of Wendy Alexander’s ill-fated ‘bring it on’ statement, trying to put pressure on the SNP to hold a referendum as soon as possible and portraying any ‘delays’ as a sign of Alex Salmond’s cowardice. Or, she has portrayed the issue as something to get out of the way; “to have the referendum now to confirm once again, that devolution is the settled will of the Scottish people and nothing else.” This strategy is a mistake. To some extent, it is a gamble that will pay off: a one-question referendum is unlikely to produce a ‘yes’ vote unless accompanied by a remarkable degree of SNP serendipity. Yet, it is also a gamble with costs since it reduces Labour, yet again, to a party that spends the bulk of its energies trying to persuade people to reject change rather than to present a more positive image of the party and devolution. The referendum lead-in provides unionist parties with the opportunity to present a more positive vision for the value and future of Scottish devolution; to debate its achievements and consider how it can improve or become more successful in the future. Instead, in the absence of demand for a second question, the unionist parties will be stymied by their need to hold the (largely UK-led) party line and to make simplistic statements about the dangers of separatism. All of the major parties know that independence from 2014 no longer means setting a country adrift from the UK and the rest of the world. Rather, the world is increasingly interdependent and further-devolution is becoming increasingly similar to modernindependence.
Wouldn’t it be good to witness more sensible and less sensationalist debates between the main parties based on that understanding of the world?
Tuesday, 10 January 2012
THE SCOTTISH POLITICAL SYSTEM SINCE DEVOLUTION: FROM NEW POLITICS TO THE NEW SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT
Here are the 'talking points' that I was asked to produce for the publication of my new book:
Argument 1: The World has Already Changed Since Scottish Devolution
a A Labour era has been replaced by a new SNP era in Scotland
b Labour dominated UK General Election results in Scotland for most of the post-war period
c Its success extended to early Scottish Parliament elections, but the more-proportional electoral system stopped it receiving enough seats to form a majority single party government
d A Labour-led Scottish Executive seemed inevitable for many years
e Labour lost the 2007 Scottish Parliament election to the SNP, which formed a minority government
f The SNP won a landslide Scottish Parliament election victory in 2011, securing a majority of seats and control of government and parliament
g The SNP wiped out Labour’s historical advantage, producing (in only 8 years) the sense of a new era in Scottish electoral politics
Argument 2: There is no such thing as ‘New Politics’
a Devolution was sold primarily as a way to solve the ‘democratic deficit’ when Scotland voted Labour but received a Conservative UK Government
b There was a residual feeling among devolution supporters that a successful ‘yes’ vote in the 1979 referendum would have saved Scotland from Thatcher rule from 1979-90 and Conservative rule from 1979-97
c The image of the UK Government was top-down and impositional, in a place with a strong tradition of collective action and consensus politics
d So, devolution would come hand in hand with new ways to foster that approach to politics
e The devolution agenda produced expectations about new forms of participation (e.g. a civic forum, a petitions system) and more consensual policymaking between parties, or between parliament and executive
f However, Scottish politics represents business as usual, with very few examples of new (and affective) forms of participation or new relationships between parties
g The government still governs and we still have government-versus-opposition
h This new reality, coupled with unrealistic expectations, produced a long spell of (particularly media) disillusionment about devolution and Scottish politics
Argument 3: Minority Government Made Little Difference to the Scottish Parliament
a Or at least , it made less of a difference than many expected
b From 1999-2007, Labour sought strength and stability in Parliament by forming a coalition with the Liberal Democrats, to maintain a majority of votes to ensure its legislative programme and avoid motions of no confidence
c From 2007-11 the SNP formed a minority government, more vulnerable to defeat and no confidence motions
d However, the SNP lasted the full 4 years
e It did not pursue some key measures (a referendum on independence; a reform of council tax; a minimum price on alcohol)
f However, it also passed a lot of legislation (over 40 bills, compared to the usual 50)
g More notably, it was able to pursue most of its objectives without recourse to Parliament, using finance, existing legislation, and its relationship with key organizations such as local authorities
Argument 4: The SNP appeared much more coherent in government – and benefited in the next election
a Labour traded strength/ stability in Parliament for reduced strength/ stability in government
b Its relationship within government was relatively convoluted
c The SNP cabinet was relatively small and able to act well as a collective body
d It was able to convey a sense of common purpose and efficiency not associated with 1999-2007
e Most policy is devolved to civil servants and negotiated with interest groups and other organizations. Governments operate best when recognizing that setup and providing the wider strategic framework in which those negotiations take place.
f The SNP Government maximized its impact by taking that high level strategic approach.
