This is a list of my academic journal article abstracts, with links to the full text. If you have any difficulty accessing them, please email paul.cairney@abdn.ac.uk:
The role of ideas in policy transfer: the case of UK smoking bans since devolution
Journal of European Public Policy 16:3 April 2009: 471–488
This article explores the relationship between ideas and interests in policy change by examining tobacco control in each country of the United Kingdom (UK). In all four, the moves towards further prohibition reflected international trends, with evidence of policy transfer and the virus-like spread of ideas which has shifted the way that tobacco is framed. However, there are notable differences in the development of policy in each territory. This reinforces conceptions of transfer in which the importation of policy is mediated by political systems. Differences in policy conditions, institutions and ‘windows of opportunity’ mean that our conclusions on the role and influence of interest groups, institutions and agenda-setting vary by territory, even within a member state. This suggests that a focus on an ‘idea whose time has come’ should be supplemented by careful analysis of the political context in which the idea was articulated and accepted.
The ‘British Policy Style’ and Mental Health: Beyond the Headlines
Forthcoming in Journal of Social Policy, 2009
Recent Mental Health Acts provide evidence of diverging UK1 and Scottish government policy styles. The UK legislative process lasted almost ten years following attempts by ministers to impose decisions and an unprecedented level of sustained opposition from interest groups. In contrast, the consultation process in Scotland was consensual, producing high levels of stakeholder ‘ownership’. This article considers two narratives on the generalisability of this experience. The first suggests that it confirms a ‘majoritarian’ British policy style, based on the centralisation of power afforded by a first-past-the-post electoral system (Lijphart, 1999). Diverging styles are likely because widespread hopes for consensus politics in the devolved territories have been underpinned by proportional representation. The second suggests that most policy-making is consensual, based on the diffusion of power across policy sectors and the ‘logic of consultation’ between governments and interest groups (Jordan and Richardson, 1982). The legislative process deviated temporarily from the ‘normal’ British policy style which is more apparent when we consider mental health policy as a whole. Overall, the evidence points to more than one picture of British styles; it suggests that broad conclusions on ‘majoritarian’ systems must be qualified by detailed empirical investigation.
IMPLEMENTATION AND THE GOVERNANCE PROBLEM: A PRESSURE PARTICIPANT PERSPECTIVE
Forthcoming in Public Policy and Administration, 2009
This article has two aims: to qualify the UK government’s ‘problem’ of governance in a comparison with Scotland and Wales, and to use implementation studies (the ancestors of the new governance literature) to explore policy developments since devolution in Britain. It presents a puzzling finding from extensive interview research: that while we may expect UK government policy to suffer a bigger ‘implementation gap’ based on distinctive governance problems (such as greater service delivery fragmentation and the unintended consequences of top-down policy styles), pressure participants in Scotland and Wales are more likely to report implementation failures. Using a ‘top-down’ framework, it explores three main explanations for this finding: that the size of the implementation gap in England is exaggerated by a focus on particular governance problems; that pressure participant dissatisfaction follows unrealistic expectations in the devolved territories; and that the UK government undermines devolved policy implementation, by retaining control of key policy instruments and setting the agenda on measures of implementation success.
Federalism and Multilevel Governance in Tobacco Policy: The European Union,
United Kingdom, and Devolved Institutions
Bossman Asare, Paul Cairney and Donley T. Studlar
Journal of Public Policy, 29, 1, 79-102, 2009
http://journals.cambridge.org/download.php?file=%2FPUP%2FPUP29_01%2FS0143814X09000993a.pdf&code=9efa7efc4b813cf30244640216120c97 Most studies of tobacco (control) policy focus on the central level of individual countries. Yet within the member states of the European Union, three levels of government have responsibilities for tobacco control: (1) the EU since 1985; (2) the central governments of member states; and (3) the provinces or devolved level of government. This article examines the role of each in the formation of tobacco policy in the United Kingdom. It compares the theory of regulatory federalism with multilevel governance as explanations for tobacco regulatory policy within the EU. While executive-legislative fusion in the United Kingdom leads to the practice of discretionary federalism, the EU provides mixed support for the theory of regulatory federalism. There is significant policy innovation in the UK and its devolved territories as well as limited policy authority for tobacco control in the EU. Overall, multi-level governance (MLG) may be a superior, albeit incomplete, explanation of tobacco control within the EU and the UK.
Territorial policy communities and devolution in the UK
Michael Keating, Paul Cairney and Eve Hepburn
Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society 2, 1, 51-66, 2009
http://cjres.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/rsn024v2
Devolution in the UK forms part of a wider process of spatial rescaling across Europe. Little work has been done on its effect on interest articulation. The literature on policy communities treats them as sectoral in scope. We propose the concept of ‘territorial policy communities’ to designate territorially bounded constellations of actors within and across policy sectors, emerging in response to the rescaling of government. Devolution may leave existing systems of interest articulation unchanged, leaving ‘regions without regionalism’; it may confine some groups within territorial boundaries while allowing others the freedom to choose’ between levels of government; or it might promote a general territorialization of interest representation and the emergence of territorial policy communities. The UK's four models of devolution help test the effects of stronger and weaker forms of devolution on the territorialization of groups.
Has Devolution Changed the ‘British Policy Style’?
British Politics, 3, 3, 350-72, 2008
http://www.palgrave-journals.com/bp/journal/v3/n3/full/bp200815a.html
The term ‘policy style’ simply means the way that governments make and implement policy. Yet, the term ‘British policy style’ may be confusing since it has the potential to relate to British exceptionalism or European convergence. Lijphart’s important contribution identifies the former. It sets up a simple distinction between policy styles in majoritarian and consensual democracies and portrays British policy-making as top down and different from a consensual European approach. In contrast, Richardson identifies a common ‘European policy style’. This suggests that although the political structures of each country vary, they share a ‘standard operating procedure’ based on two factors — an incremental approach to policy and an attempt to reach a consensus with interest groups rather than impose decisions. This article extends these arguments to British politics since devolution. It questions the assumption that policy styles are diverging within Britain. Although consultation in the devolved territories may appear to be more consensual, they are often contrasted with a caricature of the UK process based on
atypical examples of top-down policy-making.While there may be a different ‘feel’ to participation in Scotland and Wales, a similar logic of consultation and bureaucratic accommodation exists in the UK. This suggests that, although devolution has made a difference, a British (or European) policy style can still be identified.
A 'Multiple Lenses' Approach to Policy Change: The Case of Tobacco Policy in the UK
British Politics (2007) 2, 1, 45–68
http://www.palgrave-journals.com/bp/journal/v2/n1/full/4200039a.html
This article examines a period of rapid policy change following decades of stability in UK tobacco. It seeks to account for such a long period of policy stability, to analyse and qualify the extent of change, and to explain change using a 'multiple lenses' approach. It compares the explanatory value of policy network models such as punctuated equilibrium and the advocacy coalition framework, with models stressing change from 'above and below' such as multi-level governance and policy transfer. A key finding is that the value of these models varies according to the narrative of policy change that we select. The article challenges researchers to be careful about assuming the nature of policy change before embarking on explanation. While the findings of the case study may vary with other policy areas in British politics, the call for clarity and lessons from multiple approaches are widely applicable.
Using Devolution to Set the Agenda? Venue shift and the smoking ban in Scotland
British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 9,1, 73-89, 2007
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/117980951/abstract?CRETRY=1&SRETRY=0
This article examines the changing agendas on smoking-related issues in Scotland. It charts the methods that groups, governments and MSPs use to frame and pursue or suppress discussion of the prohibition of smoking in public places. The article presents two narratives—one which stresses 'new politics' and the ability of groups to influence policy through Scottish Parliamentary procedures, and another which stresses Scottish Executive 'business as usual' and presents smoking legislation as a logical progression from early ministerial commitments. A combination of narratives suggests that tobacco legislation in Scotland was by no means part of an inevitable international trend towards prohibition and this article traces the precise conditions or 'policy windows' in which decisions take place. The discussion highlights the often unsettled nature of the devolution settlement and the ability of Scottish issues to influence UK agendas.
The Professionalisation of MPs: Refining the ‘Politics-Facilitating’ Explanation
Parliamentary Affairs, 60, 2, 212-33, 2007
http://pa.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/gsm006v1
The term ‘politics-facilitating occupation’ is used widely but loosely in the MP recruitment literature. Comparative evidence suggests that this term has a different meaning according to the country, parliament and time period in which it is evoked. Most discussions do not fully explore party differences or distinguish between brokerage and instrumental occupations (used as a means to an elected end). This study analyses differing conceptions of politics-facilitating occupations and assesses their value in tracking change over time in the UK. It then explores innovative ways to identify the importance of the instrumental category. A sole focus on formative occupation oversimplifies the data while the analysis of multiple occupations combined with occupation immediately before election highlights a significance not identified in the literature. While previous studies have highlighted occupations as ‘stepping stones’ to elected office, this is the first to quantify their significance fully.
The Analysis of Scottish Parliament Committees: Beyond Capacity and Structure in Comparing West European Legislatures
European Journal of Political Research, 45, 2, 181-208, 2006
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/118728678/abstract
The Scottish Parliament was set up in the hope that strong committees would foster consensus, with an emphasis on reducing partisanship and adopting a pragmatic approach to the detailed study of draft legislation. However, few empirical studies exist that assess the value of the committee process. This flaw is common within the West European literature. The comparative literature on legislative influence is lacking in detailed empirical studies (in part because of the dominant assumption within the literature that parliaments are peripheral to the policy process). Most studies provide impressionistic discussions of the capacities of committees and the constraints to their effectiveness. They do not follow this through with an analysis of committee 'outputs'. This study of the amendments process in the Scottish Parliament addresses the gap. It uses data from a four-year study of legislative amendments to develop indicators of parliamentary outputs. While the results confirm that the committee system operates at the heart of the 'new politics' in Scotland, further such individual country studies are necessary to supplement much broader comparative analyses.
