Standing on the Shoulders of Giants?

My new year’s resolution was to make a blog entry for every academic article published from 2013, since the article may be behind a paywall (although if you contact me, I will see you right) and the article’s ideas may be expressed in a relatively inaccessible way (although we don’t all spew jargon-filled group-closure nonsense).  The aim is to get people interested enough to go from a short tweet to a larger blog to the high bar of reading (or the holy grail of citing) the article itself.

 

This article is called ‘Standing on the Shoulders of Giants’ because I wanted to give the impression that we are discussing the accumulation of scientific knowledge; our aim is to build on the insights and knowledge produced by others rather than start from scratch each time.  As stated, this is fairly uncontroversial and we might find that most people can get behind the project (in fact, they are already doing so, implicitly or explicitly).  The more problematic and debatable part of this task relates to the details: *how* do we do it? 

The article focuses on this task in the policy literature, but the themes extend to political, social and, in most cases, the so called ‘hard’ sciences.  In fact, for many of us, it may be reminiscent of postgraduate discussions of the philosophy of science, in which we consider the inadequacy of most explanations of how knowledge is accumulated (from the ‘strawman’ of inductivism to the often-caricatured position of Popper (on falsification), to the idea of paradigm shift made famous by Kuhn and the rather-misleading ‘anything goes’ description of the approach by Feyerabend – a discussion captured neatly by Chalmers).  Many of us will have concluded two things: (1) we believe that we are in the business of accumulating knowledge/ we know much more about the world now than we did in the past, and we have acted accordingly; but, (2) we have no idea *how* that has happened because all of the explanations of knowledge accumulation are problematic, while some suggest that one body of knowledge *replaces* another rather than building on it. 

In that broad context, the article (a) outlines three main ways in which scholars address this issue in policy studies and political science; and, (b) highlights the problems that may arise in each case:

 

1. Synthesis – we combine the insights of multiple theories, concepts or models to produce a single theory (in fact, the article discusses the difference between ‘synthesis’ and ‘super-synthesis’, but I don’t want to undermine my “we don’t all spew jargon-filled group-closure nonsense”).  One key problem is that when we produce a synthetic theory, from a range of other theories or concepts, we have to assume that the component parts of this new hybrid are consistent with each other. Yet, if you scratch the surface of many concepts – such as ‘new institutionalism’ or ‘policy networks’ – you find all sorts of  disagreement about the nature of the world, how our concepts relate to it and how we gather knowledge of it. There are also practical problems regarding our assumption that the authors of these concepts have the same thing in mind when they describe things like ‘punctuated equilibrium’.  In other words, imagine that you have constructed a new theory based on the wisdom of five other people.  Then, get those people in the same room and you will find that they will share all sorts of – often intractable - disagreements with each other.  In that scenario, could you honestly state that your theory was based on accumulated knowledge? 

2. The ‘Complementary’ Approach. In this case, you accept that people have these differences and so you accommodate them – you entertain a range of theories/ concepts and explore the extent to which they explain the same thing in different ways.  This is a popular approach associated with people like Allison (who compared three different explanations of the Cuban missile crisis) and used by several others to compare policy events.  One key problem with this approach is that it is difficult to do full justice to each theory.  Most theories have associated methods which are labour intensive and costly, putting few in the position to make meaningful comparisons.  Instead, the comparisons tend to be desktop exercises based on a case study and the authors’ ability to consider how each theory would explain it.

3. The ‘Contradictory’ Approach.  In that context, another option is to encourage the independence of such theories. You watch as different research teams produce their own studies and you simply try to find some way to compare and combine their insights.  Of course, it is impossible to entertain an infinite number of theories, so we also need some way to compare them; to select some and reject others.  This is the approach that we may be most familiar with, since it involves coming up with a set of rules or criteria to make sure that each theory can be accepted (at least initially) by the scientific community.  You may see such rules described as follows:

• A theory's methods should be explained so that they can be replicated by others.
• Its concepts should be clearly defined, logically consistent, and give rise to empirically falsifiable hypotheses.
• Its propositions should be as general as possible.
• It should set out clearly what the causal processes are.
• It should be subject to empirical testing and revision.