g This contributed to its image of governing competence, which became one of the key explanations for its huge success in 2011
Argument 5: Scottish-UK intergovernmental relations have been remarkably low key – and remain so, despite the arrival of the SNP and Conservatives
a 1999-2007 can be characterized as a period of informal IGR
b Formal mechanisms existed to resolve disputes and manage relations (the courts, the Joint Ministerial Committee, the Memorandum of Understanding and associated concordats between departments) but these were used rarely
c The governments resolved issues informally, through the Labour party and the civil service
d The SNP government did not produce a sea change in those relationships
e There were more disputes, but visible public disputes were still rare
f Nor did the election of a Conservative led UK government produce a new relationship in 2010
g The long term experience shows us the ‘logic of informal IGR’ in which the UK Government recognises the costs to top-down imposition (or merely disengages from devolution) and the Scottish Government picks its battles wisely or acknowledges its relatively less powerful position and limited room for formal dispute resolution in its favour
h This overall experience is qualified in chapter 5’s focus on two key sources of tension: the role of the Scottish Secretary (a UK government post) in Scottish affairs; and, the Scottish Government’s limited ability to engage in or influence EU affairs
Argument 6: The biggest SNP effect is on local government and policy implementation
a 1999-2007 produced a mixed picture of central-local relations
b There were some concerns that the Scottish Government would replace local government, even though local authorities largely supported devolution and enjoyed a better relationship with government than their counterparts in England
c The 1999-2007 relationship reflected that tension, with better consultation and more open access to devolved government sitting alongside key tensions on the funding and autonomy of local authorities
d The SNP government exploited that tense relationship, signaling an end to ‘top down diktats’ and freeing up local authorities to make more decisions on how they delivered and funded local policies
e Its concordat with COSLA (Convention of Scottish Local Authorities) summed up that shift. It involved the trade of more local autonomy for key commitments on aspects of education and, most politically importantly, to freeze local council taxes in preparation for the introduction of a new local income tax
f This shift of relationships is still unfolding, with interest groups now faced with the task of influencing not only one Scottish Government but also 32 local authorities
Argument 7: The Public wants more devolution, not independence
a Levels of Scottish national identity are relatively strong and remain strong; they have been affected little by devolution
b When given the choice between independence, more devolution or a return to the days of no Scottish Parliament, a plurality choose more devolution
c This changes little if we mess around with the question – about a third want independence and at least half want devolution or more devolution
d Independence sometimes gains a plurality of responses (not the majority, since too many people are undecided) if the question is asked in a particular way
e The question must refer to the negotiation of independence, not automatic independence
f The record of SNP Government has not changed these attitudes
g The 2011 election avalanche did not reflect a significant rise in support for independence
h Respondents generally suggest that devolution has made little difference to policy or their lives
i However, they do not blame Scottish institutions; rather, they want more devolution to make more difference
j They want a Scottish government to stand up for Scotland’s interests (even if few really know what this involves)
k This, and the SNP’s perceived record in office (and the status of its leader, Alex Salmond), helps explain SNP popularity – not support for independence
l Overall, the evidence suggests that the only way people will vote for independence is if the UK Government holds a snap poll (annoying the Scottish electorate and reminding them of the old top-down Conservative rule) and asks the electorate to make a yes/ no decision on independence. This will turn the process into a vote for the Scottish government over the UK government.
m That move might eventually be more popular in England, where there is some (but let’s not exaggerate it) rise in the perception that Scotland is doing disproportionately well out the of the Union
n In other news, the link between public opinion is often very weak indeed. This effect began almost immediately, with the Scottish Parliament putting leadership before opinion when deciding to abolish ‘section 28’. Few examples since then have produced a closer association between opinion and policy. Indeed, in key areas of public health (such as smoking and drinking), the Scottish Government appears more interested in changing rather than reflecting public opinion.
Argument 8: Evolution, not revolution, in public policy
a There was much talk before devolution about the need for ‘Scottish solutions to Scottish problems’ and the idea of Westminster having no time for Scottish legislation
b Hopes were high for policy innovation and new ideas
c At the same time, devolution was seen by many as a way to avoid policy innovation; to step off the train associated with the constant top-down reform agenda of the UK government
d The latter image is a better guide
e Public policy did not change dramatically after devolution, and did not mark dramatic policy divergence from the past or the rest of the UK
f There were key examples of divergence, including ‘free’ personal care for older people, the abolition of higher education tuition fees, the abolition of the healthcare internal market and the introduction of the single transferable vote in local elections
g There were also sources of policy change in areas such as housing stock transfer and anti-social behavior
h However, there was also a notable degree of policy continuity and pressure to converge with UK government policy
i The phrase ‘Scottish solutions to Scottish problems’ may relate more to how it processes policy than the actual policy outputs and outcomes
Argument 9: The much-maligned ‘Barnett formula’ has proved to be remarkably durable despite its lack of public support
a Scotland appears to enjoy a funding advantage, with more public money spent per head in Scotland than in most parts of England and Wales
b This advantage has become associated with the Barnett formula, even though the formula is not the cause of (and does not help protect) that advantage
c The Barnett formula represents a way to determine annual changes to the Scottish budget
d We identify (comparable) changes to English budgets and assign a Scottish share based on its share of the UK population
e If all else remains equal, and spending rises, the Barnett formula may in fact help reduce Scotland’s higher per capita rates of spending
f The pre- and post-devolved experience is that things do not remain equal and that other factors (including incorrect estimates of Scotland’s share of the UK population) have contributed to the maintenance of Scotland’s financial position
g This issue received relatively low attention in the first 10 years (or so) of devolution, when overall UK expenditure was high and rising
h It now receives more attention during the new age of economic austerity, but has yet to produce a new system in Scotland
i The experience shows us the importance of inertia in politics, where the status quo is difficult to shift when there is no agreement on what new system to introduce, hard choices have to made and any new system will produce vocal ‘losers’
j It exposes a contradiction of sorts, in which the UK Treasury remains a powerful actor in Scottish politics, determining the size of the Scottish budget but also providing a large budget and often giving little direction on how to spend it (with the exception of areas such as capital spending, where it limits the ability of devolved governments to pursue alternatives to public private partnerships)
k The Scottish Government does not have the equivalent of a Treasury and its control of the key economic levers are very limited
Argument 9: We are entering a new phase of constitutional fixation
a. The first half of devolution was characterized by relatively low attention to further constitutional change
b. Constitutional issues arose rarely and referred to the potential anomalies of devolution, including the ‘West Lothian’ question and the role of a UK Supreme Court in Scottish criminal justice
c. The prospect of an SNP election victory helped raise the constitutional question up the Scottish agenda
d. The 2007-11 period saw two reviews of the devolution settlement – the SNP’s National Conversation (seeking views on its preference for devolution) and the Scottish Parliament commissioned (and UK Government financed) Calman Commission review of devolution.