Venue Shift Following Devolution: When Reserved Meets Devolved in Scotland
Regional and Federal Studies, 16, 4, 429-45, 2006
http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/487645_751311283_769594881.pdf
This article examines the means used to address blurred or shifting boundaries between reserved UK and devolved Scottish policy. It outlines the main issues of multi-level governance and intergovernmental relations in Scotland and the initial problems faced in identifying responsibility for policy action. While it suggests that legislative ambiguities are now mainly resolved with the use of ‘Sewel motions’, it highlights cases of Scottish action in reserved areas, including the example of smoking policy in which the Scottish Executive appears to ‘commandeer’ a previously reserved issue. However, most examples of new Scottish influence suggest the need for UK support or minimal UK interest.
A New Elite? Politicians and Civil Servants in Scotland after Devolution
Michael Keating and Paul Cairney
Parliamentary Affairs, 59, 1, 43-59
http://pa.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/59/1/43
One aim of devolution in Scotland was to create a political class more representative of the country as a whole. In practice devolution has accelerated trends towards a professional background in Scottish representatives. There has been a significant increase in representativeness by gender; but not by social or occupational background. A professional Scottish political class is in the making. Devolution has not had a significant effect on the civil service in Scotland. Mobility between Edinburgh and London and between the public and private sectors was always low and Scottish civil servants tended to be less likely to gain a private or Oxbridge education. The Scottish Parliament gains in gender representation are not mirrored within the civil service.
The Impact of the Scottish Parliament in Amending Executive Legislation
Mark Shephard and Paul Cairney
Political Studies, 53, 2, 303-19, 2005
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/118648188/abstract?CRETRY=1&SRETRY=0
This paper provides the first systematic attempt to investigate the legislative impact of the
Scottish Parliament on Executive legislation, by analysing the fate of all amendments to Executive bills from the Parliament’s first session (1999–2003). Initial findings on the success of bill amendments show that the balance of power inclines strongly in favour of ministers. However, when we account for the type of amendment and initial authorship we find evidence that the Parliament (both coalition and opposition MSPs) actually makes more of an impact, particularly in terms of the level of success of substantive amendments to Executive bills. Our findings have implications for much of the current literature that is sceptical of the existence of power sharing between the Executive and the Parliament and within the Parliament.
Sewel Motions in the Scottish Parliament
Paul Cairney and Michael Keating
Scottish Affairs, 47, 115-34, 2004
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/committees/procedures/papers-05/SMpaper6cairn.pdf
One of the most controversial aspects of Scottish parliamentary procedure since devolution has been the use of Sewel motions, whereby the Scottish Parliament agrees to Westminster legislating in devolved matters. It was originally envisaged that this procedure would be exceptional, yet in the first session forty one were passed, provoking criticism that Holyrood was dodging its responsibility, becoming a ‘copycat Parliament’ and undermining the principles of devolution. Gerry Hassan (2002) makes much of the fact that the Scottish Parliament was passing almost as many Sewel motions as full Acts. The SNP have also been highly critical of the procedure on principle. They argue that more distinct Scottish solutions should be found for Scottish problems and that, even when Holyrood is adopting the same policy as Westminster, it should pass its own legislation . Academic commentators have criticized the procedure as weakening parliamentary scrutiny (Page 2002) and some lawyers and interest groups complain that the mixture of bits of Westminster and Holyrood legislation makes the statute book untidy and difficult to follow. Scottish ministers, on the other hand, have defended the practice, arguing that the opposition has exaggerated the problem and insisting on a pragmatic approach that saves parliamentary time by not duplicating legislation that is effectively identical on both sides of the border. Further, this debate shows no sign of abatement.
Consensual or Dominant Relationships with Parliament? A Comparison of Administrations and Ministers in Scotland
Mark Shephard and Paul Cairney
Public Administration, 82, 4, 831-56, 2004
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/118761648/abstract
The study of administrations and ministers and their relationships with UK Parliaments has tended to focus on the issues of accountability and responsibility, levels of legislative dissent or broad performance indicators supported by anecdotal examples. This paper addresses the lack of systematic analysis of executive/legislative relations in the policy-making process by examining the dominance of different administrations and ministers in the Scottish Parliament. Two questions are addressed. First, is there any variance in the legislative dominance of different administrations in the parliamentary arena? Second, do individual ministers make a difference to the degree of policy dominance? Controlling for both initial authorship and quality of amendments to Executive policy, we analyse the nature and extent of Executive dominance during the legislative process of the First Session of the Scottish Parliament. We find some evidence to suggest that Executive dominance varies both by administration and by individual minister.
Does Devolution Make a Difference? Legislative Output and Policy Divergence in Scotland
Michael Keating, Linda Stevenson, Paul Cairney and Kate Taylor
Journal of Legislative Studies, 9, 3, 110-39, 2003
http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/684983_751311283_713953841.pdf
Devolution provides large scope for Scotland to make its own policy. Primary legislation is one measure of this. Scottish legislation before devolution tended to replicate measures for the rest of the UK, with differences of style. Scottish legislation in the first four-year term of the Parliament shows a big increase in output. There is an autonomous sphere, in which Scotland has gone its own way without reference to the rest of the UK. In other areas, there is evidence of joint or parallel policy making, with Scottish legislation meeting the same goals by different means. Finally there is a sphere in which Scottish legislation is essentially the same as that in England and Wales. Sewel motions have not been used to impose policy uniformity on Scotland. There is evidence that devolution has shifted influence both vertically, between the UK and Scottish levels, and horizontally, within a Scottish legislative system that has been opened up.
New Public Management and the Thatcher Health Care Legacy
British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 4, 3, 375-98, 2002
http://www.abdn.ac.uk/pir/notes05/Level3/PI3546/Cairney%202002%20Health%20Scotland%20Pre%20Post%20Devolution.pdf
See also:
Paul Cairney, Darren Halpin and Grant Jordan (2009) ‘New Scottish Parliament, Same Old Interest Group Politics?’ in C. Jeffery and J. Mitchell (eds.) The Scottish Parliament, 1999-2009: The First Decade (Edinburgh: Luath Press)
Michael Keating and Paul Cairney (2009) ‘The New Scottish Statute Book: The Scottish Parliament’s Legislative Record Since 1999’ in C. Jeffery and J. Mitchell (eds.) The Scottish Parliament, 1999-2009: The First Decade (Edinburgh: Luath Press)
Friday, 29 May 2009
Scottish Politics students and MSPs
One of the benefits of teaching Scottish Politics in Scotland is that we are relatively close to the action. This is a slide show of various trips my students and I have made to the Scottish Parliament to meet MSPs and watch First Minister's Questions. We have also been lucky enough to welcome some of these MSPs to Aberdeen University.
Scottish Parliament Budget 2009
Here is a piece that I wrote on the Scottish Parliament's Budget bill for the Press and Journal in February 2009.
The fallout from the annual budget rounds in the Scottish Parliament
Much has been made about the unprecedented nature of the SNP’s budget defeat, the fact that we are entering uncharted waters and that this is a crisis of epic proportions. Yet, this is to give the proceedings a sense of drama that they do not yet deserve. Let us first consider the defeat itself. This certainly marks a departure from the first 8 years of devolution in which the Labour- Liberal Democrat coalition dominated the vote within the Scottish Parliament. It would be possible to count the number of serious Scottish Executive defeats on the fingers of one hand. This, combined with the fact that only Scottish ministers can suggest amendments to the budget bill, gave the overall annual impression of a rather mundane, technical and ceremonial process. The only coverage given to the budget regarded the odd clash of personalities between the Finance Committee and ministers or the committee’s perennial call for better statistics. Neither the Parliament nor its parties had the resources or power to make a profound difference. Now, things have changed. The SNP Government must take seriously the concerns of at least two other parties. However, this was not a particular problem last year. Although the SNP had to court support from the Greens and Conservatives, the concessions it made were complementary to its own aims. While the Greens perhaps act as the SNP’s environmental conscience (drawing attention last year to the problem of ship-to-ship oil transfers), the Conservative requests for more police officers and tax relief for small businesses were consistent with the SNP’s manifesto. The demands from other parties were also relatively small compared to the overall budget. Therefore, while there was a brief drama when the bill was defeated at stage 1 (a consideration of the broad principles of the bill), the SNP had enough votes when it came to stage 3 (the final vote). The decision by Labour to abstain, just in case its opposition was enough to defeat the bill and prompt Alex Salmond to resign, prompted laughter rather than relief among the SNP front bench.
As things stand, we have more of the same. Although this year the bill has been defeated at stage 3, the SNP still has over two weeks to pass its replacement in time for the new financial year. Further, it did not lose by much. In fact, the vote was tied at 64-64, prompting Presiding Officer Alex Fergusson to vote for the ‘status quo’ and effectively reject the bill. Although both Labour and the Liberal Democrats voted against (the former wanted more for modern apprenticeships, while the latter pushed for a 2p reduction in Scottish income tax), the Conservatives are already on board, in exchange for assurances on fairly uncontroversial policies to regenerate towns, tackle hospital acquired infections and provide outdoor adventure training courses for school pupils (Margo MacDonald is also on-board following assurances about spending in Edinburgh). This just leaves the support of the Greens, who originally called for a policy promising £100m per year (for 10 years) for a major free home insulation project, but seem willing to accept £33m. As I understand it, its main source of opposition regarded the status of the money (Is it ‘new’? Will it be ‘ring fenced’ rather than left to cash-strapped local authorities with other priorities?) and the inability of SNP ministers to assure Patrick Harvie and Robin Harper about the seriousness of their commitment. If such assurances are forthcoming, then the next vote will (hopefully) seem like an anti-climax. The changes involved will also be marginal compared to the overall budget (they would also be marginal if the SNP agreed to fund Labour’s modern apprenticeships).
