Political Studies Association Annual Conference, Cardiff,
March 2013
Public Administration Panel 3: New Theory for Turbulent
Times I http://www.psa.ac.uk/2013/PanelDetails.aspx?PanelID=102
Policy Theories for Turbulent Times: Comparing Old and
New
Abstract
The postwar period has seen a
major shift in the discussion of policy theory, from a focus on policy cycles
and ordered stages towards theories that recognise the messy and unpredictable
nature of politics and policymaking.
However, it is more difficult to detect that shift when we examine the
role of academic policy advice and the models that governments use to organise
policymaking. Despite recognition that
policymaking does not operate in discrete stages, there is still a residual
(but by no means exclusive) attachment to stages based policymaking models in
government (often reinforced by a ‘Westminster model’ approach in which
governments assume that power is concentrated at the centre). Part of the explanation is that new theories
may be more realistic but less amenable to policy advice. The paper explores this problem by examining
the practical value of complexity theory.
It shows that although many (largely think tank) recommendations have
been made in the name of complexity (including, for example, using more
randomised control trials), few new models are as directly applicable or
understandable as the old. It outlines two attempts by the author to address
this problem in academic-practitioner exchanges.
Introduction
This paper updates my argument
from last year (Cairney, 2012a, which provides most of the background
references), based on experience of knowledge exchange in two areas, outlined
below. It is necessarily a ‘rougher’ draft than I would normally provide,
largely because it discusses material produced for a practitioner conference on
the 14th March.
The original paper argues, first,
that the postwar period has seen a major shift in the discussion of policy
theory, from a focus on policy cycles and ordered stages towards theories that
recognise the messy and unpredictable nature of politics and policymaking. Our object of study has changed somewhat and
new approaches have developed to conceptualise that new world. Modern accounts do not support the idea of
top-down decision making pursued by a sole central actor (an assumption which
is central to early discussions of concepts such as comprehensive rationality
and policy cycles). Rather, they situate
such action within a more complex policy process (note, at this stage, that
‘complex’ is used widely, perhaps as shorthand for ‘complicated’). We have
witnessed a shift towards a more fragmented system with many more policy
participants; power has dispersed from a single central actor towards many
organisations and sources of authority and influence. The policy environment now seems more complex
and potentially unstable, populated by more fragmented governments and many
participants with different values, perceptions and preferences (Sabatier,
2007: 3-4). Consequently, the way that we describe and explain public policy
has changed significantly. A new and
often esoteric language has emerged to describe policy processes.
However, second, it is more
difficult to detect that shift when we examine the role of academic policy
advice and the models that governments use to organise policymaking. Despite recognition that policymaking does
not operate in discrete stages, there is still a residual (but by no means
exclusive) attachment to stages based policymaking models in government, often
reinforced by a ‘Westminster model’ approach in which governments assume that
power is concentrated at the centre.
The paper then argued that, for
new theories to work, they have to be translated into a language that is
meaningful for policy practitioners.
Practitioners also have to be open to that advice; there has to be some
sort of demand for new ways of thinking analytically about how we understand
and seek to solve policy problems. Since 2012, I have made two attempts to do
this: (1) through regular Scottish Government policy seminars (led by Professor
Michael Keating) which have run for several years; and (a) the 2013 CIPFA
(Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy) Scotland annual
conference on the implications of complexity theory for the public service. The
paper outlines or reproduces that material, commenting on how the ‘translation’
took place and how successful the conversation was. The conclusion considers the value of such
exchanges (beyond our current need to demonstrate ‘impact’) and the extent to
which contemporary theories can guide the analysis of policymaking by
practitioners.
Scottish Government Seminars
The Scottish Government seminar
begins by examining why policy cycles approaches remain in such good currency:
are they still relevant to modern discussions of good policymaking? We discuss
the extent to which the approach symbolizes and perhaps romanticises a former age;
a world of centralized policymaking in which we assume that there can be a sole,
central policymaker which is ‘comprehensively rational’ (or at least aware of
enough information to help solve problems and anticipate the effects of
policy). We then compare that image with
competing interpretations, based on the broad idea of multi-level governance: policymaking
in partnership with organisation in the public, private and third sectors; comprehensive
rationality as an ideal-type (to be contrasted with the real world); and movement
away from the idea that problems can be ‘solved’ by research and analysis. We
generally agree on the limitations of the former and potential realism of the
latter before exploring the modern use of the former and the difficulty of
articulating valuable models from the latter.