For me, this is where the task becomes very interesting because, on the one hand, most of us will find these aims to be intuitively appealing – but, on the other, they are incredibly problematic for the following reasons:

• Few, if any, theories or research projects live up to these expectations.
• The principles give a misleading impression of most (social?) scientific research which is largely built on trust rather than constant replication by others.
• Many of the most famous proponents of this approach do something a bit different – such as when they subject their ‘secondary hypotheses’ to rigorous testing but insulate their ‘hard core’ from falsification.
• The study of complex phenomenon may not allow us to falsify, since we can interpret our findings in very different ways.
• Few theories are currently popular simply because they adhere to these principles.  In fact, science is much more of a social enterprise than the principles suggest. 

Of course, by now you may have identified a key problem with this argument: it is all beginning to sound a bit ‘postpositivist’ (which, in my mind, is still more of a term of abuse than ‘you, my friend, are a positivist’).  However, it does not need to be taken this way.  It is OK to highlight problems with scientific principles and admit that science is about the methods and beliefs accepted by a particular scientific community because, if you like, you can still assert that those principles and beliefs are *correct*. Many, many, people do.  In fact, perhaps we all do it, because we have to find a way to accept some theories, approaches and evidence and reject others.  We seek a way to produce some knowledge ourselves and find a common language and set of principles to make sure that we can compare our knowledge with the knowledge of others.  We seek a way to sift through an almost infinite number of ‘signals’ from our environment, to pay attention to very few and ignore most.  That task requires rules which are problematic but necessary. 

All I suggest we do (which is a bit of a bland recommendation) is to reject the unthinking and too-rigid application of rules that hold us all up to a standard that no-one will meet.  Rather, people in different disciplines might discuss and negotiate those rules with each other. This is more of an art than a science. 

I also argue that (a) if we are serious about these rules, and the need to submit theories and evidence to rigorous testing; but (b) we accept that most of this is done on trust rather than replication; then (c) we should take on some of that burden ourselves by subjecting our own evidence to a form of testing, in which we consider the extent to which our findings can be interpreted in different, and equally plausible, ways.   The article talks about producing different ‘narratives’ of the same evidence, but I won’t talk about that too much in case you confuse me with the presenter of Jackanory. 

 

Full reference: Cairney, P. (2013) 'Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: How Do We Combine the Insights of Multiple Theories in Public Policy Studies?' Policy Studies Journal, 41, 1, 1-21

 

 

TY  - JOUR

AU  - Cairney, Paul

TI  - Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: How Do We Combine the Insights of Multiple Theories in Public Policy Studies?

JO  - Policy Studies Journal

JA  - Policy Stud J

VL  - 41

IS  - 1

SN  - 1541-0072

UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/psj.12000

DO  - 10.1111/psj.12000

SP  - 1

EP  - 21

Independence: how no, eh?

I know that memes aren't cool anymore and that they shouldn't be generated by anyone over 21, but how else to commemorate the biggest news of the year - one guy from Biffy Clyro is maybe for independence, although he doesn't seem that bothered.

University of Stirling

I will be moving to the University of Stirling on the 1^st of February. I will post my new details, including my new email address, when I have them. 

UPDATE: I have now moved.  My new email is p.a.cairney@stir.ac.uk

Global Tobacco Control

I co-authored a book called Global Tobacco Control: Power, Policy, Governance and Transfer (Palgrave, 2012) with Donley Studlar and Hadii Mamudu. It raises two key questions: Why is there often such a wide gap between the size of the tobacco policy problem and the government response? Why, if the tobacco problem is the same across the globe, does policy vary so markedly across political systems?

It is hardback only, which means that it costs £57.50 to buy a physical copy. Or, it is a snip at £38 if you only want to own the words). Still, the chances are that you won’t own a copy and only libraries will stock it (perhaps reinforcing a not very good academic mantra: books are to be written, not read). Instead, you can read the introduction for free here or have it read to you in an annoying monotone here. This blog provides a summary of the whole argument.