Now, let us consider the likelihood of a fallen government and extraordinary election if Alex Salmond resigns. A similar need for a re-election seemed likely for a brief period in the aftermath of the 2007 elections. However, this time things are very different for three main reasons. First, in 2007 there was a widespread sense that, although the SNP did not gain a majority (which is unlikely under most proportional electoral systems) they had effectively won the election. Therefore, the Scottish Labour Party went through several common phases of grief: from a position of stunned disbelief to rejection (when complaining about particular election results, including the loss of former minister Allan Wilson) and, eventually, acceptance of its loss. It then seemed politic to allow the SNP the first opportunity to form a government. Then, when the Liberal Democrats rejected an alliance with the SNP, it did so on the assumption that it would also not try to form a coalition with Labour. The mood of the Liberal Democrats was towards a period of opposition and relative independence (to rediscover itself and question what it had given up as a condition of coalition). This left the door open for only two realistic options: an SNP coalition with the Conservatives (always unlikely given the need for the SNP to link an independence vote to an unwelcome Conservative UK Government) and minority government. Under these circumstances, most parties were effectively willing to accept the experiment of minority government by voting for their own leader when they could, or abstaining when they couldn’t (the Greens voted for Salmond in exchange for assurances on environmental policies). This time, there will be no assumption towards an SNP First Minister. Second, there is potential for the other parties to argue that if a new First Minister has to be found then this is the fault of the SNP. This could be used to justify their attempts to form a multi-party coalition or, given that it is unlikely that any attempt to do so will command a majority, support an alternative minority government (although this is also unlikely). Third, this year there is a general sense that the more serious economic context gives parties more of an incentive to cooperate (which all vowed to do following the defeat). If the SNP are seen to be willing to risk the stability of government for the sake of fairly marginal sums, then it will no longer have the moral majority that it enjoyed in 2007. There would therefore not be a public uproar if a new First Minister were elected by existing MSPs. This is the more interesting aspect of uncharted territory. The Scottish Government does not have the power to dissolve Parliament and call for a general election. Instead, the parliament has 28 days to elect a new First Minister. If Labour attempts to call Salmond’s bluff and gets behind a new candidate (who will not necessarily require the support of the majority of MSPs), then the SNP may have to support one of its own (presumably Salmond) to stop that candidate succeeding.
The fallout from the annual budget rounds in the Scottish Parliament
Much has been made about the unprecedented nature of the SNP’s budget defeat, the fact that we are entering uncharted waters and that this is a crisis of epic proportions. Yet, this is to give the proceedings a sense of drama that they do not yet deserve. Let us first consider the defeat itself. This certainly marks a departure from the first 8 years of devolution in which the Labour- Liberal Democrat coalition dominated the vote within the Scottish Parliament. It would be possible to count the number of serious Scottish Executive defeats on the fingers of one hand. This, combined with the fact that only Scottish ministers can suggest amendments to the budget bill, gave the overall annual impression of a rather mundane, technical and ceremonial process. The only coverage given to the budget regarded the odd clash of personalities between the Finance Committee and ministers or the committee’s perennial call for better statistics. Neither the Parliament nor its parties had the resources or power to make a profound difference. Now, things have changed. The SNP Government must take seriously the concerns of at least two other parties. However, this was not a particular problem last year. Although the SNP had to court support from the Greens and Conservatives, the concessions it made were complementary to its own aims. While the Greens perhaps act as the SNP’s environmental conscience (drawing attention last year to the problem of ship-to-ship oil transfers), the Conservative requests for more police officers and tax relief for small businesses were consistent with the SNP’s manifesto. The demands from other parties were also relatively small compared to the overall budget. Therefore, while there was a brief drama when the bill was defeated at stage 1 (a consideration of the broad principles of the bill), the SNP had enough votes when it came to stage 3 (the final vote). The decision by Labour to abstain, just in case its opposition was enough to defeat the bill and prompt Alex Salmond to resign, prompted laughter rather than relief among the SNP front bench.
As things stand, we have more of the same. Although this year the bill has been defeated at stage 3, the SNP still has over two weeks to pass its replacement in time for the new financial year. Further, it did not lose by much. In fact, the vote was tied at 64-64, prompting Presiding Officer Alex Fergusson to vote for the ‘status quo’ and effectively reject the bill. Although both Labour and the Liberal Democrats voted against (the former wanted more for modern apprenticeships, while the latter pushed for a 2p reduction in Scottish income tax), the Conservatives are already on board, in exchange for assurances on fairly uncontroversial policies to regenerate towns, tackle hospital acquired infections and provide outdoor adventure training courses for school pupils (Margo MacDonald is also on-board following assurances about spending in Edinburgh). This just leaves the support of the Greens, who originally called for a policy promising £100m per year (for 10 years) for a major free home insulation project, but seem willing to accept £33m. As I understand it, its main source of opposition regarded the status of the money (Is it ‘new’? Will it be ‘ring fenced’ rather than left to cash-strapped local authorities with other priorities?) and the inability of SNP ministers to assure Patrick Harvie and Robin Harper about the seriousness of their commitment. If such assurances are forthcoming, then the next vote will (hopefully) seem like an anti-climax. The changes involved will also be marginal compared to the overall budget (they would also be marginal if the SNP agreed to fund Labour’s modern apprenticeships).
Now, let us consider the likelihood of a fallen government and extraordinary election if Alex Salmond resigns. A similar need for a re-election seemed likely for a brief period in the aftermath of the 2007 elections. However, this time things are very different for three main reasons. First, in 2007 there was a widespread sense that, although the SNP did not gain a majority (which is unlikely under most proportional electoral systems) they had effectively won the election. Therefore, the Scottish Labour Party went through several common phases of grief: from a position of stunned disbelief to rejection (when complaining about particular election results, including the loss of former minister Allan Wilson) and, eventually, acceptance of its loss. It then seemed politic to allow the SNP the first opportunity to form a government. Then, when the Liberal Democrats rejected an alliance with the SNP, it did so on the assumption that it would also not try to form a coalition with Labour. The mood of the Liberal Democrats was towards a period of opposition and relative independence (to rediscover itself and question what it had given up as a condition of coalition). This left the door open for only two realistic options: an SNP coalition with the Conservatives (always unlikely given the need for the SNP to link an independence vote to an unwelcome Conservative UK Government) and minority government. Under these circumstances, most parties were effectively willing to accept the experiment of minority government by voting for their own leader when they could, or abstaining when they couldn’t (the Greens voted for Salmond in exchange for assurances on environmental policies). This time, there will be no assumption towards an SNP First Minister. Second, there is potential for the other parties to argue that if a new First Minister has to be found then this is the fault of the SNP. This could be used to justify their attempts to form a multi-party coalition or, given that it is unlikely that any attempt to do so will command a majority, support an alternative minority government (although this is also unlikely). Third, this year there is a general sense that the more serious economic context gives parties more of an incentive to cooperate (which all vowed to do following the defeat). If the SNP are seen to be willing to risk the stability of government for the sake of fairly marginal sums, then it will no longer have the moral majority that it enjoyed in 2007. There would therefore not be a public uproar if a new First Minister were elected by existing MSPs. This is the more interesting aspect of uncharted territory. The Scottish Government does not have the power to dissolve Parliament and call for a general election. Instead, the parliament has 28 days to elect a new First Minister. If Labour attempts to call Salmond’s bluff and gets behind a new candidate (who will not necessarily require the support of the majority of MSPs), then the SNP may have to support one of its own (presumably Salmond) to stop that candidate succeeding.
Scottish Conservatives 2009
Here is a piece that I wrote on the fortunes of the Scottish Conservative Party for Holyrood Magazine in February 2009
The Scottish Conservatives
One of the great ironies in the history of Scottish Politics is that the Conservative Party has a great deal to gain from the devolution that it worked so hard to oppose. Indeed, this payoff was almost immediate following the introduction of a mixed member proportional system to elect MSPs. While it failed to command a single Scottish seat during Labour’s landslide Westminster general election victory in 1997, a reduced share of the vote (from 17.5% to 15.6% of the constituency vote) gave it 18 (14%) of 129 Scottish Parliament seats – all from the regional list (it now has 17 seats, including 4 from the constituency vote). This level of representation was not enough to give it any real power in the first eight years of devolution because Labour and the Liberal Democrats formed a majority coalition that rarely needed to negotiate with the opposition parties. However, it did offer a way out of its embarrassing lack of representation and provided a spell of rehabilitation in which the party could seek to set new priorities and adapt its approach to the Scottish arena.
This has started to pay off following the formation of a minority SNP Government in 2007 producing a sense that every vote counts. In particular, it has emerged as the party most likely to secure policy concessions in return for support of the SNP’s annual budget. In the first year it secured a greater commitment to funding new police officers and revisit drugs policy, while in the second it secured a reduction in business rates and a commitment to dedicate funding to town regeneration. Although these are modest gains they are also significant. While the concessions are consistent with the SNP manifesto, they mark a moderate shift in SNP priorities. While the cost of the concessions represents less than 1% of the overall budget, there is only a 1% or so level of ‘slack’ in the budget anyway – because the funding increase is modest this year and governments feel the most pressure to maintain existing commitments. The concessions also compare favourably with those of the other parties and may represent as much as a party with 17 seats (minus the vote that Alex Fergusson effectively gave up when becoming Presiding Officer) could expect. Perhaps more importantly the Conservative party could be the only party that emerges with any sense of credit from the budget crisis. The budget process exposed both the SNP’s reliance on other parties and the role of Labour and the Liberal Democrats in seeking to oppose the budget only if it still proved successful. All three parties were undermined by the Green decision to oppose, prompting frenetic activity in Parliament to secure a face-saving deal allowing the main parties to sign up to a budget that looked suspiciously like the old one. In contrast, the Conservative position was consistent, allowing for the slightly uncomfortable sight of Annabel Goldie telling-off Iain Gray for playing party politics with the big issues (describing Labour’s strategy as a ‘bloodless debating chamber coup to ensconce him as First Minister’).