In academia, cycles may still be
discussed as a starting point for discussion, previously as a means to
structure textbooks (with a chapter on each stage) but now increasingly as a
means to present more realistic concepts or theories (such as when we explore
the implications of ‘bounded rationality’ (Simon, 1976) on policymaking) or
simply to show how not to
conceptualise policymaking – an approach taken to its extreme by the Advocacy
Coalition Framework (ACF) (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993) built, initially,
on a scientific critique of the ‘stages heuristic’ (although note that I would
not use that sort of term outside an academic conference). One good example is
a focus on studies of implementation over the years, from a ‘top-down’ focus on
the conditions that have to be met to ensure perfect implementation (in which
almost all studies use those factors to explain the ‘implementation gap’),
towards a ‘bottom-up’ critique, used to describe and explain how policy is
really made on the ground, followed by new generations of studies that tried to
go beyond the debates between each approach – such as the ACF, which started
life partly as a way to reconceptualise implementation.
In government, cycles may still
be used either as a way to begin to understand the policymaking task or to make
recommendations on how to act based on a simplification of that world. The Australian Policy Handbook (which has
produced four editions so far) is a good example of the academic/ practitioner
crossover. The authors generally agree that the policymaking world is complex
(or complicated?) but that we need a way to simplify it; dividing policymaking
into stages is a way to provide manageable simplicity even if it is not an
accurate model of the real world.
Various UK government departments
seem to agree. Most notably, in the
Scottish Government Office of Chief Researcher’s ‘Review of Policymaking in the
Scottish Government’ (circulated internally in 2009) we can find two arguments:
(1) governments need to ‘change the way they develop public policy to respond
adequately to increasing social complexity’ because ‘mechanistic’ and ‘command
and control’ approaches may be outdated; and/ but (2) “while ‘real’ policy
making will always be more messy and complicated than is represented in a
policy cycle, there is still value in having a ‘model’ of some kind”. The
report then reproduces six examples of cycle-like models: the Scottish
Government policy cycle (picture below); the DEFRA model; the Home Office
Policy Wheel (picture below); the DWP’s Excellence in Policymaking; the
National School of Government’s Strategy Compass; and the NSG’s Engage model of
strategic communication.
Such visual representations of
policymaking are useful focal points for discussion:
·
Producing a general sense that they might be
some comfort to civil servants new to the job but that they do not model the
real world particularly well. Indeed, the Home Office example (above) is useful
to demonstrate the downside to a simplifying model that seems to be rather
convoluted.
·
Prompting criticisms that we also find in the
literature, such as that: the work of government generally does not proceed in
such an orderly fashion; and, government consists of a large number of
interacting cycles that interact with, and often undermine, each other.
They also help inform wider
related discussions on topics such as:
·
The use of frameworks and targets to ensure
policy outcomes – discussion soon turns to the often vague or indirect link
between the broad strategic aims of a government and the day-to-day work of
civil servants.
·
Evidence based policy. Discussions might begin
with a commitment to EBP as an abstract and neutral process to gather
knowledge, followed by a wide range of factors that seem to undermine it (such
as the need to prioritise consultation with particular groups and to sell
decisions that have largely been taken).
Overall, the policy cycle
discussion is indeed useful as a focus for identifying what does not happen in government and
policymaking. The harder task is to find something more useful to put in its
place. In the discussions, we consider
the extent to which the ‘key tenets’ of policy studies (outlined in Cairney,
2012a; 2012c) can be used to inform policymaking. They are outlined in powerpoint
form below:
·
Bounded Rationality and Punctuated
Equilibrium. Policymakers can only pay
attention to a small number of the issues for which they are responsible
·
Bounded Rationality and Incrementalism.
Policymakers tend to rely on trial-and-error strategies
·
Policy Succession. Any ‘new’ policy is likely to
be a revision of an old one following policy failure.
·
Inheritance Before Choice. Most policy decisions
are based on legislation which already exists and most public expenditure is
devoted to activities that continue by routine.