e. Both operated on parallel tracks, with limited engagement between the two
f. The National Conversation did not culminate in a referendum on independence, since the SNP did not have enough support in the Scottish Parliament to pass a referendum bill
g. The Calman Commission produced recommendations to extend devolution in a number of small ways (such as on airguns policy and the devolution of some taxes) and provide a new framework for the administration of Scottish income tax (allowing the Scottish Parliament to vary the rate by ten pence in the pound and obliging it to choose its income tax rate in a way not seen before)
h. The Scotland Bill may now be amended to reflect many of Calman’s recommendations, but the 2011 election result has complicated matters
i. A particular source of tension regards the Scottish Parliament’s scrutiny of the new Scotland Bill in the light of a new SNP majority on the relevant committee
j. Independence following a referendum is unlikely, but the referendum may result in a vote for further devolution or ‘devolution max’
k. Whatever the result, further devolution is likely to result in a very messy compromise, since no one is quite sure what further devolution will involve
Argument 10: Scottish devolution has been a success, but only if we measure success in a particular way
a. There are many ways to measure the success of devolution, from instant success, as soon as the Scotland Bill was passed in 1998, to almost no success, as the Scottish Parliament failed to live up to its billing as the symbol of new politics
b. If devolution is about a new form of politics, then it has been a failure – but we should not compare its actual operation with the unrealistic aspirations of its most naïve supporters
c. The often-peripheral role of the Scottish Parliament in the policy process should not detract from its new role as a source of light on the policymaking process in Scotland
d. Further, there is now a Scottish political system with its own institutions that are here to stay
Argument 1: The World has Already Changed Since Scottish Devolution
a A Labour era has been replaced by a new SNP era in Scotland
b Labour dominated UK General Election results in Scotland for most of the post-war period
c Its success extended to early Scottish Parliament elections, but the more-proportional electoral system stopped it receiving enough seats to form a majority single party government
d A Labour-led Scottish Executive seemed inevitable for many years
e Labour lost the 2007 Scottish Parliament election to the SNP, which formed a minority government
f The SNP won a landslide Scottish Parliament election victory in 2011, securing a majority of seats and control of government and parliament
g The SNP wiped out Labour’s historical advantage, producing (in only 8 years) the sense of a new era in Scottish electoral politics
Argument 2: There is no such thing as ‘New Politics’
a Devolution was sold primarily as a way to solve the ‘democratic deficit’ when Scotland voted Labour but received a Conservative UK Government
b There was a residual feeling among devolution supporters that a successful ‘yes’ vote in the 1979 referendum would have saved Scotland from Thatcher rule from 1979-90 and Conservative rule from 1979-97
c The image of the UK Government was top-down and impositional, in a place with a strong tradition of collective action and consensus politics
d So, devolution would come hand in hand with new ways to foster that approach to politics
e The devolution agenda produced expectations about new forms of participation (e.g. a civic forum, a petitions system) and more consensual policymaking between parties, or between parliament and executive
f However, Scottish politics represents business as usual, with very few examples of new (and affective) forms of participation or new relationships between parties
g The government still governs and we still have government-versus-opposition
h This new reality, coupled with unrealistic expectations, produced a long spell of (particularly media) disillusionment about devolution and Scottish politics
Argument 3: Minority Government Made Little Difference to the Scottish Parliament
a Or at least , it made less of a difference than many expected
b From 1999-2007, Labour sought strength and stability in Parliament by forming a coalition with the Liberal Democrats, to maintain a majority of votes to ensure its legislative programme and avoid motions of no confidence
c From 2007-11 the SNP formed a minority government, more vulnerable to defeat and no confidence motions
d However, the SNP lasted the full 4 years
e It did not pursue some key measures (a referendum on independence; a reform of council tax; a minimum price on alcohol)
f However, it also passed a lot of legislation (over 40 bills, compared to the usual 50)
g More notably, it was able to pursue most of its objectives without recourse to Parliament, using finance, existing legislation, and its relationship with key organizations such as local authorities
Argument 4: The SNP appeared much more coherent in government – and benefited in the next election
a Labour traded strength/ stability in Parliament for reduced strength/ stability in government
b Its relationship within government was relatively convoluted
c The SNP cabinet was relatively small and able to act well as a collective body
d It was able to convey a sense of common purpose and efficiency not associated with 1999-2007
e Most policy is devolved to civil servants and negotiated with interest groups and other organizations. Governments operate best when recognizing that setup and providing the wider strategic framework in which those negotiations take place.