The Conservative strategy in Scotland has obvious links to its overall approach to the prospect of a UK general election win in 2010. It is no secret that a Conservative win would suit the SNP independence referendum strategy. This would be the first Conservative government operating in Scotland since the 1979-97 period in which Thatcherism proved so out of touch with Scottish public opinion (particularly when introducing the poll tax) and the Major government contributed to its own demise by refusing to support any significant form of constitutional change. Provided that the Conservatives fail to elect many MPs in Scotland (they will almost certainly fail to return the 11 MPs of 1992), the picture will be one of a return to the democratic deficit when Scotland votes for one government but receives another. However, three main things have changed in the meantime to challenge the sense in which the Conservatives are as out of touch with public opinion in Scotland as they were in the 1980s and 1990s. First, the party has shown, particularly since 2007, that it can engage effectively on the big Scottish Parliament debates and take a central role, when negotiating with the SNP or when contributing to unified opposition. Second, its pursuit of the status quo (i.e. devolution, not independence) now represents a new position on constitutional change – and one which is shared by most parties and the public in Scotland. Third, David Cameron has expressed a much greater willingness to ‘govern Scots with respect’, allow the Scottish party to go its own way, accept recommendations from the Calman Commission to enhance Scottish Parliament policy responsibilities and work closely with the Scottish Government. This even extended to headline-seeking offers to engage in meetings between SNP ministers and UK Conservative shadow ministers - for example, on the funding of the Forth road bridge at a time when the UK Labour Government seemed determined to embarrass John Swinney and show him who was in control. Thus, David Cameron has demonstrated the ability to appear both committed to the Union but also relaxed about the prospects for change, in marked contrast to the image of Gordon Brown as a source of interference and central control. This will not be enough to ensure a significant Scottish Conservative presence in Westminster. However, it may be enough to prevent independence as an unintended consequence of its electoral success overall.
The Scottish Conservatives
One of the great ironies in the history of Scottish Politics is that the Conservative Party has a great deal to gain from the devolution that it worked so hard to oppose. Indeed, this payoff was almost immediate following the introduction of a mixed member proportional system to elect MSPs. While it failed to command a single Scottish seat during Labour’s landslide Westminster general election victory in 1997, a reduced share of the vote (from 17.5% to 15.6% of the constituency vote) gave it 18 (14%) of 129 Scottish Parliament seats – all from the regional list (it now has 17 seats, including 4 from the constituency vote). This level of representation was not enough to give it any real power in the first eight years of devolution because Labour and the Liberal Democrats formed a majority coalition that rarely needed to negotiate with the opposition parties. However, it did offer a way out of its embarrassing lack of representation and provided a spell of rehabilitation in which the party could seek to set new priorities and adapt its approach to the Scottish arena.
This has started to pay off following the formation of a minority SNP Government in 2007 producing a sense that every vote counts. In particular, it has emerged as the party most likely to secure policy concessions in return for support of the SNP’s annual budget. In the first year it secured a greater commitment to funding new police officers and revisit drugs policy, while in the second it secured a reduction in business rates and a commitment to dedicate funding to town regeneration. Although these are modest gains they are also significant. While the concessions are consistent with the SNP manifesto, they mark a moderate shift in SNP priorities. While the cost of the concessions represents less than 1% of the overall budget, there is only a 1% or so level of ‘slack’ in the budget anyway – because the funding increase is modest this year and governments feel the most pressure to maintain existing commitments. The concessions also compare favourably with those of the other parties and may represent as much as a party with 17 seats (minus the vote that Alex Fergusson effectively gave up when becoming Presiding Officer) could expect. Perhaps more importantly the Conservative party could be the only party that emerges with any sense of credit from the budget crisis. The budget process exposed both the SNP’s reliance on other parties and the role of Labour and the Liberal Democrats in seeking to oppose the budget only if it still proved successful. All three parties were undermined by the Green decision to oppose, prompting frenetic activity in Parliament to secure a face-saving deal allowing the main parties to sign up to a budget that looked suspiciously like the old one. In contrast, the Conservative position was consistent, allowing for the slightly uncomfortable sight of Annabel Goldie telling-off Iain Gray for playing party politics with the big issues (describing Labour’s strategy as a ‘bloodless debating chamber coup to ensconce him as First Minister’).
The Conservative strategy in Scotland has obvious links to its overall approach to the prospect of a UK general election win in 2010. It is no secret that a Conservative win would suit the SNP independence referendum strategy. This would be the first Conservative government operating in Scotland since the 1979-97 period in which Thatcherism proved so out of touch with Scottish public opinion (particularly when introducing the poll tax) and the Major government contributed to its own demise by refusing to support any significant form of constitutional change. Provided that the Conservatives fail to elect many MPs in Scotland (they will almost certainly fail to return the 11 MPs of 1992), the picture will be one of a return to the democratic deficit when Scotland votes for one government but receives another. However, three main things have changed in the meantime to challenge the sense in which the Conservatives are as out of touch with public opinion in Scotland as they were in the 1980s and 1990s. First, the party has shown, particularly since 2007, that it can engage effectively on the big Scottish Parliament debates and take a central role, when negotiating with the SNP or when contributing to unified opposition. Second, its pursuit of the status quo (i.e. devolution, not independence) now represents a new position on constitutional change – and one which is shared by most parties and the public in Scotland. Third, David Cameron has expressed a much greater willingness to ‘govern Scots with respect’, allow the Scottish party to go its own way, accept recommendations from the Calman Commission to enhance Scottish Parliament policy responsibilities and work closely with the Scottish Government. This even extended to headline-seeking offers to engage in meetings between SNP ministers and UK Conservative shadow ministers - for example, on the funding of the Forth road bridge at a time when the UK Labour Government seemed determined to embarrass John Swinney and show him who was in control. Thus, David Cameron has demonstrated the ability to appear both committed to the Union but also relaxed about the prospects for change, in marked contrast to the image of Gordon Brown as a source of interference and central control. This will not be enough to ensure a significant Scottish Conservative presence in Westminster. However, it may be enough to prevent independence as an unintended consequence of its electoral success overall.
Scottish Labour and Liberal Democrats 2009
Here is a piece that I wrote on the fortunes of Scottish Labour and Liberal Democrats for Holyrood Magazine in February 2009.
What next for the former Scottish Executive – vision or opposition?
If there is one word that sums up the reaction by both Scottish Labour and the Scottish Liberal Democrats to the 2007 election and its aftermath, it is this: shock. For Labour the shock was profound because it has long been considered the ‘establishment’ party. The 2007 defeat followed a sustained period of electoral dominance in Scotland that stretches back to 1964. Although it never achieved more than 50% of the vote in Scotland, the first-past-the-post system exaggerated its position, allowing Labour to win the most Scottish seats in 15 of the 17 post-war UK general elections. Its dominance of seats even continued during the election of a Thatcher government in 1979 (Labour won 61% of Scottish seats) and a Michael Foot inspired Conservative landslide victory in 1983 (57%). Indeed, the years of Conservative government from 1979-97 actually cemented Labour’s position in Scotland – first, by producing a group of MPs (including Gordon Brown and Alistair Darling) more assured of election and more able to rise up the UK party ranks than many of their counterparts in England and, second, by establishing an association in the Scottish public mind between Labour and the need to address the ‘democratic deficit’ (in which a population votes for one government but receives another). By the time that New Labour enjoyed its own landslide in 1997, the share of seats rose to 78% - an expression of dominance made all the more significant by the failure of the Conservative party to win any seats. This pattern extended to local government, with Labour’s high (but generally below 50%) share of the vote translating into a majority of council seats and overall control of more councils than any other party for much of the post-war period.
Despite widespread hopes for ‘new politics’ and multi-party cooperation, the introduction of devolution in 1999 actually helped cement the image of Labour as the establishment party. Although its share of the vote fell below 40% and the introduction of proportional representation ruled out an exaggerated Labour majority in the Scottish Parliament, it was still the largest party. Following a coalition with the Liberal Democrats in both 1999 and 2003, it was effectively able to function as a majority in the Westminster mould. Further, since the reform of the electoral system for local government did not happen until 2007, Labour also commanded the majority of councillors in 1999 and 2003. Therefore, until 2007, the centrality of Scottish Labour to Scottish government (both central and local) seemed assured. Add to this the fact that Labour has formed the UK government as long as devolution’s existence, and the ability of Scottish Labour ministers to appoint a range of people in high profile governmental posts (such as quango boards), and you produce a widespread perception that the Labour party is embedded in the DNA of the Scottish political system. The culture of Scottish Labour included, understandably, an expectation that they would be in charge.