·
(Multi-level) Governance. There is no single, central
decision-maker. Strong central
government replaced by bargaining government and ‘mutual adjustments’.
·
Historical Institutionalism and Path
Dependence. Decisions made in the past
contributed to the formation of institutions that influence current
practices.
·
Street Level Bureaucracies establish routines to
satisfy a proportion of central government objectives.
·
The Advocacy Coalition Framework. The most
frequent policy changes follow attempts by coalitions to adapt to their
environments and engage in policy learning.
·
The Role of Ideas. Paradigms undermine policy change. Viruses promote change.
·
Multiple Streams Analysis. Radical policy change may happen only when a
‘window of opportunity’ opens and three independent streams come together –
problems, policies and politics.
·
The Logic of Subgovernments and
Consultation. Regular changes of
government do not cause wholesale shifts in policy because most decisions are
beyond the reach of ministers. Most policy is conducted through small and
specialist ‘policy communities’.
The discussions relate broadly to
these themes which, after some translation, generally make sense to, and find
agreement among, practitioners. Perhaps one key exception is the underlying
theme relating to the need for ministers to delegate the vast majority of the
issues for which they are responsible to civil servants and other actors. In
policy studies, we may be comfortable with treating such actors as
‘policymakers’ since they may have day-to-day responsibility for the vast
majority of policy issues, and ministers do not have the ability to give a
clear ‘steer’ to every civil servant.
Many practitioners agree with Ed
Page’s (APSA 2009) suggestion, based on interviews with civil servants, that
civil servants don’t feel a sense of discretion in this situation since they
are attached to a ‘Westminster model’ understanding of the minister-civil
servants relationship (ministers are responsible for all decisions that take
place in their departments; civil servants are the neutral actors carrying out
ministerial policy) and seek to find out the ‘minister’s mind’ on the subject. This
is a fruitful area of discussion, since there will be many areas in which civil
servants cannot deduce a meaningful steer from ministerial documents or the government’s
strategy framework. Perhaps more
importantly, ministers to do not give a clear sense of their priorities, which
makes it difficult to know a ‘minister’s mind’ when choices have to be made
between aims. This is an area in which civil servants from different
departments or divisions can learn from each other’s experience; group
discussions help some civil servants find out either that they are not alone or
that some departments follow clearer aims than others.
A bigger problem for discussion
is that these key tenets of policy studies sometimes give rather impractical
insights. For example, we could take
from multiple streams analysis the need for civil servants to produce policy
solutions in anticipation of problems, perhaps by engaging in some prophylactic
learning from other political systems. This sounds good in theory, but is
generally impractical (unless, of course, practitioners are the ones trying to
create problems that fit their solutions). More generally, ‘policy studies’
does not give direct policymaking advice.
As Cairney (2012a) suggests, in a discussion of Thatcherism, the factors
identified could be treated as problems to be solved: remain sceptical about
the idea that top-down policymaking is politically expensive; draw up a clear
list of policy priorities; reform political and administrative structures, and
modes of service delivery, to challenge the idea of multiple centres of authority;
reform legislative frameworks governing ‘street level bureaucrats’ or choose
new organisations to deliver policy; challenge cosy policy community
relationships; and so on. Rather, the
value of the literature is that it suggests that many of these solutions
produce partial successes (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992; Rhodes, 1997).
Complexity Theory and Policy Advice
It is in this context that it is
worthwhile to introduce the potential value of complexity theory – as a
relatively new but growing branch of policy studies whose authors seek, more
than most, to give direct policymaking advice. One key issue, in this setting,
relates to a basic choice: do we introduce the history, theoretical basis and
interdisciplinary nature of complexity theory or simply provide the
recommendations? The shortened version
of events presents us with recommendations along these lines:
·
Accept your limitations
·
Use simplifying strategies to gather and analyse
info
·
Build failure and unintended consequences into
policy design
·
Use trial and error rather than grand strategies
Those of us familiar with the
post-war policymaking literature will notice that such, modern, scholarly
advice seems to resemble advice provided by Lindblom (1959) several decades
ago. Further, Lindblom came under considerable criticism in the 1960s when he
appeared to recommend incremental policymaking (because, for example,
incremental changes were easier to withdraw if they failed - Cairney, 2012b:
100-2). In particular, Dror (1964: 154-5)
argues that Lindblom’s thesis legitimizes the bias towards inertia and
conservatism in political systems and discourages organizations from breaking
their usual routine. Given that governments already ‘muddle through’, Dror
recommends a series of initiatives – such as brainstorming – to encourage them
to plan their activities more efficiently, clarify their values, identify
alternative policies and identify issues more worthy of comprehensive analysis
(1964: 156). Such discussions could be fruitful if we want to encourage
practitioners to think about the big questions of government; about why their
departments, and the policies they help create and implement, exist. This is
particularly true if they have effectively been trained to focus in depth on
particular areas and tend to ‘muddle through’.