f The SNP Government maximized its impact by taking that high level strategic approach.
g This contributed to its image of governing competence, which became one of the key explanations for its huge success in 2011
Argument 5: Scottish-UK intergovernmental relations have been remarkably low key – and remain so, despite the arrival of the SNP and Conservatives
a 1999-2007 can be characterized as a period of informal IGR
b Formal mechanisms existed to resolve disputes and manage relations (the courts, the Joint Ministerial Committee, the Memorandum of Understanding and associated concordats between departments) but these were used rarely
c The governments resolved issues informally, through the Labour party and the civil service
d The SNP government did not produce a sea change in those relationships
e There were more disputes, but visible public disputes were still rare
f Nor did the election of a Conservative led UK government produce a new relationship in 2010
g The long term experience shows us the ‘logic of informal IGR’ in which the UK Government recognises the costs to top-down imposition (or merely disengages from devolution) and the Scottish Government picks its battles wisely or acknowledges its relatively less powerful position and limited room for formal dispute resolution in its favour
h This overall experience is qualified in chapter 5’s focus on two key sources of tension: the role of the Scottish Secretary (a UK government post) in Scottish affairs; and, the Scottish Government’s limited ability to engage in or influence EU affairs
Argument 6: The biggest SNP effect is on local government and policy implementation
a 1999-2007 produced a mixed picture of central-local relations
b There were some concerns that the Scottish Government would replace local government, even though local authorities largely supported devolution and enjoyed a better relationship with government than their counterparts in England
c The 1999-2007 relationship reflected that tension, with better consultation and more open access to devolved government sitting alongside key tensions on the funding and autonomy of local authorities
d The SNP government exploited that tense relationship, signaling an end to ‘top down diktats’ and freeing up local authorities to make more decisions on how they delivered and funded local policies
e Its concordat with COSLA (Convention of Scottish Local Authorities) summed up that shift. It involved the trade of more local autonomy for key commitments on aspects of education and, most politically importantly, to freeze local council taxes in preparation for the introduction of a new local income tax
f This shift of relationships is still unfolding, with interest groups now faced with the task of influencing not only one Scottish Government but also 32 local authorities
Argument 7: The Public wants more devolution, not independence
a Levels of Scottish national identity are relatively strong and remain strong; they have been affected little by devolution
b When given the choice between independence, more devolution or a return to the days of no Scottish Parliament, a plurality choose more devolution
c This changes little if we mess around with the question – about a third want independence and at least half want devolution or more devolution
d Independence sometimes gains a plurality of responses (not the majority, since too many people are undecided) if the question is asked in a particular way
e The question must refer to the negotiation of independence, not automatic independence
f The record of SNP Government has not changed these attitudes
g The 2011 election avalanche did not reflect a significant rise in support for independence
h Respondents generally suggest that devolution has made little difference to policy or their lives
i However, they do not blame Scottish institutions; rather, they want more devolution to make more difference
j They want a Scottish government to stand up for Scotland’s interests (even if few really know what this involves)
k This, and the SNP’s perceived record in office (and the status of its leader, Alex Salmond), helps explain SNP popularity – not support for independence
l Overall, the evidence suggests that the only way people will vote for independence is if the UK Government holds a snap poll (annoying the Scottish electorate and reminding them of the old top-down Conservative rule) and asks the electorate to make a yes/ no decision on independence. This will turn the process into a vote for the Scottish government over the UK government.
m That move might eventually be more popular in England, where there is some (but let’s not exaggerate it) rise in the perception that Scotland is doing disproportionately well out the of the Union
n In other news, the link between public opinion is often very weak indeed. This effect began almost immediately, with the Scottish Parliament putting leadership before opinion when deciding to abolish ‘section 28’. Few examples since then have produced a closer association between opinion and policy. Indeed, in key areas of public health (such as smoking and drinking), the Scottish Government appears more interested in changing rather than reflecting public opinion.