It is in this context that we can view the SNP’s electoral success, perhaps made more difficult for Labour by the margin of its defeat. For the neutral observer (if there is such a thing) there was a clear sense that, although the SNP did not gain a majority (which is unlikely under most proportional electoral systems) they had effectively won the election. However, for Labour we can identify a much longer thought process akin to the most common phases of grief: from stunned disbelief to anger (when complaining about particular election results, including the loss of former minister Allan Wilson) and, eventually, acceptance of its loss. This contributed to an unusually lengthy process in which the Scottish Labour leadership has sought to define its new role as an opposition party. To some extent this has been plagued with bad luck or issues outside of the control of the Scottish leadership. While Jack McConnell resigned as leader, he could not bow out as quickly from Scottish politics as he hoped, because Labour could not face an embarrassing result in the subsequent bye-election. While Wendy Alexander was elected as Scottish leader with minimal opposition, the unfortunate details surrounding the funding of her campaign contributed to her early downfall. While new leader Iain Gray’s election as Scottish leader should have marked a new era in Scottish politics, it was quickly mired in controversy over the conduct of Labour members in East Lothian and caught up in yet another bye-election which could threaten the position of Gordon Brown as Prime Minister - both issues in which Gray had little influence and distracted him from Labour’s strategy in the Scottish Parliament.
However, these events should not distract the party from a much wider problem: of how to balance the need to criticise the government for electoral gain while also supporting it enough to pursue its policy preferences and, more importantly, to not be seen as the main culprit behind the SNP government’s downfall (particularly during a period of economic crisis in which politicians are less likely to be forgiven their excessive partisanship). So far, the results have not been impressive. The image produced by the Creative Scotland Bill debacle was that the party was too pleased with its part in the Scottish Government’s defeat over the financial provisions to notice that this would kill the whole bill. Similarly, the party has not done well during the two annual budget rounds. Last year, it pursued neither the Conservative party’s aim of trading support for concessions nor the Liberal Democrats’ aim to present principled opposition. Instead, it abstained in the key stage 3 vote, producing more laughter than relief among the SNP benches. This year, its clearer opposition helped defeat the whole bill at stage 3, producing embarrassing headlines for the Scottish Parliament as a whole rather than the impression of a strong, assertive opposition (particularly when Labour then appeared to accept marginal concessions in exchange for support only a few days later).
Overall, recent experience has provided two main lessons for the Scottish Labour leadership. First, the idea of Scottish politicians standing up for Scottish interests goes down well. Conversely, Scottish Labour does not benefit from a media and public perception that it merely represents a regional arm of a larger and more powerful organisation. Scottish Labour needs to avoid a repeat of the effect that the lack of support from Gordon Brown had on Wendy Alexander. The aftermath of Alexander’s ‘bring it on’ statement was that she became vulnerable to portrayals as a powerless leader. It is time that a Scottish Labour leader gave the impression that s/he cares less about, or is at least willing to challenge, any response from the British party and its leadership. This will be crucial to the forthcoming debates on whether or not the Scottish Parliament should be given more powers (following the conclusion of the Calman report) and whether or not it should pass a referendum bill (following the conclusion of the National Conversation).
Second, no party should go too far in opposition. While principled opposition is justifiable, the strategy of opposition merely to embarrass the government is not (particularly in a country in which most parties are competing to occupy the same left-of-centre ground). Instead, the Scottish labour leadership needs to learn how to be a critical friend – to suggest, for example, that government policy is broadly the right thing to do but not the best way to do it (rather than introduce an alternative electoral programme without the support or resources to see it through). If the election in 2007 taught us anything it is that when the parties broadly agree on most (but not all) major policy issues, what counts is the ability to present an image of (past, current or future) governing competence and a positive vision that leaders can rely on when trying to rise above the petty world of electoral politics. In the domestic context, Iain Gray has done well to reflect on his party’s operational mistakes in government while sticking to the idea that the guiding principles were correct. The more ambitious and necessary strategy will be to present two coherent and related visions for Scotland. First, it is time that Scottish Labour outlined a vision for a distinct welfare state in Scotland, akin to but not as dramatically presented as Rhodri Morgan’s ‘clear red water’ speech. Second, it should produce a vision for Scotland’s constitutional future, to challenge not only the SNP but also send a signal that Scottish Labour is not merely run from London.
For the Scottish Liberal Democrats, the sense of shock was more subtle and related to the practicalities of life in opposition rather than government. In particular, its then leader, Nicol Stephen, soon found out that the lack of party resources produced a job in opposition more demanding than a minister in government. Less difficult was the change in thinking from government to opposition (because it has always been a relatively small party dependent on negotiation with larger parties to have any influence) or the issue of British party influence (because the Liberal Democrats favour a federal model in which the Scottish leader has more autonomy). There was also a greater sense of choice for the Liberal Democrats, who rejected the chance to negotiate another four years of government. It appears that the mood of the Liberal Democrats was towards a period of opposition and relative independence, to rediscover itself and question what it had given up as a condition of coalition (the difference in constitutional preferences between it and the SNP did not help either). Yet, the Liberal Democrats have also struggled to find that balance between opposition and support. In particular, Nicol Stephen’s unfortunate term ‘smell of sleaze’ (describing the SNP government’s involvement in the Trump planning application) played into the SNP’s hands, allowing Alex Salmond to wrap up any personal insult and refusal to answer a question properly as a reaction against Stephen’s initial snub. The Liberal Democrats also played their part in the Creative Scotland and annual budget debacles without appearing to gain much for the party or country in return (bar the SNP’s agreement to correspond with a Commission it does not value and a vague commitment to future cross-party scrutiny of the budget). While Tavish Scott is less likely to pursue a confrontational style, he has yet to demonstrate what value the Liberal Democrats add to the Scottish Parliament. As things stand, the party has a higgledy-piggledy approach to the presentation of its policy aims - promising very little during election campaigns (such as extra time for PE in schools), but then demanding the Earth when elected (such as a reduction in Scottish income tax). It is relatively easy to oppose policy innovation and make unrealistic demands in Parliament, but more difficult to present a worthwhile, viable and coherent alternative to government policy.
What next for the former Scottish Executive – vision or opposition?
If there is one word that sums up the reaction by both Scottish Labour and the Scottish Liberal Democrats to the 2007 election and its aftermath, it is this: shock. For Labour the shock was profound because it has long been considered the ‘establishment’ party. The 2007 defeat followed a sustained period of electoral dominance in Scotland that stretches back to 1964. Although it never achieved more than 50% of the vote in Scotland, the first-past-the-post system exaggerated its position, allowing Labour to win the most Scottish seats in 15 of the 17 post-war UK general elections. Its dominance of seats even continued during the election of a Thatcher government in 1979 (Labour won 61% of Scottish seats) and a Michael Foot inspired Conservative landslide victory in 1983 (57%). Indeed, the years of Conservative government from 1979-97 actually cemented Labour’s position in Scotland – first, by producing a group of MPs (including Gordon Brown and Alistair Darling) more assured of election and more able to rise up the UK party ranks than many of their counterparts in England and, second, by establishing an association in the Scottish public mind between Labour and the need to address the ‘democratic deficit’ (in which a population votes for one government but receives another). By the time that New Labour enjoyed its own landslide in 1997, the share of seats rose to 78% - an expression of dominance made all the more significant by the failure of the Conservative party to win any seats. This pattern extended to local government, with Labour’s high (but generally below 50%) share of the vote translating into a majority of council seats and overall control of more councils than any other party for much of the post-war period.
Despite widespread hopes for ‘new politics’ and multi-party cooperation, the introduction of devolution in 1999 actually helped cement the image of Labour as the establishment party. Although its share of the vote fell below 40% and the introduction of proportional representation ruled out an exaggerated Labour majority in the Scottish Parliament, it was still the largest party. Following a coalition with the Liberal Democrats in both 1999 and 2003, it was effectively able to function as a majority in the Westminster mould. Further, since the reform of the electoral system for local government did not happen until 2007, Labour also commanded the majority of councillors in 1999 and 2003. Therefore, until 2007, the centrality of Scottish Labour to Scottish government (both central and local) seemed assured. Add to this the fact that Labour has formed the UK government as long as devolution’s existence, and the ability of Scottish Labour ministers to appoint a range of people in high profile governmental posts (such as quango boards), and you produce a widespread perception that the Labour party is embedded in the DNA of the Scottish political system. The culture of Scottish Labour included, understandably, an expectation that they would be in charge.
It is in this context that we can view the SNP’s electoral success, perhaps made more difficult for Labour by the margin of its defeat. For the neutral observer (if there is such a thing) there was a clear sense that, although the SNP did not gain a majority (which is unlikely under most proportional electoral systems) they had effectively won the election. However, for Labour we can identify a much longer thought process akin to the most common phases of grief: from stunned disbelief to anger (when complaining about particular election results, including the loss of former minister Allan Wilson) and, eventually, acceptance of its loss. This contributed to an unusually lengthy process in which the Scottish Labour leadership has sought to define its new role as an opposition party. To some extent this has been plagued with bad luck or issues outside of the control of the Scottish leadership. While Jack McConnell resigned as leader, he could not bow out as quickly from Scottish politics as he hoped, because Labour could not face an embarrassing result in the subsequent bye-election. While Wendy Alexander was elected as Scottish leader with minimal opposition, the unfortunate details surrounding the funding of her campaign contributed to her early downfall. While new leader Iain Gray’s election as Scottish leader should have marked a new era in Scottish politics, it was quickly mired in controversy over the conduct of Labour members in East Lothian and caught up in yet another bye-election which could threaten the position of Gordon Brown as Prime Minister - both issues in which Gray had little influence and distracted him from Labour’s strategy in the Scottish Parliament.