The final roundup question in the
seminar is along these lines: Imagine that you have been asked to produce a
short note on 'good policymaking' for a new colleague (the aim of the
Australian Policy Handbook) - what are the five main bullet points that you
would provide?
The responses tend not to be
ringing endorsements for following policy cycles models, but nor do they tend
to embrace new concepts. Instead, we may
find rather specific, pragmatic, advice about, for example, understanding party
political sensitivities and making sure that information or consultation on
policies does not embarrass departmental ministers. In this context, our academic expectations
may be rather limited, to simply encouraging a wider analytical understanding
of policymaking that goes beyond a dependence on stages and the ‘day to day’.
CIPFA Scotland and Complexity
The CIPFA Scotland experience is
different because ‘complexity’ is a theme of the annual conference and its
leadership used the conference to launch a report, on the public finance
system, which employs some of the language of complexity theory (CIPFA
Scotland, 2013). The aim of the report is to employ a ‘complexity theory lens’
to examine the public management ‘system’ and to use the idea of a
chaos-equilibrium spectrum to argue that only being at the ‘edge of chaos’ is
optimal (2013: 2). In other words, there is a demand to use complexity theory
and to persuade its membership about the value of this way of thinking.
In this case, it may be more
important to focus on the history, theoretical basis and interdisciplinary
nature of complexity theory rather than simply provide the recommendations – partly
because many references to ‘complex systems’ and the related language (including
‘chaos’) are often used loosely and metaphorically. Consequently, the audience may be encouraged
to engage in ‘systems thinking’, which can refer to a range of practices,
including the broad desire to see a range of activities as interconnected. It
might also refer to the idea that decision-making should take place, as far as
possible, at the ‘local’ level. To know
for sure, we need to unpack these terms and try to give them meaning in the
public sector context. The paper outlines my initial approach – a lecture accompanied
by a blog (reproduced below) followed by a second, briefer lecture, based on
notes and feedback over the two day conference:
“Complexity Theory and
Complex Adaptive Systems
The
theme running through this year’s conference is: ‘adaptive system thinking …
how adaptive public finance and its finance function and people are’. There are three key sources of background for
the discussions:
1. Economic crisis. The UK and devolved
governments are addressing a new age of austerity associated with economic crisis,
rising government debt and plans to reduce public spending. The reductions may be so significant, in some
areas, that they prompt a complete rethink of the way that governments plan and
deliver services (or new ways to identify, understand and seek to solve policy
problems). In some areas, governments may simply cut budgets and encourage
other bodies to decide how to adapt.
2. Targets and rules. How can targets and rules ensure the delivery
of public services? This is a perennial
topic in the study of government. For CIPFA in particular, the issue may relate
to the need to follow rules to ensure that the spending of public money is
properly accounted for. We may ask
ourselves if current rules and targets produce the right sort of behaviour or
if they encourage rigid rule following (or game playing) which might cause
unintended consequences.
3. Organisational Change in Scotland.
Since 2007, the Scottish Government has made some important changes to the
Scottish public sector – centralising some areas (such as the police and fire
services) and decentralising others (such as local authorities). Its new
relationship with local authorities has the potential to place more
responsibility on local actors to identify and solve problems rather than
implement policies made from the ‘top’.
The Scottish Government’s approach may also be contrasted with that of
the UK Government (associated with a more extensive and punitive targets/
inspection regime).
A
combination of all three elements draws our attention to the importance of
adapting and responding to crises, perhaps by taking a flexible approach to
existing rules to ensure that they are not overtaken by events and new
problems. Such decisions may increasingly be taken at a local level, often
without central government direction; they may fall increasingly to particular
branches or professions within larger governmental organisations, often without
explicit or detailed government direction.