Argument 8: Evolution, not revolution, in public policy
a There was much talk before devolution about the need for ‘Scottish solutions to Scottish problems’ and the idea of Westminster having no time for Scottish legislation
b Hopes were high for policy innovation and new ideas
c At the same time, devolution was seen by many as a way to avoid policy innovation; to step off the train associated with the constant top-down reform agenda of the UK government
d The latter image is a better guide
e Public policy did not change dramatically after devolution, and did not mark dramatic policy divergence from the past or the rest of the UK
f There were key examples of divergence, including ‘free’ personal care for older people, the abolition of higher education tuition fees, the abolition of the healthcare internal market and the introduction of the single transferable vote in local elections
g There were also sources of policy change in areas such as housing stock transfer and anti-social behavior
h However, there was also a notable degree of policy continuity and pressure to converge with UK government policy
i The phrase ‘Scottish solutions to Scottish problems’ may relate more to how it processes policy than the actual policy outputs and outcomes
Argument 9: The much-maligned ‘Barnett formula’ has proved to be remarkably durable despite its lack of public support
a Scotland appears to enjoy a funding advantage, with more public money spent per head in Scotland than in most parts of England and Wales
b This advantage has become associated with the Barnett formula, even though the formula is not the cause of (and does not help protect) that advantage
c The Barnett formula represents a way to determine annual changes to the Scottish budget
d We identify (comparable) changes to English budgets and assign a Scottish share based on its share of the UK population
e If all else remains equal, and spending rises, the Barnett formula may in fact help reduce Scotland’s higher per capita rates of spending
f The pre- and post-devolved experience is that things do not remain equal and that other factors (including incorrect estimates of Scotland’s share of the UK population) have contributed to the maintenance of Scotland’s financial position
g This issue received relatively low attention in the first 10 years (or so) of devolution, when overall UK expenditure was high and rising
h It now receives more attention during the new age of economic austerity, but has yet to produce a new system in Scotland
i The experience shows us the importance of inertia in politics, where the status quo is difficult to shift when there is no agreement on what new system to introduce, hard choices have to made and any new system will produce vocal ‘losers’
j It exposes a contradiction of sorts, in which the UK Treasury remains a powerful actor in Scottish politics, determining the size of the Scottish budget but also providing a large budget and often giving little direction on how to spend it (with the exception of areas such as capital spending, where it limits the ability of devolved governments to pursue alternatives to public private partnerships)
k The Scottish Government does not have the equivalent of a Treasury and its control of the key economic levers are very limited
Argument 9: We are entering a new phase of constitutional fixation
a. The first half of devolution was characterized by relatively low attention to further constitutional change
b. Constitutional issues arose rarely and referred to the potential anomalies of devolution, including the ‘West Lothian’ question and the role of a UK Supreme Court in Scottish criminal justice
c. The prospect of an SNP election victory helped raise the constitutional question up the Scottish agenda
d. The 2007-11 period saw two reviews of the devolution settlement – the SNP’s National Conversation (seeking views on its preference for devolution) and the Scottish Parliament commissioned (and UK Government financed) Calman Commission review of devolution.
e. Both operated on parallel tracks, with limited engagement between the two
f. The National Conversation did not culminate in a referendum on independence, since the SNP did not have enough support in the Scottish Parliament to pass a referendum bill
g. The Calman Commission produced recommendations to extend devolution in a number of small ways (such as on airguns policy and the devolution of some taxes) and provide a new framework for the administration of Scottish income tax (allowing the Scottish Parliament to vary the rate by ten pence in the pound and obliging it to choose its income tax rate in a way not seen before)
h. The Scotland Bill may now be amended to reflect many of Calman’s recommendations, but the 2011 election result has complicated matters
i. A particular source of tension regards the Scottish Parliament’s scrutiny of the new Scotland Bill in the light of a new SNP majority on the relevant committee
j. Independence following a referendum is unlikely, but the referendum may result in a vote for further devolution or ‘devolution max’
k. Whatever the result, further devolution is likely to result in a very messy compromise, since no one is quite sure what further devolution will involve
Argument 10: Scottish devolution has been a success, but only if we measure success in a particular way
a. There are many ways to measure the success of devolution, from instant success, as soon as the Scotland Bill was passed in 1998, to almost no success, as the Scottish Parliament failed to live up to its billing as the symbol of new politics
b. If devolution is about a new form of politics, then it has been a failure – but we should not compare its actual operation with the unrealistic aspirations of its most naïve supporters
c. The often-peripheral role of the Scottish Parliament in the policy process should not detract from its new role as a source of light on the policymaking process in Scotland
d. Further, there is now a Scottish political system with its own institutions that are here to stay
Independence Referendum: One for the Trainspotters
One of my students pointed out that the SNP commitment to hold the independence referendum in the second half of the 2011-16 parliamentary session is not in its 2011 manifesto. So, I checked and he is correct. Yet, both Alex Salmond and Nicola Sturgeon (in the video above Curtice's article) are very clear that they have an electoral mandate for that timetable. What this means is that the SNP made this commitment orally during the campaign itself. Specifically, Alex Salmond made the commitment during the BBC debate on May 1st. This was described by the Telegraph as a climb down to stop scaring potential voters, while the Daily Record reports in its class style: 'After weeks of refusing to name a date, he said he wanted Scots to vote on breaking up Britain "in the second half of the parliament"'. Salmond's justification in the BBC debate was that the first half of the session would be taken up by scrutiny of the new Scotland Bill. In any case, it seems to have been well-known-enough during the campaign (certainly, all the main opposition parties and media knew about it) to justify recent statements, but it is one of those issues that makes us wonder what 'the electorate' is said to give a mandate to - the party in general or the manifesto in particular?