However, these events should not distract the party from a much wider problem: of how to balance the need to criticise the government for electoral gain while also supporting it enough to pursue its policy preferences and, more importantly, to not be seen as the main culprit behind the SNP government’s downfall (particularly during a period of economic crisis in which politicians are less likely to be forgiven their excessive partisanship). So far, the results have not been impressive. The image produced by the Creative Scotland Bill debacle was that the party was too pleased with its part in the Scottish Government’s defeat over the financial provisions to notice that this would kill the whole bill. Similarly, the party has not done well during the two annual budget rounds. Last year, it pursued neither the Conservative party’s aim of trading support for concessions nor the Liberal Democrats’ aim to present principled opposition. Instead, it abstained in the key stage 3 vote, producing more laughter than relief among the SNP benches. This year, its clearer opposition helped defeat the whole bill at stage 3, producing embarrassing headlines for the Scottish Parliament as a whole rather than the impression of a strong, assertive opposition (particularly when Labour then appeared to accept marginal concessions in exchange for support only a few days later).
Overall, recent experience has provided two main lessons for the Scottish Labour leadership. First, the idea of Scottish politicians standing up for Scottish interests goes down well. Conversely, Scottish Labour does not benefit from a media and public perception that it merely represents a regional arm of a larger and more powerful organisation. Scottish Labour needs to avoid a repeat of the effect that the lack of support from Gordon Brown had on Wendy Alexander. The aftermath of Alexander’s ‘bring it on’ statement was that she became vulnerable to portrayals as a powerless leader. It is time that a Scottish Labour leader gave the impression that s/he cares less about, or is at least willing to challenge, any response from the British party and its leadership. This will be crucial to the forthcoming debates on whether or not the Scottish Parliament should be given more powers (following the conclusion of the Calman report) and whether or not it should pass a referendum bill (following the conclusion of the National Conversation).
Second, no party should go too far in opposition. While principled opposition is justifiable, the strategy of opposition merely to embarrass the government is not (particularly in a country in which most parties are competing to occupy the same left-of-centre ground). Instead, the Scottish labour leadership needs to learn how to be a critical friend – to suggest, for example, that government policy is broadly the right thing to do but not the best way to do it (rather than introduce an alternative electoral programme without the support or resources to see it through). If the election in 2007 taught us anything it is that when the parties broadly agree on most (but not all) major policy issues, what counts is the ability to present an image of (past, current or future) governing competence and a positive vision that leaders can rely on when trying to rise above the petty world of electoral politics. In the domestic context, Iain Gray has done well to reflect on his party’s operational mistakes in government while sticking to the idea that the guiding principles were correct. The more ambitious and necessary strategy will be to present two coherent and related visions for Scotland. First, it is time that Scottish Labour outlined a vision for a distinct welfare state in Scotland, akin to but not as dramatically presented as Rhodri Morgan’s ‘clear red water’ speech. Second, it should produce a vision for Scotland’s constitutional future, to challenge not only the SNP but also send a signal that Scottish Labour is not merely run from London.
For the Scottish Liberal Democrats, the sense of shock was more subtle and related to the practicalities of life in opposition rather than government. In particular, its then leader, Nicol Stephen, soon found out that the lack of party resources produced a job in opposition more demanding than a minister in government. Less difficult was the change in thinking from government to opposition (because it has always been a relatively small party dependent on negotiation with larger parties to have any influence) or the issue of British party influence (because the Liberal Democrats favour a federal model in which the Scottish leader has more autonomy). There was also a greater sense of choice for the Liberal Democrats, who rejected the chance to negotiate another four years of government. It appears that the mood of the Liberal Democrats was towards a period of opposition and relative independence, to rediscover itself and question what it had given up as a condition of coalition (the difference in constitutional preferences between it and the SNP did not help either). Yet, the Liberal Democrats have also struggled to find that balance between opposition and support. In particular, Nicol Stephen’s unfortunate term ‘smell of sleaze’ (describing the SNP government’s involvement in the Trump planning application) played into the SNP’s hands, allowing Alex Salmond to wrap up any personal insult and refusal to answer a question properly as a reaction against Stephen’s initial snub. The Liberal Democrats also played their part in the Creative Scotland and annual budget debacles without appearing to gain much for the party or country in return (bar the SNP’s agreement to correspond with a Commission it does not value and a vague commitment to future cross-party scrutiny of the budget). While Tavish Scott is less likely to pursue a confrontational style, he has yet to demonstrate what value the Liberal Democrats add to the Scottish Parliament. As things stand, the party has a higgledy-piggledy approach to the presentation of its policy aims - promising very little during election campaigns (such as extra time for PE in schools), but then demanding the Earth when elected (such as a reduction in Scottish income tax). It is relatively easy to oppose policy innovation and make unrealistic demands in Parliament, but more difficult to present a worthwhile, viable and coherent alternative to government policy.
Scottish National Party 2008-9
Here are two pieces that I wrote on the fortunes of the SNP for Holyrood Magazine.
April 2009
While the SNP Government has now returned from its remarkably-long honeymoon, it is still enjoying a fairly happy marriage with the Scottish electorate and non-threatening relations with its in-laws, the UK Government and Scottish Parliament. This may be a surprising summary given the rise in media stories regarding the SNP’s ‘broken promises’ to the electorate, tense territorial disputes and partisan opposition. So how do we justify this account and explain these three developments?
First, the SNP is enjoying something that most mid-term governments would envy: the ability to present a convincing narrative of continuous popularity. For example, polls throughout 2008 suggested that the SNP had maintained the level of popular support that won it the election in 2007, while Alex Salmond is still by far the most popular leader within the Scottish Parliament. This firm foundation of support has allowed it to weather the short-term storms of temporary unpopularity that any government would expect to face. For example, its polling fortunes appeared to suffer in March, signalling (for some) the prospect of a Labour win in 2011. Yet, in the same month, the SNP commanded the headlines by taking control of Dundee council for the first time in its history and, more importantly, producing another blow to the image of endless Labour dominance in certain parts of Scotland. Similarly, the quick establishment of the SNP as an effective government has softened the blow of an economic crisis that has often made Scottish political issues appear parochial and inconsequential, exposed some weaknesses of the independence argument and reignited the fortunes of Gordon Brown. The credit crunch initially allowed Brown to appear as a safe pair of hands during a period of crisis, to capitalise on the value of the Union and to accentuate the power of the Prime Minister to broker mergers and bail-out the big banks. It also allowed Brown to play a leading role in the world stage, particularly during the latest G20 summit in London. While the SNP has its own narrative of the economic crisis – stressing that Scotland needs its own fiscal measures to deal with its own problems, that Scottish ministers would not have left the banks unregulated, and that a combination of corporation-tax plus oil-tax surpluses would have put an independent Scottish Government in a position to bail out the RBS – this has struggled for media attention. Instead, the crisis often shifted Salmond’s image from a statesman on the world stage towards a parochial figure unable to command powerful policy levers in Scotland. On the other hand, the Scottish Government has shown a much greater ability to focus and not be overwhelmed by events. This contrasts with a UK government that appears to lurch from one crisis (e.g. ministerial expenses) to another (e.g. the planned smear campaign by a special adviser), exposing Brown to sporadic shifts in popularity and undermining his ability to focus consistently on Scottish politics in any meaningful way.
In some respects this void has been filled by Jim Murphy as the first full-time Secretary of State for Scotland since 2003. Murphy has also quickly become a figurehead for the UK Government’s more abrasive relationship with the SNP despite initial assurances that he represented ‘Scotland's man in the cabinet rather than the cabinet's man in Scotland’. This has produced publicity for a series of niggles between both governments (ranging from Linda Fabiani’s rebuffed phone calls to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office regarding the Mumbai massacre, to the China delegation nonsense and even John Swinney’s humiliating trip to London to discuss the funding of the Forth bridge) that Murphy may have exacerbated rather than smoothed over. Murphy’s role has also been to minimise the kinds of meetings between Salmond and Brown that establish the former as the latter’s equal. Yet, overall, the governments have enjoyed a smoother-than-expected relationship. This can be explained by three main factors. First, the big debate – on constitutional change – has still to take place and so the governments are effectively shadow boxing until at least 2010. Second, there is a strong logic to informality, consultation and negotiation. While some issues bubble up to the surface and enter the highly charged world of intergovernmental politics, most are resolved quietly between civil servants at a relatively low level of the Scottish and UK governments. Third, many debates that could have taken place between the governments have in fact been played out in the Scottish Parliament.
Yet, the rub is that the installation of a high profile, full-time Secretary of State for Scotland has undermined the image of effective Labour opposition in the Scottish Parliament. For example, the decision by John Swinney to drop local income tax proposals, combined with clear SNP difficulties in finding a coherent and effective alternative to public-private partnerships, could have represented a big win for the opposition in Scotland. Instead, both issues have been plagued by UK interference, allowing the SNP to produce a story of partisanship and intergovernmental constraint to compete very well with Labour’s account of ideological incoherence and the lack of popular and elite support for its measures. This is on top of an opposition party still struggling to provide useful opposition to the SNP. While Labour contributes to the theatre of parliamentary debate, its leader has yet to expose the SNP’s deficiencies in any effective way (the lack of publicity regarding the falling number of teachers in Scotland is a good example). In part, the reason that the SNP is still doing remarkably well in this regard is that it does not have an opposition with a coherent message. While the stories of broken promises may be on the rise, they are not accompanied by an alternative vision for Scottish politics. Therefore, the implicit opposition promises to do better with free swimming lessons, more police officers, cleaner hospitals and a clearer school curriculum on their own do not get many people excited. Further, it is too early to say whether or not the climb-down by the SNP towards the need for legislation to restrict alcohol consumption marks the beginning of an effective and assertive opposition in the Scottish Parliament.
Overall, the SNP has still to be tested. The interesting aspect in all of this is that it will not take much of a shift to produce a Labour win at the polls in 2011. Wouldn’t it be ironic if this occurred because the SNP was not given a chance to show its mettle in the face of effective opposition?