This is a situation that may be particularly worrying to a profession
built on demonstrating financial accountability to the public through
government and Parliament.
In
this context, one aim of the conference is to find the right balance between
following proper rules properly and adopting a flexible approach: to use discretion
to secure outcomes for which policies may have been designed; and, to interpret
rules in the right way to secure the right outcomes. This process is subject to uncertainty; it is
difficult to know how to use rules flexibly.
Indeed, even the language we might use to describe it – such as
‘stretching’ rules – implies that it is inappropriate. So, while most of the sessions are devoted to
how accountants and other actors in the public sector might become more creative
in their contribution to the use of public money, this blog (and my first brief
lecture) is devoted simply to the question: how can we justify the flexible use
of government rules?
If
put bluntly, the main message that we could
take from the policymaking literature is that:
1. No government can control the public
sector, its outputs or the subsequent outcomes.
2. Many governments exacerbate this
problem by imposing a large number of too-rigid targets backed up by a punitive
inspection regime, producing unintended consequences.
3. Giving more discretion to local public
sector employees allows them to adapt to local circumstances in a way that
central governments cannot anticipate.
A
classic discussion of this problem can be linked to key texts in the
policymaking literature, including:
• Lipsky’s idea of ‘street level
bureaucracy’. He suggests that there are so many targets, rules and laws that
no public agency or official can be reasonably expected to fulfil them
all. In fact, many may be too vague or
even contradictory, requiring ‘street level bureaucrats’ to choose some over
others. The potential irony is that the
cumulative pressure from more central government rules and targets effectively
provides implementers with a greater degree of freedom to manage their budgets
and day-to-day activities.
• Hjern’s focus on intra-departmental
conflict, when central government departments pursue programmes with competing
aims, and interdependence, when policies are implemented by multiple
organizations. Programmes are implemented through ‘implementation structures’
where ‘parts of many public and private organizations cooperate in the
implementation of a programme’. Although national governments create the
overall framework of regulations and resources, and there are ‘administrative
imperatives’ behind the legislation authorizing a programme, the main shaping
of policy takes place at local levels.
• The more recent focus on ‘governance’
as an alternative to the idea of ‘government’ (not to be confused with a
discussion of ‘corporate’ or ‘good’ governance). While such problems of central government
control have prompted governments in the past to embrace New Public Management
(NPM) and seek to impose order through hierarchy and targeting, local
implementation networks (with members from the public, third and private
sectors) may not be amenable to such direct control
A
more recent contribution comes from the modern study of complexity theory. As Marco Thiel’s discussion on Friday
suggests, complexity theory has been applied to an incredibly wide range of
activity, from the swarming behaviour of bees, the weather and the function of
the brain, to social and political systems.
The argument is that all such systems have common properties or are
subject to the same arguments, including:
1. A complex system is greater than the
sum of its parts; those parts are interdependent - elements interact with each
other, share information and combine to produce systemic behaviour.
2. Some attempts to influence complex
systems are dampened (negative feedback) while others are amplified (positive feedback). Small actions can
have large effects and large actions can have small effects.
3. Complex systems are particularly
sensitive to initial conditions that produce a long-term momentum or ‘path
dependence’.
4. They exhibit ‘emergence’, or behaviour
that results from the interaction between elements at a local level rather than
central direction.
5. They may contain ‘strange attractors’
or demonstrate extended regularities of behaviour which may be interrupted by
short bursts of change.
As
you might expect from (what seems like) a theory of all things, the language is
vague and needs some interpretation in each field. In the policymaking field,
the identification of a complex system is often used to make the following
suggestions:
• Law-like behaviour is difficult to identify – so a policy that was
successful in one context may not have the same effect in another.
• Policymaking systems are difficult to control; policy makers should not
be surprised when their policy interventions do not have the desired effect.
• Policy makers in the UK have been too
driven by the idea of order, maintaining rigid hierarchies and producing
top-down, centrally driven policy strategies.
An attachment to performance indicators, to monitor and control local
actors, may simply result in policy failure and demoralised policymakers.
• Policymaking systems or their
environments change quickly. Therefore, organisations must adapt quickly and
not rely on a single policy strategy.