The starting point for the study is to identify the size of the problem. For example, smoking represents the number one preventable cause of death and disease in the world. There are 1.35 billion smokers in the world, smoking is still rising in many countries, and it contributes to one in ten deaths worldwide (over six million per year and rising). The book discusses various ways in which we can express these figures, including breaking them down according to gender and comparing so called ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries (and discussing the ‘Tobacco Epidemic Model’ in that context – to follow up this point, see Thun et al’s revision) . The latter distinction is highly problematic (some prefer, for example, high-income countries, HICs, and low- and medium-income countries, LMICs) but also quite useful for our purposes (the United Nations Statistics Division lists developed countries as the US, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Australia and certain (generally Western, not ‘transitional’ Central and Eastern) European countries). Indeed, the well-discussed 'tobacco epidemic model' serves partly to describe the smoking equivalent of a ticking time bomb in many ‘developing’ countries.

Our aim is not to complain that governments are not doing enough to address this problem, or to claim that many government actors are in cahoots with tobacco companies to minimise tobacco regulation - largely because the public health literature (and sites such as the Legal Tobacco Documents Library) does a good job of that already. Further, we do not want to get sued and this paragraph is making me nervous enough already (I kid you not – I don’t even want to give the potentially-slanderous impression that tobacco companies are excessively litigious).

Instead, the study seeks to explain why different governments have responded to this problem so differently. Some countries – like Australia, Canada, Finland, Norway, Sweden, New Zealand, the UK and almost the US (it has more limited controls but, generally, played a huge part in the international tobacco control effort) - now have ‘comprehensive’ tobacco control, which means that they combine a large number of mutually-reinforcing policy instruments designed to reduce smoking in the population (see the WHO ‘MPOWER’ report which identifies six key tobacco control measures: 1) ‘monitor tobacco use and prevention policies’; 2) ‘protect people from tobacco smoke’; 3) ‘offer help to quit tobacco’; 4) ‘warn about the dangers of tobacco’; 5) ‘enforce bans on tobacco adverting, promotion and sponsorship’, and 6) ‘raise taxes on tobacco’). Others do relatively little to address the problem. For example, Germany and Japan are often described as ‘laggard’ developing countries while most developing countries (with exceptions such as Brazil, Singapore, Thailand and Uruguay) have relatively limited tobacco controls.

We also want to know why tobacco control in many countries is now so comprehensive when it was minimal until the 1980s. Many countries which now have comprehensive tobacco control regimes did very little to regulate tobacco until the 1980s. In other words, the gap between the initial identification of smoking (and then passive smoking) related ill health and the initiation of a major policy response was, in most cases, 20-30 years, followed by gradual policy change often over a similar period. The book identifies a history of minimal tobacco control, linked to the power of the tobacco industry (careful now), then charts the extent to which governments, aided by public health advocates, have regulated tobacco domestically and internationally in the modern era.

We explain ‘comprehensive’ change in ‘leading developed’ countries with reference to five key factors:

1. Institutional Change. Government departments, and other organisations focused on health policy, have taken the main responsibility for tobacco control, largely replacing departments focused on finance, agriculture, trade, industry and employment.

2. The Problem Is ‘Framed’ Differently. Tobacco was once viewed primarily as a product with economic value, and tobacco growing and manufacturing was often subsidised or encouraged. Now, it is largely viewed as a public health problem; an epidemic to be eradicated aggressively (or, at least, a problem to be minimised).

3. The Balance Of Power Has Shifted Between Participants. The tobacco industry was an ally of government for decades before and after WWII. When policy was coordinated by finance and other departments, tobacco companies were the most consulted. Now, public health or anti-tobacco groups are more likely to be consulted and tobacco companies are often deliberately excluded.

4. The Socioeconomic Context Has Changed Markedly. The economic benefit of tobacco production and consumption has fallen (for example, tax revenue is less important to finance departments once protective of the industry) and the number of smokers and opposition to tobacco control has declined.

5. The Role Of Beliefs And Knowledge. The production and dissemination of the scientific evidence linking smoking (and now passive smoking) to ill health has been accepted within most government circles. The most effective policies to reduce smoking are increasingly adopted and transferred across countries.