September 2008
The SNP is still enjoying a prolonged honeymoon that few marriages can boast. It is popular in the polls, effective in Parliament and finding that minority government can be much more productive than it expected. So how do we explain these three developments? Ironically, its prolonged popularity can be linked most usefully to the unpopularity of the UK Labour government. For this to work, the nature of Scottish Politics has to remain ‘second order’, in which most attention is still paid to the UK and the decisions of the Scottish Government are generally seen within that context (in other words, we may not expect this level of ‘cover’ following independence). Therefore, if Scots are suffering the effects of the ‘credit crunch’ and economic difficulties, we still blame the Treasury and pay more attention to its role in the collapse of Northern Rock, the HBOS/ Lloyds TSB merger and various gaffes (such as the 10 pence income tax row) that not only deflect attention from any SNP difficulties, but also taint a Labour Party in Scotland already uncomfortable with many policies pursued by the Blair and Brown governments. The novelty of different parties in government also shifts the Scotland-UK dynamic. Although from 1999 to 2007 we saw generous financial settlements for Scotland, the post-2007 settlement has been tight. If Scottish Labour had made it to a third term, these issues would have been embarrassing but dealt with in-house. Under the SNP, they give further grist to the independence mill, highlighting UK fiscal constraints (particularly when linked to North Sea Oil) and allowing Scottish ministers to blame the UK for any failure to meet its manifesto commitments (such as on student debt and the recruitment of police officers).
The spectre of UK Labour partly explains the SNP’s effectiveness in Parliament. Although much credit must go to Alex Salmond’s assured style (and the self confident style of ministers-with-a-cause such as Nicola Sturgeon and Kenny MacAskill), he has been helped by a faltering Labour leadership tainted yet again by developments in the UK. While the pressure from the party donations saga may have been enough to topple Wendy Alexander, the embarrassing lack of support from Gordon Brown for her position on the independence referendum sealed her fate and undermined her position when going against Salmond in FMQs (can anyone remember a single question asked by Alexander during this period?). This left the job of opposition to two figures with different fortunes. For the sake of a soundbite (‘smell of sleaze’), the Liberal Democrat leader Nicol Stephen played into Salmond’s hands, allowing him to appear offended and to do little else but insult Stephen rather than answer his questions. Only new leadership under Tavish Scott will allow a fresh start and more scope for public negotiations. In this regard, Annabel Goldie has played a more clever game, asking Salmond politely to provide the details of the policies he supports in plenary, while negotiating common goals (e.g. on small business rates and drugs) in private. No party has shown much interest in scrutinising the government through committee work.
The final success story has been minority government. Many senior SNP figures, including Salmond, preferred the idea of a more comfortable coalition. However, the decision by the Liberal Democrats not to negotiate (unless the SNP dropped its agenda on independence!) proved to be a blessing. SNP ministers soon found that most public policy decisions can be made faster and most effectively without recourse to legislation. Or, when legislation is required, it can continue its win-win game, taking the credit for populist bills (such as the abolition of tolls) and blaming the opposition for obstinate partisanship when things go wrong (such as when Labour MSPs contributed to the farcical demise of the Creative Scotland bill). The UK Labour hangover is still working. The SNP government can take a lot of credit for its appearance of governing competence (a key plank of the long term independence strategy) during a range of crisis situations – such as the terrorist attempt on Glasgow Airport, the outbreak of foot and mouth disease, and the strike at the Grangemouth refinery. Its lack of association with the crisis at Aberdeen City Council also followed the canny move to give local authorities the autonomy they want in exchange for a shift in accountability. However, had it been Jack McConnell and not Alex Salmond linked to questionable discussions with Donald Trump, the call for his head would have been much louder.
Overall, the SNP strategy is sound. If things go well, it can claim the credit as the elected government in Scotland. If they go badly, it can blame the UK (and ‘stand up for Scotland’) or the opposition in Parliament. The next test will be the local income tax. While I was surprised by the decision to pursue this so soon (in negotiation with Tavish Scott and the Greens), I have been convinced that it makes sense if the implementation is put off to coincide with a change in the mood of the UK government. If this follows the election of the Conservatives, then David Cameron may be unwilling to risk the union further by appearing to hold back ‘Scotland’s money’. Or, a new, non-Scottish Labour Prime Minister should be enough to deflect from an English perception of Scotland’s ‘advantage’ and Brown’s need to appear strong both at home and in government. Even Brown’s new stance towards fiscal autonomy may provide room for negotiation.
All that is left is the SNP’s end-game. The chances are that the Conservatives will win in 2010 and the independence referendum will have more Thatcher-inspired spice. However, the vote will be for greater devolved powers, not independence. Therefore, to avoid a drastic fall in popularity (in line with its fate in 1979), Salmond has to go into overdrive and take the credit for SNP success rather than become tainted with a once-in-a-generation failure.
April 2009
While the SNP Government has now returned from its remarkably-long honeymoon, it is still enjoying a fairly happy marriage with the Scottish electorate and non-threatening relations with its in-laws, the UK Government and Scottish Parliament. This may be a surprising summary given the rise in media stories regarding the SNP’s ‘broken promises’ to the electorate, tense territorial disputes and partisan opposition. So how do we justify this account and explain these three developments?
First, the SNP is enjoying something that most mid-term governments would envy: the ability to present a convincing narrative of continuous popularity. For example, polls throughout 2008 suggested that the SNP had maintained the level of popular support that won it the election in 2007, while Alex Salmond is still by far the most popular leader within the Scottish Parliament. This firm foundation of support has allowed it to weather the short-term storms of temporary unpopularity that any government would expect to face. For example, its polling fortunes appeared to suffer in March, signalling (for some) the prospect of a Labour win in 2011. Yet, in the same month, the SNP commanded the headlines by taking control of Dundee council for the first time in its history and, more importantly, producing another blow to the image of endless Labour dominance in certain parts of Scotland. Similarly, the quick establishment of the SNP as an effective government has softened the blow of an economic crisis that has often made Scottish political issues appear parochial and inconsequential, exposed some weaknesses of the independence argument and reignited the fortunes of Gordon Brown. The credit crunch initially allowed Brown to appear as a safe pair of hands during a period of crisis, to capitalise on the value of the Union and to accentuate the power of the Prime Minister to broker mergers and bail-out the big banks. It also allowed Brown to play a leading role in the world stage, particularly during the latest G20 summit in London. While the SNP has its own narrative of the economic crisis – stressing that Scotland needs its own fiscal measures to deal with its own problems, that Scottish ministers would not have left the banks unregulated, and that a combination of corporation-tax plus oil-tax surpluses would have put an independent Scottish Government in a position to bail out the RBS – this has struggled for media attention. Instead, the crisis often shifted Salmond’s image from a statesman on the world stage towards a parochial figure unable to command powerful policy levers in Scotland. On the other hand, the Scottish Government has shown a much greater ability to focus and not be overwhelmed by events. This contrasts with a UK government that appears to lurch from one crisis (e.g. ministerial expenses) to another (e.g. the planned smear campaign by a special adviser), exposing Brown to sporadic shifts in popularity and undermining his ability to focus consistently on Scottish politics in any meaningful way.
In some respects this void has been filled by Jim Murphy as the first full-time Secretary of State for Scotland since 2003. Murphy has also quickly become a figurehead for the UK Government’s more abrasive relationship with the SNP despite initial assurances that he represented ‘Scotland's man in the cabinet rather than the cabinet's man in Scotland’. This has produced publicity for a series of niggles between both governments (ranging from Linda Fabiani’s rebuffed phone calls to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office regarding the Mumbai massacre, to the China delegation nonsense and even John Swinney’s humiliating trip to London to discuss the funding of the Forth bridge) that Murphy may have exacerbated rather than smoothed over. Murphy’s role has also been to minimise the kinds of meetings between Salmond and Brown that establish the former as the latter’s equal. Yet, overall, the governments have enjoyed a smoother-than-expected relationship. This can be explained by three main factors. First, the big debate – on constitutional change – has still to take place and so the governments are effectively shadow boxing until at least 2010. Second, there is a strong logic to informality, consultation and negotiation. While some issues bubble up to the surface and enter the highly charged world of intergovernmental politics, most are resolved quietly between civil servants at a relatively low level of the Scottish and UK governments. Third, many debates that could have taken place between the governments have in fact been played out in the Scottish Parliament.
Yet, the rub is that the installation of a high profile, full-time Secretary of State for Scotland has undermined the image of effective Labour opposition in the Scottish Parliament. For example, the decision by John Swinney to drop local income tax proposals, combined with clear SNP difficulties in finding a coherent and effective alternative to public-private partnerships, could have represented a big win for the opposition in Scotland. Instead, both issues have been plagued by UK interference, allowing the SNP to produce a story of partisanship and intergovernmental constraint to compete very well with Labour’s account of ideological incoherence and the lack of popular and elite support for its measures. This is on top of an opposition party still struggling to provide useful opposition to the SNP. While Labour contributes to the theatre of parliamentary debate, its leader has yet to expose the SNP’s deficiencies in any effective way (the lack of publicity regarding the falling number of teachers in Scotland is a good example). In part, the reason that the SNP is still doing remarkably well in this regard is that it does not have an opposition with a coherent message. While the stories of broken promises may be on the rise, they are not accompanied by an alternative vision for Scottish politics. Therefore, the implicit opposition promises to do better with free swimming lessons, more police officers, cleaner hospitals and a clearer school curriculum on their own do not get many people excited. Further, it is too early to say whether or not the climb-down by the SNP towards the need for legislation to restrict alcohol consumption marks the beginning of an effective and assertive opposition in the Scottish Parliament.
Overall, the SNP has still to be tested. The interesting aspect in all of this is that it will not take much of a shift to produce a Labour win at the polls in 2011. Wouldn’t it be ironic if this occurred because the SNP was not given a chance to show its mettle in the face of effective opposition?