The Independence Referendum - annoyance is important
I'm not much of a blogger, and you probably shouldn't blog when you are annoyed (just like email), but I am annoyed and so I want to blog about the independence referendum chatter. What a pile of nonsense. Yes, that's quite vague, but that is my overall feeling about the current debate. There is the usually excellent reasoning given by John Curtice about why David Cameron is pushing the issue now, in terms of current opinion polls and the window of opportunity to close the matter down. However, I don't think there are many analyses about the basic link to the emotions on which we draw when we make major decisions. We make different decisions when we are annoyed. We make different decisions when we feel that we are being pressured or told what to do. We make different decisions when people tell us that we do not have the right to make decisions. Indeed, we might even make contrary choices simply because some people have told us to do otherwise. That is why David Cameron's recent strategy seems so off the mark. In my mind, the only thing that will produce a 'yes to independence' vote is a combination of two things: (1) the referendum is held and controlled by the Conservative-led UK Government (since many Scots feel much more strongly about the Conservatives than they do about constitutional change); and, (2) it asks a stark yes/ no question about independence (since the best way to ensure a lower vote for independence is to offer further devolution instead). However, the more that this goes on, the more I think that the Conservative-led UK Government can screw it up without holding the referendum itself. All it has to do is keep banging on about the 18-month timetable of permission (just as Iron Lady is coming to our screens) and watch as a huge population of docile people suddenly get annoyed enough to vote 'yes'. For anecdotal evidence, take me as a best case. When asked about this issue in private I say 'I don't care about independence'. When asked on academic panels, and I have to be more polite and sound more intelligent, I say 'I really don't think that independence will have a significant effect on our daily lives'. Yet, now, I DO care - and, if the vote was tomorrow, I would vote 'yes'. Now, let's say that I am am a relatively intelligent and thoughtful person, that I think carefully about major decisions and that, therefore, I am a decent 'best case' for either side. I have just said that a combination of David Cameron's poor strategy, combined with being annoyed by commentators on Sky News saying 'we English should have a say, too' (the best response seems to be to consider a relationship in which one person wants out; the other person gets a say in how they divvy up their possessions, but not if they stay together), has made me want to vote 'yes' instantly. Now consider all those people who don't study Scottish politics for a living and are much more likely to make an emotional decision backed on little evidence. Be careful not to open doors towards you, otherwise you will be knocked over by the stampede to the polling booths (or, in my case, first class post). My advice to unionists is simple: do not let anyone from the current (or, in the case of Michael Forsyth, former) UK Government near this issue (with the exception of civil servants negotiating the details behind closed doors). There may be few sparkling lights in the Scottish political class, but the fact that they are practicing their politics in Scotland and adapting to its environment is much more valuable than a smoother operator making pronouncements from on high.
Monday, 27 June 2011
Draft chapters of 'The Scottish Political System Since Devolution'
The Scottish Political System Since Devolution:
From New Politics to the New Scottish Government
My plan was to share these draft book chapters online so that it could be openly peer reviewed before publication. I received a few comments that way (including useful suggestions by Michael Clancy), but also benefited from more systematic commentary from Neil McGarvey and Barry Winetrobe. Here are the drafts of all eleven chapters and bibliography as sent to the publisher on the 25th August. The book's details can be found here - http://www.booksonix.com/imprint/bookshop/ or, if you want to pay a bit more, here http://www.amazon.co.uk/Scottish-Political-System-Since-Devolution/dp/1845402022/ref=sr_1_5?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1314622180&sr=1-5
Comments are still welcome, either here or by email (paul.cairney@abdn.ac.uk). I have also clicked the box 'editable by anyone' - let's hope that doesn't end badly.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/13OjF5W55oSbLABbxR6pmClCg_pFeC5C3o_Egtfa0SnE/edit?hl=en_US
https://docs.google.com/document/d/15nDRgdYscAuLGadJcYhOsCSa2Adjk4h7S2s-E-pUPa4/edit?hl=en_US
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1XvDro2C4I8l-F3VDzyaWlYy4QBo2YgDndvadfNEXU-8/edit?hl=en_US
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1mZZQYULqul6BCy0oNWe9iwApkxvGu5qEyk3YU1bPlyI/edit?hl=en_US
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1_vCSilFoqnSD35PhZ981RhmI1JwEmS0f89Yub9kw9oU/edit?hl=en_US
https://docs.google.com/document/d/19D_95LDwaGxxgdLQfo5wF1oDbIa_cWCNwS3-RIwX4qY/edit?hl=en_US
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1-t5ZYsxtuuOq407kvzrVmF4q1_76H9T2Q5krMI-Ag5c/edit?hl=en_US
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1tPV_KnRgBL4iQb6dOkFDfKk-bra48CXyK2JMumvOEXY/edit?hl=en_US
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1c0H09jtLZyu0XJ_H2fau_sQ8sfoVNJV9Y6mjLD1ME3U/edit?hl=en_US
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1dhfHZxmH6Rik9XFvSmzFfyZWCbtmQ0LssLQL86FYe9o/edit?hl=en_US
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1YK5pbs35UEqyBWRr_lqqfd9soClsfmB6nmrb-Zf6My0/edit?hl=en_US
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1CPfgt5Zw0xz3lcPFZ1RMQDRbxtGvF1vq4TYGP26GoBI/edit?hl=en_US
Just ignore the wacky page numbers (or tell me how to change them).