On
this basis, there is a tendency in the literature to encourage the delegation
of decision-making to local actors:
1. Rely less on central government driven
targets, in favour of giving local organisations more freedom to learn from
their experience and adapt to their rapidly-changing environment.
2. To deal with uncertainty and change,
encourage trial-and-error projects, or pilots, that can provide lessons, or be
adopted or rejected, relatively quickly.
3. Encourage better ways to deal with
alleged failure by treating ‘errors’ as sources of learning (rather than a
means to punish organisations) or setting more realistic parameters for
success/ failure.
4. Encourage a greater understanding,
within the public sector, of the implications of complex systems and terms such
as ‘emergence’ or ‘feedback loops’.
In
other words, this literature, when applied to policymaking, tends to encourage
a movement from centrally driven targets, rules and performance indicators
towards a more flexible understanding of rules and targets by local actors who
are more able to understand and adapt to rapidly-changing local circumstances.
Of
course, you may still end up feeling that the advice is a bit vague (and
perhaps not completely convincing), but it provides a starting point for
discussion, followed by various conference presentations on how to use,
creatively or flexibly, new forms of discretion in the public sector. There will be the usual forums for
participation – including Q&A sessions after lectures and smaller seminar
groups – as well as a live twitter feed throughout
(#cipfascotlandconference).
For
more detail, and further references, see:
Cairney,
P. (2012) ‘Complexity Theory in Political Science and Public Policy’, Political
Studies Review, 10, 346-58 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1478-9302.2012.00270.x/abstract
(or email Paul for a copy)
The Second Lecture
The first lecture was preceded
and followed by a range of talks confirming this focus on the importance of
local policy actors and their need to be creative; to reframe and solve policy
problems rather than merely adopting a narrow focus on costs and rules. The
talks included: management consultants
talking about new ways of thinking (and, in one case, challenging the audience
in a surprisingly condescending way); design scholars encouraging the design of
new forms of policymaking (which allowed me to spend an hour with senior
members of CIPFA and the Scottish Government, drawing stick figures and
inventing an implausible ‘health-e’ app); and, the Scottish Finance Secretary
(John Swinney) confirming the need for more decisions to be taken at local
levels, accompanied by the Scottish Government encouragement of greater
decision-making discretion. By the second day, my role had changed from a
simple provider of thoughts on complexity theory and policymaking, towards
being a commentator on the audience’s ability to turn theory into practice:
“The main thing that struck me, when watching
the plenary and workshop sessions, was the potentially large disconnect between
(a) the focus on creativity, problem solving and leading the framing of
debates; and (b) the day to day realities of the environments in which most
people operate. This is by no means
unique to CIPFA. It is a common tendency
to become enthused by positive messages, workshops and new networks made in
conferences, only to lose that enthusiasm with 10-15 seconds of returning to
the office, with a crisis, the usual constraints and/ or a long email list to
work through.
Still,
one interesting thing about the first workshop I attended – with a title of
‘Art or Science?’ – is that the daily realities tended to dominate a session
that may have been designed to encourage a wider appreciation of the problem at
hand. The aim was to move an
organisation’s staff from three existing buildings to one, producing criteria
to determine how to make the move at lowest cost. The outcomes seemed to
contrast with at least three other sessions:
- The tone and substance of
discussions seemed a million miles away from Guy Browning’s initial
exhortation to engage in lateral thinking, creativity (thinking new
things), innovation (making them happen without upsetting peoples’
sensitivities) and getting to the core, not the immediate, problem; not
accepting current parameters or the way that a problem is defined for you;
questioning the problem and framing problems in different ways to
influence how they are solved.