Change in these factors has been mutually reinforcing. For example, increased acceptance of the scientific evidence has helped shift the way that governments understand the tobacco problem. The framing of tobacco as a health problem allows health departments to take the policy lead. Tobacco control and smoking prevalence go hand in hand: a decrease in smoking rates reduces the barriers to tobacco control; more tobacco control means fewer smokers.

We explain the lack of policy change in other countries with reference to the same factors:

1. Health departments are often key players, but their voices are often drowned out by other departments, such as agriculture, finance and trade.

2. Tobacco policy arises on the policy agenda rarely and, when it does, the public health frame competes with attempts to frame tobacco as an economic good.

3. Tobacco companies are powerful and the capacity of anti-tobacco groups is often low.

4. Tobacco growing and manufacturing is an important source of jobs, exports and revenue and smoking prevalence is rising.

5. The medical-scientific knowledge has had less of an effect on the policy agenda. Domestic anti-tobacco groups have the motivation but not the resources to ensure the acceptance of tobacco control ideas within their political systems.

In this context, the book identifies the role of international action to close the gap between ‘leading’ and ‘laggard’ countries – a gap which is often linked specifically (but not exclusively) to the fortunes of developed/ developing countries. In particular, the World Health Organisation (WHO) Framework Convention for Tobacco Control has 175 ‘Parties’ (174 countries plus the European Union). The FCTC represents a significant short-term success, because it commits a huge number of countries to comprehensive tobacco control. However, we describe it largely as a tool for agenda-setting rather than a guarantee of long term policy implementation.

Our current work, based on the book and subsequent articles, highlights one of life’s ironies: the countries best placed to deliver on their treaty commitments are the ones which don’t need a treaty so much. They are already well on the road towards comprehensive tobacco control. In contrast, the countries that do need the treaty are the least likely to deliver its aims. This argument is backed up by statistics that we are currently gathering (ooh, the excitement of anticipation) and expert surveys like the one produced by Warner and Tam. We make this argument on the basis of the 5 factors outlined above, which help us identify an unfavourable environment in which to implement the FCTC.

Consider, for example, the experience of China as the world’s largest tobacco using and producing population (one third of the world’s smokers and 38% of tobacco production) (see a paper by Jin). It maintains a state monopoly over tobacco production which provides 8-11% of government revenue. Tobacco control is low on the domestic policy agenda and the health image competes with an unusually strong economic image based on the importance of its tobacco industry and economic growth to the legitimacy of the Chinese government. Tobacco policy (and the implementation of the FCTC) is led by an economic development agency which consults regularly with the tobacco industry, and the health ministry is ‘sidelined’. Public health groups are neither well resourced nor engaged. Public *and physician* knowledge of tobacco harm is low and smoking rates are very high among the police force held responsible for the implementation of bans on smoking in public places. If we combine these factors, we can reasonably expect much slower progress towards comprehensive tobacco control than in (say) the UK even though both have signed up to the same agreement.

Overall, we should not take comprehensive tobacco control for granted. If we live in countries like the UK we are starting to take it for granted, and may even come to accept new measures such as bans on smoking among foster parents and/ or in cars. If we travel elsewhere and smell smoke indoors, we should be quickly reminded that tobacco control varies markedly across the globe, and is likely to vary for decades to come.

Framing Wind Farms

As I was walking along the fields next to my house, I wished that I had a nice smart phone with a decent camera, because I wanted to show you that the view was spoiled, not by the wind farm in the distance, but by the electricity pylons and the phone mast. This, of course, is a political statement masquerading as a throwaway comment before being exposed as a political statement. It reminded me that I had been meaning to write a blog about wind farms after reading a small thing in Private Eye about how images of wind turbines are manipulated to make farms look more or less appealing. It is an interesting case, for students of politics and public policy, where the wind farm debate is almost-literally ‘framed’ (plug: there is a nice little discussion of framing in Understanding Public Policy). Policy images are linked in an unusually literal way to the images of wind farms. In other words, we are used to a framing debate along these lines:

• Economic arguments – renewable energy is heavily subsidised VERSUS other forms of energy, such as nuclear, have hidden subsidies