From New Politics to the New Scottish Government
My plan was to share these draft book chapters online so that it could be openly peer reviewed before publication. I received a few comments that way (including useful suggestions by Michael Clancy), but also benefited from more systematic commentary from Neil McGarvey and Barry Winetrobe. Here are the drafts of all eleven chapters and bibliography as sent to the publisher on the 25th August. The book's details can be found here - http://www.booksonix.com/imprint/bookshop/ or, if you want to pay a bit more, here http://www.amazon.co.uk/Scottish-Political-System-Since-Devolution/dp/1845402022/ref=sr_1_5?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1314622180&sr=1-5
Comments are still welcome, either here or by email (paul.cairney@abdn.ac.uk). I have also clicked the box 'editable by anyone' - let's hope that doesn't end badly.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/13OjF5W55oSbLABbxR6pmClCg_pFeC5C3o_Egtfa0SnE/edit?hl=en_US
https://docs.google.com/document/d/15nDRgdYscAuLGadJcYhOsCSa2Adjk4h7S2s-E-pUPa4/edit?hl=en_US
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1XvDro2C4I8l-F3VDzyaWlYy4QBo2YgDndvadfNEXU-8/edit?hl=en_US
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1mZZQYULqul6BCy0oNWe9iwApkxvGu5qEyk3YU1bPlyI/edit?hl=en_US
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1_vCSilFoqnSD35PhZ981RhmI1JwEmS0f89Yub9kw9oU/edit?hl=en_US
https://docs.google.com/document/d/19D_95LDwaGxxgdLQfo5wF1oDbIa_cWCNwS3-RIwX4qY/edit?hl=en_US
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1-t5ZYsxtuuOq407kvzrVmF4q1_76H9T2Q5krMI-Ag5c/edit?hl=en_US
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1tPV_KnRgBL4iQb6dOkFDfKk-bra48CXyK2JMumvOEXY/edit?hl=en_US
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1c0H09jtLZyu0XJ_H2fau_sQ8sfoVNJV9Y6mjLD1ME3U/edit?hl=en_US
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1dhfHZxmH6Rik9XFvSmzFfyZWCbtmQ0LssLQL86FYe9o/edit?hl=en_US
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1YK5pbs35UEqyBWRr_lqqfd9soClsfmB6nmrb-Zf6My0/edit?hl=en_US
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1CPfgt5Zw0xz3lcPFZ1RMQDRbxtGvF1vq4TYGP26GoBI/edit?hl=en_US
Just ignore the wacky page numbers (or tell me how to change them).
Monday, 30 May 2011
Class sizes
This is just a list of newspaper articles on class size targets, linked to Fiona Hyslop's departure as Education secretary in 2009. I refer to it in my book 'The Scottish Political System Since Devolution' (http://www.booksonix.com/imprint/bookshop/ ). Some of the links may no longer work (e.g. The Times has gone subscription-based since I collected them), but the Scotsman has a very good archive.
D. Maddox 16.10.09 ‘Hyslop admits government has failed on class sizes’, The Scotsman, http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Hyslop-admits-government-has-failed.5739396.jp
F. Macleod 12.11.09 ‘Failure on class sizes isn’t my fault ... blame the recession, councils and minority rule – Fiona Hyslop’, The Scotsman, http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Failure-on-class-sizes-isn39t.5816932.jp
L. McIntosh 12.11.09 ‘Hyslop blames class size failures on councils’, The Times, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6913280.ece
B. Currie 03.12.09 ‘Gray: Salmond misled MSPs with promise on class sizes’, The Herald, http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/politics/gray-salmond-misled-msps-with-promise-on-class-sizes-1.989349
S. Johnson 03.12.09 “Alex Salmond accused of misleading MSPs over ‘unachievable’ class size pledge”, Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/scotland/6719692/Alex-Salmond-accused-of-misleading-MSPs-over-unachievable-class-size-pledge.html
T. Peterkin 06.12.09 ‘Three codes broken in promoting SNP class size pledge, claim Lib Dems’, Scotland on Sunday, http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Three-codes-broken-in-promoting.5887767.jp
C. Mackie 08.12.09 ‘Ex-education minister calls for inquiry into SNP class sizes pledge’, The Scotsman, http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Exeducation-minister-calls-for-inquiry.5891301.jp
Herald Scotland 07.12.09 ‘Salmond faces Holyrood inquiry over primary class sizes’, The Herald, http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/politics/salmond-faces-holyrood-inquiry-over-primary-class-sizes-1.990575
BBC News 08.12.09 ‘Salmond’s class size claim probed’, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/8402839.stm
C. Churchill 10.12.09 ‘Anger as Russell offers up new class size deal’, The Herald, http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/education/anger-as-russell-offers-up-new-class-size-deal-1.991429
F. Macleod 12.12.09 ‘Mike Russell admits class sizes will not be reduced in lifetime of government’, The Scotsman, http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Mike-Russell-admits-class-sizes.5906199.jp
Scottish Government News Release 11.11.09 ‘Review of class sizes taken forward’ http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2009/11/11163026
Scottish Government News Release 23.09.09 ‘Action to tackle class sizes’ http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2009/09/23094529
I. Swanson 01.12.09 ‘Fiona Hyslop sacked as Education Secretary’, The Scotsman, http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Fiona-Hyslop-sacked-as-Education.5871555.jp
A. Macleod 02.12.09 “Salmond ‘sacrifices’ his Education Secretary”, The Times, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6939893.ece
A. Macleod 01.12.09 ‘Fantasy of education portfolio sealed Hyslop’s fate’, The Times, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6940021.ece
A. Macleod 01.12.09 ‘Fiona Hyslop stripped of education role in SNP Cabinet’, The Times, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6939026.ece
BBC News 01.12.09 ‘Demoted SNP education secretary endorses successor’, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/8388141.stm