- It differed from the recommendation
to consider systems thinking, in which we interact with a wide range of
people to produce outcomes. Instead, much of the assumption of the session
was that the strategy was based essentially on a single mind: hundreds of
choices would have to be made in the future, when the group gathered and
considered new information. This would be relatively straightforward for a
single person making constant calculations, but complicated for a group of
people operating within a structure containing many other influential
groups. The focus was also very narrow (in general), without the group
being able to consider the less tangible costs – such as the disruption to
staff related to moving office, moving house, changing transport – related
to staff productivity during transition and the development of new
relationships with colleagues (although some contributors tried to get at
these issues with their recommendations). There was little sense of the
need to, for example, find out from staff what they thought about
potential moves (which may produce ‘ownership’ of the decision) or to
frame the issue in a particular way to influence the success of the
recommendation at a higher level of decision making. Perhaps more thought
could have gone into the importance of our ability to frame an issue in
narrow ‘technical’ terms, according to financial and accounting rules,
versus the tendency of major decisions to be framed in many different ways
by other actors. It is a very different discussion when the issue catches
fire and gets away from you – something that most are aware of, but not
something much discussed. This may require a very different mindset, based
on developing ‘political’ skills (since politics, broadly defined, is
about making choices that do not suit everyone, when people have different
preferences).
- It contrasted spectacularly with the
Vangard exhortation not to exacerbate problems in the public sector with a
fixation on unit cost (rather than across the board costs) and value
- It seemed to contrast with the
session on quantity surveying which exhorted us to:
- Focus on whole life appraisals; it is
sometimes better to spend more in the short term to save in the long term
- Focus on the links between costs,
value and intended use (rather than assume those considerations away)
- Ask yourself if particular
performance measures are appropriate, focusing on ‘in the round’ measures
- Note that it is difficult (but
important) to measure increases in the better use of space and making
people feel good (or not making them feel bad) in that space
- Look at the service we deliver and
consider the big picture
If
we take the ‘art or science’ session as representative of the day to day work
of accountants, it reminds us that it is difficult to know what professional
accountants should do with all of this information. Perhaps the temptation is
to focus on the ‘facts’ and technical requirements and to pass on the value
based choices to policymakers such as elected politicians. Is this a worse solution that taking the
decision to lead and innovate? We began, in my original session, with the idea
that public sector accountants have to show that they are accountable to the
public via elected organisations and people. The glib assertion that
accountability is ‘all you have left when you remove responsibility’ will not
convince many accountants to throw caution to the wind (at least when they
return to their day jobs).
The
other recommendations throw up similar issues. For example:
Recommendations:
- Challenge silos, often physically,
to include everyone and generate new ways of thinking (e.g. by comparing
the norms and taken for granted rules in different organisations, often
generated within professions). Challenge silos to make people more
comfortable about managing other professions. Go to each other’s
conferences. Note that the mixing of groups/ professions may initially be
less efficient before becoming more efficient.
- BUT who has the time (who is allowed
to devote the time?
- Embrace the relative uncertainties
of the political and corporate sides of the job.
- BUT they are the elected and
accountable people there to make value based choices
- Spend considerable time defining the
problem before identifying the solution
- BUT it felt like the opposite in the
art or science session, reflecting an immediate setting
- Base decisions regarding risk on
data, not perception
- BUT this seems like a false duality;
impossible to separate the two – more about not basing it on hope, seeking
other perspectives
- Provide a better service for less
money; motivate people while restraining pay.
- VERSUS spend more money for a better
service
- Focus on the totality, not the
margins of spending
- BUT this may force us to enter the
political sphere, where it is about bargaining, not zero based budgeting
- Innovation may be about embracing
and accepting risk
- BUT remember to manage risk and try
to reduce it
Maybe
this leaves a small number of recommendations which are less immediately
objectionable, largely because they are quite vague and represent only a
starting point before harder and more specific decisions have to be made:
- Shift from an outputs to outcomes
focus.
- Avoid the league table approach to
evaluation.
- Shift from a command and control
model to systems thinking.
What
we may have learned is that this is easier said than done. Perhaps this is the
role of a professional body like CIPFA – to remind us of the big picture when
the pressure is on us to focus on narrow problems. If so, this should be a regular conversation,
not just an annual conversation. Blogs such as these should be seen as a way to
encourage that discussion ...”
In other words, the second
lecture betrays a feeling that there may be a minimal ‘impact’ to the
introduction of a ‘complexity theory lens’ even if the agenda is driven by the
professional body. The theory may receive maximal audience attention during the
conference but minimal attention when the audience returns to work.