• Environmental arguments – renewable is the environmentally friendly option VERSUS wind farms are very far away and the pylon infrastructure is damaging

• Public opinion arguments – wind farms are unpopular VERSUS wind farms are popular (except amongst NIMBYs)

Wind farms kill birds, give you cancer, mess with your head, and so on. The unusual added element is the potential to frame the issue with photos, which is why I wish I had the camera. These images will have to do (my advice is to right click, new tab for the full effect):

Here is the famous Daily Mail doomsday image picked up by Private Eye - http://www.dailymail.co.uk/home/moslive/article-2199284/Wind-farms-Are-wind-farms-saving-killing-A-provocative-investigation-claims-thousands-people-falling-sick-live-near-them.html

Here is another from the Dail Mail about wind farms spoiling the view from your conservatory (although good luck getting planning permission to build one, eh? Back off Brussels) http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2221277/Scottish-tourism-chiefs-admit-wind-farms-drive-holidaymakers-away.html

This one shows you how nice fields look without them http://www.visitcumbria.com/wind.htm

This one has an eery Children of the Corn look http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/may/08/conservative-thinktanks-obama-energy-plans

This one is eery more for the site on which it is housed http://hardons-blog.blogspot.co.uk/2011_09_18_archive.html

This one says, hey let’s have a chat about wind farms next to nice old buildings guys http://www.northumberland.gov.uk/default.aspx?page=7688

This one is not scary, but perhaps it would have been framed more positively if taken further away http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Geraldton_Wind_Farms_DSC04308.JPG  , like this one http://andrewlainton.wordpress.com/2012/05/24/test-case-lowland-post-nppf-windfarms-permitted/

This one says that wind energy is better than nuclear meltdowns, the turbines look cool and space age, and they are off in the ocean somewhere anyway http://www.kirainet.com/english/floating-wind-turbines/

So does this http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/36805701/ns/us_news-environment/t/first-german-wind-farm-sea-opens/

This one tells you that China and wind farms are cool http://www.innovativechina.com/?p=885

This one tells you that manly men are in charge of offshore wind energy safety http://www.falck.com/nutec_uk/markets/pages/renewablesoffshorewindtraining.aspx

This one shows you that wind farms might look better than ‘water-vapour belching cooling towers’ unless you have been looking at the latter for a generation and are used to them http://blogs.ft.com/energy-source/2010/08/19/what-is-it-with-wind-farms/#axzz2BLny5Bpw

This one says, look how happy this woman is and her hard hat shows she means business, and it’s good clean business too http://www.res-group.com/

This one tells you that you can walk past them without having your limbs lopped off http://www.farmersguardian.com/wind-farms-can-assist-in-climate-change-fight/17667.article

This site has a mini debate, with someone providing a photo and saying ‘they're truly beautiful’ and someone else countering with ‘Are you shitting me?’ http://www.eastdulwichforum.co.uk/forum/read.php?20,747326,756113

This one does not play by the rules because the story tells you to reject wind energy, but how can it be so bad if this little girl with the balloon is so happy http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/uk_news/Environment/article815405.ece

This is a windmill http://www.darvill.clara.net/altenerg/wind.htm

An SNP Debate on Policy is not Synonymous with Scottish Policy

I read recently that the BBC was getting much better at covering devolved issues, but some things will still fall through the cracks. One important problem is that, sometimes, SNP policy is equated, outside Scotland, as Scottish Government policy. Or, in the case of the future of Trident, an SNP debate at a party conference may be taken to mean Scottish Government policy after a ‘yes’ vote in the Scottish independence referendum. I will confess that I heard this not on the BBC Radio 4 Today Programme but, instead, on their news quiz (I just need things to listen to while walking my dog – please don’t judge me), but still I will blame the BBC as a whole, since this is now the done thing.