A. Cochrane 02.12.09 ‘It is good news for Scotland’s children that Alex Salmond has finally faced reality on Fiona Hylsop’, Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/columnists/alancochrane/6707191/It-is-good-news-for-Scotlands-children-that-Alex-Salmond-has-finally-faced-reality-on-Fiona-Hyslop.html
Telegraph 02.12.09 ‘Alex Salmond forced to sack education minister after resignation bluff called’, Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/scotland/6702176/Alex-Salmond-forced-to-sack-education-minister-after-resignation-bluff-called.html
T. Peterkin 04.12.09 “Alex Salmond ‘used sacked Fiona Hyslop as scapegoat and misled Holyrood’”, The Scotsman, http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Alex-Salmond-39used-sacked-Fiona.5883882.jp
A. Macleod 04.12.09 “Salmond accused of ‘sticking knife’ into Hyslop over class size memo”, The Times, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/education/article6943650.ece
M. Linklater 04.12.09 ‘Alex Salmond is hurt and Holyrood knows it’, The Times, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6943692.ece
A. Macleod 02.12.09 “Salmond sacked Hyslop ‘because she had lost support of the party’”, The Times, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6941802.ece
D. Maddox 16.10.09 ‘Hyslop admits government has failed on class sizes’, The Scotsman, http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Hyslop-admits-government-has-failed.5739396.jp
F. Macleod 12.11.09 ‘Failure on class sizes isn’t my fault ... blame the recession, councils and minority rule – Fiona Hyslop’, The Scotsman, http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Failure-on-class-sizes-isn39t.5816932.jp
L. McIntosh 12.11.09 ‘Hyslop blames class size failures on councils’, The Times, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6913280.ece
B. Currie 03.12.09 ‘Gray: Salmond misled MSPs with promise on class sizes’, The Herald, http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/politics/gray-salmond-misled-msps-with-promise-on-class-sizes-1.989349
S. Johnson 03.12.09 “Alex Salmond accused of misleading MSPs over ‘unachievable’ class size pledge”, Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/scotland/6719692/Alex-Salmond-accused-of-misleading-MSPs-over-unachievable-class-size-pledge.html
T. Peterkin 06.12.09 ‘Three codes broken in promoting SNP class size pledge, claim Lib Dems’, Scotland on Sunday, http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Three-codes-broken-in-promoting.5887767.jp
C. Mackie 08.12.09 ‘Ex-education minister calls for inquiry into SNP class sizes pledge’, The Scotsman, http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Exeducation-minister-calls-for-inquiry.5891301.jp
Herald Scotland 07.12.09 ‘Salmond faces Holyrood inquiry over primary class sizes’, The Herald, http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/politics/salmond-faces-holyrood-inquiry-over-primary-class-sizes-1.990575
BBC News 08.12.09 ‘Salmond’s class size claim probed’, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/8402839.stm
C. Churchill 10.12.09 ‘Anger as Russell offers up new class size deal’, The Herald, http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/education/anger-as-russell-offers-up-new-class-size-deal-1.991429
F. Macleod 12.12.09 ‘Mike Russell admits class sizes will not be reduced in lifetime of government’, The Scotsman, http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Mike-Russell-admits-class-sizes.5906199.jp
Scottish Government News Release 11.11.09 ‘Review of class sizes taken forward’ http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2009/11/11163026
Scottish Government News Release 23.09.09 ‘Action to tackle class sizes’ http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2009/09/23094529
I. Swanson 01.12.09 ‘Fiona Hyslop sacked as Education Secretary’, The Scotsman, http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Fiona-Hyslop-sacked-as-Education.5871555.jp
A. Macleod 02.12.09 “Salmond ‘sacrifices’ his Education Secretary”, The Times, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6939893.ece
A. Macleod 01.12.09 ‘Fantasy of education portfolio sealed Hyslop’s fate’, The Times, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6940021.ece
A. Macleod 01.12.09 ‘Fiona Hyslop stripped of education role in SNP Cabinet’, The Times, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6939026.ece
BBC News 01.12.09 ‘Demoted SNP education secretary endorses successor’, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/8388141.stm
A. Cochrane 02.12.09 ‘It is good news for Scotland’s children that Alex Salmond has finally faced reality on Fiona Hylsop’, Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/columnists/alancochrane/6707191/It-is-good-news-for-Scotlands-children-that-Alex-Salmond-has-finally-faced-reality-on-Fiona-Hyslop.html
Telegraph 02.12.09 ‘Alex Salmond forced to sack education minister after resignation bluff called’, Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/scotland/6702176/Alex-Salmond-forced-to-sack-education-minister-after-resignation-bluff-called.html
T. Peterkin 04.12.09 “Alex Salmond ‘used sacked Fiona Hyslop as scapegoat and misled Holyrood’”, The Scotsman, http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Alex-Salmond-39used-sacked-Fiona.5883882.jp
A. Macleod 04.12.09 “Salmond accused of ‘sticking knife’ into Hyslop over class size memo”, The Times, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/education/article6943650.ece
M. Linklater 04.12.09 ‘Alex Salmond is hurt and Holyrood knows it’, The Times, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6943692.ece
A. Macleod 02.12.09 “Salmond sacked Hyslop ‘because she had lost support of the party’”, The Times, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6941802.ece
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