Perhaps more importantly, any
audience member with the desire to take forward the ideas may still be at a
loss. This problem was summed up neatly by Marco Thiel’s (Senior lecturer in
Physics, University of Aberdeen) lecture which showed a wide range of examples
from the natural and physical worlds in which complex systems were apparent:
single cells formed larger organisms; trees grew in formation and fireflies
turned on their lights at the same time to draw attention to themselves and
attract their mates. In each case, the
point was that the actions took place without a ‘mind’ or a sense of central
control. Rather, each actor within the complex system interacted with their
neighbour and acted accordingly. One
problem for the study of policymaking is that this sort of behaviour is more
difficult to detect, and the initial idea may be misleading (which perhaps
shows that the inter-disciplinarily of the theory is a double edged sword). There is not usually an equivalent in
policymaking to the complete absence of a ‘mind’, either directing activity or
influencing the rules of behaviour when people interact with each other. In
policymaking, we may be talking about ‘emergent’ behaviour when local outcomes
appear not to relate to central control,
but this is not the same thing as the assumption of a collection of parts with
no central influence.[1]
Conclusion
The value of these two examples
is that they prompt us to consider what sort of ‘impact’ we could possibly have
on policy practitioners when we seek to translate the insights of policy
theories into something meaningful to inform practice. Both examples suggest
that complexity theory has some merit in conceptualising the messy and often unpredictable
nature of politics and policymaking; the often fragmented policymaking system
with many participants and sources of authority and influence. However, we may be less clear on what
practitioners should do with that information. More difficult still is to
consider what practitioners could do
with the information. Much of the normative side, so far, has generally focused
on the inappropriateness of centrally driven targets and a punitive inspection
regime that does not take into account the likelihood of service delivery
‘error’. This sort of advice may be increasingly like preaching to the
converted in Scotland. Yet, there is less detailed advice on the alternative,
beyond encouraging ‘systems thinking’ and focusing on outcomes over outputs. On
the other hand, perhaps we would only be dissatisfied with this outcome if we
were setting too high a bar for academic or ideational success. Perhaps the willingness within government to
adopt ‘systems thinking’ and encourage new ways to deliver and evaluate policy
could be seen as successful impact in itself.
If so, the only remaining problem could be that the Research Councils’
current measures would not allow a single scholar or department to claim any
credit for the impact.
References
Althaus, C., Bridgman, P. and
Davis, G. (2007) The Australian Policy Handbook 4th Ed.
(Sydney: Allen and Unwin)
Cairney, P. (2012a) ‘How Can
Policy Theory Inform Policy Making (and vice versa)?’ Paper to Political
Studies Association Annual Conference, Belfast, 2012 http://www.psa.ac.uk/2012/PanelDetails.aspx?PanelID=43
Cairney, P. (2012b) Understanding
Public Policy: Theories and Issues (Basingstoke: Palgrave)
Cairney, P. (2012b) ‘‘Public
Administration in an Age of Austerity’: Positive Lessons From Policy Studies’, Public Policy and Administration, 27, 3,
230-47
CIPFA Scotland (2013) Public finances: at the edge of chaos and
ready for outcomes? http://www.cipfa.org/-/media/files/regions/scotland/public_finances_at_the_edge_of_chaos_and_ready_for_outcomes.pdf
Dror, Y. (1964) ‘Muddling Through
– “Science” or Inertia?’, Public Administration Review, 24: 153–7.
Lindblom, C. (1959) ‘The Science
of Muddling Through’, Public Administration Review, 19, 79-88
Sabatier, P. (2007) ‘The Need for
Better Theories’ in (ed) P. Sabatier Theories of the Policy Process 2
(Cambridge MA: Westview)
Sabatier, P. and Jenkins-Smith,
H. (1993) Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach
(Boulder: Westview Press)
Simon, H. (1947; 1976) Administrative
Behavior 1st and 3rd eds. (London: MacMillan)
Marsh, D. and Rhodes, R.A.W., eds
(1992) Implementing Thatcherite Policies (Buckingham: Open University Press)
Rhodes, R.A.W. (1997) Understanding
Governance (Open University Press)
[1] In
the lecture, Thiel discussed simple social examples, such as the ‘Mexican wave’
or rhythmic clapping, in which people simply react to the behaviour of their
neighbours – but, in both cases, it makes sense to say that one person may have
initiated the activity. That argument, about
responsibility for initiation, is stronger when people are directed to
follow rules by a central authority.