Another phrase that caught my ear related to the criticism, by HEPI, that the UK Government was calculating the costs of its tuition fee policy on ‘an assumption that the future will be like the past’. If we apply this assumption to a hypothetical independent Scotland considering the Trident issue, what can we say? Let us assume that the SNP still has a small majority and that I am contradicting myself by basing my prophesy on the SNP’s draft constitution (discussed by Bulmer ): (1) the Scottish Government will pass legislation to remove Trident from Scotland (assuming that it needs to do so); (2) there will be enough opposition in the Scottish Parliament (40% is required) to force a postponement of 12-18 months; (3) the SNP Government will feel obliged to trigger a referendum on the issue. Only then can the decision become Scottish policy.

But what will the people of Scotland say? I got briefly excited when I noticed a House of Commons Defence Committee arguing last month that ‘Opinion polls show maintaining Trident is unpopular throughout the UK , but nowhere is it less popular than in Scotland’ before I realised that this argument came from written evidence by the CND . It is also the view of the Scottish Government drawing on polls in 2007 . The debate can be followed on blog sites such as Better Nation , which won't make the synonymity mistake.

Scottish Public Policy Explained

I am co-authoring a 2nd edition of Scottish Politics with Neil McGarvey (2013).  It includes a revised chapter on public policy in Scotland.  I have copy and pasted the introduction below.  This chapter was quite straightforward to revise and I don't think we changed the introduction much at all - which perhaps gives you a sense of the continuity involved in policymaking.  The full chapter can be found here
https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B-vqUYxLrgufUWJOUmRoNEhzVzA/edit

"This chapter examines the extent to which the new political arrangements in Scotland have produced new policies. Such discussions often focus on the extent of policy divergence and difference between Scotland and England as a key test of devolution. This follows the image before devolution of a ‘back-log’ of policies which built up because Westminster did not have the time for Scottish legislation. On the basis of differing social and party attitudes and the need for ‘Scottish solutions to Scottish problems’, there were widespread expectations of divergence as soon as the Scottish Parliament had the opportunity to legislate. To a great extent, this picture of a ‘rush to policy’ has been confirmed since devolution, with 180 pieces of primary legislation passed in three 4-year parliamentary terms. Yet, there are three main qualifications to the idea of Scotland as a source of fast-paced policy divergence.

First, in the 1980s and 1990s most policy innovation came from the UK Government. Indeed, as noted in Chapter 2, part of the rationale for devolution was the defence of existing state institutions. The ‘Yes, Yes’ vote in 1997 was in part ‘a vote to change institutions in order to stay the same’ (Mitchell, 2005: 26-7). Second, there are as many good reasons to suggest that policy will converge rather than diverge. Factors such as a shared party of government, the role of the Treasury and the Europeanization of policy undermine the idea that Scotland will necessarily go its own way. Third, there is a big difference between making the decision to be different and seeing that decision through to its final outcome.

The evidence supports these qualifications. Policy divergence through legislation has been slower to develop than we might expect, and this picture is reinforced if we extend analysis to the wider policy ‘cycle’. In the relatively small number of cases where significant divergence has occurred in legisla­tion, the incomplete implementation of policy has undermined divergence.

This is not to say that policy change has not been significant since devolu­tion. In many cases, significant policy changes may have a greater effect on Scotland or be missed with a focus on divergence. This suggests that a focus on being different may be inappropriate, particularly since devolution is no longer in its infancy or enjoying its ‘honeymoon’ period. In this sense it is more important to develop and gain support for policies which are appropri­ate to Scotland regardless of the UK government position, particularly since a key aim of devolution was to address the ‘democratic deficit’ (Box 8.1). Yet, the temptation to look across the border is strong and has been reinforced not only by the election of an SNP Government keen to distance itself from its UK counterpart, but also the media reaction in London which suggests that English taxpayers are subsiding Scottish policy divergence (e.g. Browne, 2007; Settle, 2007; Groves, 2011).

This chapter therefore explores:

·           How we identify and measure policy change. For example, although this chapter focuses heavily on outputs such as legislation or funding for services, it also considers outcomes following implementation.

·           Why policies in Scotland may diverge or converge.

·           The evidence for policy change in a range of policy areas - including ‘flag­ship’ policies regarding free personal care, student fees, and the smoking ban – in each parliamentary session.

·           The implementation of those policies."