September 2008
The SNP is still enjoying a prolonged honeymoon that few marriages can boast. It is popular in the polls, effective in Parliament and finding that minority government can be much more productive than it expected. So how do we explain these three developments? Ironically, its prolonged popularity can be linked most usefully to the unpopularity of the UK Labour government. For this to work, the nature of Scottish Politics has to remain ‘second order’, in which most attention is still paid to the UK and the decisions of the Scottish Government are generally seen within that context (in other words, we may not expect this level of ‘cover’ following independence). Therefore, if Scots are suffering the effects of the ‘credit crunch’ and economic difficulties, we still blame the Treasury and pay more attention to its role in the collapse of Northern Rock, the HBOS/ Lloyds TSB merger and various gaffes (such as the 10 pence income tax row) that not only deflect attention from any SNP difficulties, but also taint a Labour Party in Scotland already uncomfortable with many policies pursued by the Blair and Brown governments. The novelty of different parties in government also shifts the Scotland-UK dynamic. Although from 1999 to 2007 we saw generous financial settlements for Scotland, the post-2007 settlement has been tight. If Scottish Labour had made it to a third term, these issues would have been embarrassing but dealt with in-house. Under the SNP, they give further grist to the independence mill, highlighting UK fiscal constraints (particularly when linked to North Sea Oil) and allowing Scottish ministers to blame the UK for any failure to meet its manifesto commitments (such as on student debt and the recruitment of police officers).
The spectre of UK Labour partly explains the SNP’s effectiveness in Parliament. Although much credit must go to Alex Salmond’s assured style (and the self confident style of ministers-with-a-cause such as Nicola Sturgeon and Kenny MacAskill), he has been helped by a faltering Labour leadership tainted yet again by developments in the UK. While the pressure from the party donations saga may have been enough to topple Wendy Alexander, the embarrassing lack of support from Gordon Brown for her position on the independence referendum sealed her fate and undermined her position when going against Salmond in FMQs (can anyone remember a single question asked by Alexander during this period?). This left the job of opposition to two figures with different fortunes. For the sake of a soundbite (‘smell of sleaze’), the Liberal Democrat leader Nicol Stephen played into Salmond’s hands, allowing him to appear offended and to do little else but insult Stephen rather than answer his questions. Only new leadership under Tavish Scott will allow a fresh start and more scope for public negotiations. In this regard, Annabel Goldie has played a more clever game, asking Salmond politely to provide the details of the policies he supports in plenary, while negotiating common goals (e.g. on small business rates and drugs) in private. No party has shown much interest in scrutinising the government through committee work.
The final success story has been minority government. Many senior SNP figures, including Salmond, preferred the idea of a more comfortable coalition. However, the decision by the Liberal Democrats not to negotiate (unless the SNP dropped its agenda on independence!) proved to be a blessing. SNP ministers soon found that most public policy decisions can be made faster and most effectively without recourse to legislation. Or, when legislation is required, it can continue its win-win game, taking the credit for populist bills (such as the abolition of tolls) and blaming the opposition for obstinate partisanship when things go wrong (such as when Labour MSPs contributed to the farcical demise of the Creative Scotland bill). The UK Labour hangover is still working. The SNP government can take a lot of credit for its appearance of governing competence (a key plank of the long term independence strategy) during a range of crisis situations – such as the terrorist attempt on Glasgow Airport, the outbreak of foot and mouth disease, and the strike at the Grangemouth refinery. Its lack of association with the crisis at Aberdeen City Council also followed the canny move to give local authorities the autonomy they want in exchange for a shift in accountability. However, had it been Jack McConnell and not Alex Salmond linked to questionable discussions with Donald Trump, the call for his head would have been much louder.
Overall, the SNP strategy is sound. If things go well, it can claim the credit as the elected government in Scotland. If they go badly, it can blame the UK (and ‘stand up for Scotland’) or the opposition in Parliament. The next test will be the local income tax. While I was surprised by the decision to pursue this so soon (in negotiation with Tavish Scott and the Greens), I have been convinced that it makes sense if the implementation is put off to coincide with a change in the mood of the UK government. If this follows the election of the Conservatives, then David Cameron may be unwilling to risk the union further by appearing to hold back ‘Scotland’s money’. Or, a new, non-Scottish Labour Prime Minister should be enough to deflect from an English perception of Scotland’s ‘advantage’ and Brown’s need to appear strong both at home and in government. Even Brown’s new stance towards fiscal autonomy may provide room for negotiation.
All that is left is the SNP’s end-game. The chances are that the Conservatives will win in 2010 and the independence referendum will have more Thatcher-inspired spice. However, the vote will be for greater devolved powers, not independence. Therefore, to avoid a drastic fall in popularity (in line with its fate in 1979), Salmond has to go into overdrive and take the credit for SNP success rather than become tainted with a once-in-a-generation failure.
Scottish Devolution Monitoring Report January 2009
Here is a summary of the SDMR May 2009 report that appeared in Holyrood Magazine. The full report can be found at the UCL Constitution Unit. Or, if you would like the report as a Word document with endnotes rather than footnotes (you will see what I mean if you look at the report) then please email me (paul.cairney@abdn.ac.uk).
The Devolution Monitoring Programme is a major research project into the functioning of devolution, led by University College London’s Constitution Unit and funded by the UK and devolved Governments. It has produced over 150 reports and five books since 1999, including over 30 reports on post-devolution trends in Scottish Politics. The Scotland team is now led by Dr Paul Cairney, Lecturer in Politics, University of Aberdeen.
Paul Cairney reveals the findings of the January 2009 Scotland Devolution Monitoring Report which covers events from September 2008 to January 2009.
This is a period dominated by the effect of economic crisis which serves to show that it is difficult to predict which issues will dominate the political agenda. A range of issues which had the potential to dominate the headlines for days or weeks on end have been downgraded to second place following heightened sensitivity to the prospect of recession and unemployment. This includes: the decision to delay Jack McConnell’s departure from the Scottish Parliament (to avoid a potentially damaging bye-election for the UK Labour Government); the prospect of an end to the detention of children of asylum seekers at Dungavel (a long-term practice which brooked considerable opposition from ‘civil society’ in Scotland and put pressure on the relationship between UK and Scottish Labour ministers); reports of a rise in the number of people employed by Scottish quangos when the Scottish Government (like all governments) has promised to reduce their number; the approval of (but continued uncertainty over) Donald Trump’s golf course in Aberdeenshire; the likelihood of a public inquiry into the deaths related to C. difficile at the Vale of Leven Hospital; David Cameron’s non-rejection of Scottish independence (combined with what appears to be a ban on Conservative MSPs making a contribution to the devolution debate); and, the decision not to transfer responsibility for Scottish Parliament elections to the Scottish Parliament.
Much more could also have been made about the first (interim) report of the Commission on Scottish Devolution, led by Professor Kenneth Calman and supported by the UK government civil service (as well as a motion passed by Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrat MSPs). Yet, in this case the problem may have been the report’s contents. As Charlie Jeffery argues in The Scottish Constitutional Debate, although the report’s publication overshadowed the National Conversation conducted by the Scottish Government, very few commentators found much ‘meat’ to chew. Jeffery argues that this disinterest is unfortunate because the report discusses the principles behind potentially profound constitutional changes. First, its Independent Expert Group of Finance makes clear that any system of territorial finance which addresses the ‘right’ to fiscal autonomy but also the requirement to redistribute funding by ‘need’ has no ‘technical’ solution. Second, it entertains the prospect of establishing: ‘a distinctive welfare state in Scotland funded by resources raised in Scotland. The devolution-max option would not look out of place in the … SNP Government’s White Paper’.
For a brief period, the scale of the economic problem also produced an unusual level of consensus between the parties in Westminster and Holyrood. However, the Glenrothes bye-election subsequently heightened their differences, before Labour retained its seat and marked the end of the SNP’s remarkable honeymoon period in office and popularity. While the personalisation of politics and Gordon Brown’s premiership were key factors in previous Labour defeats, they worked in Labour’s favour this time. Brown became a ‘safe pair of hands’ and took centre stage in world politics by promoting a financial rescue plan that many countries welcomed. This allowed Labour to build on the message that small countries are vulnerable during global crises, that only the UK government could have bailed out the big banks and that the Union was crucial to Scotland’s economic stability. The ‘arc of prosperity’ - Salmond’s famous description of a range of small but successful independent nations (including Iceland) that Scotland could emulate if it became independent - was replaced in the headlines by Labour’s phrase ‘arc of insolvency’. This shifting mix of consensus and partisanship is mirrored in the actions of Jim Murphy, the new Secretary of State for Scotland. As Alan Trench discusses in Intergovernmental Relations, one of Murphy’s first statements was to assure the SNP that he was in the post to represent Scotland’s interests, as ‘Scotland's man in the cabinet rather than the cabinet's man in Scotland’. Murphy is also comfortable with the term 'Scottish Government' and became involved quickly in a number of joint meetings with Scottish Government ministers about issues such as the economic crisis and the future of Dungavel. Yet, Murphy was also a key figure during Labour’s defence of the Union and criticism of the SNP during the Glenrothes campaign.
As John Curtice argues in Public Attitudes and Elections, Labour’s win does not reflect a fundamental change in public opinion. The proportion backing independence ‘is still no lower now than it was in August 2007’ (but is still not high enough to win a referendum on independence). Similarly, although more people trust Brown (42%) over Salmond (23%) to ‘steer Scotland through the current financial crisis’, many more would prefer Salmond (38%) as First Minister than new Scottish Labour leader Iain Gray (13%). The SNP still commands ‘a larger lead over Labour than the party secured in the ballot box in May 2007’, and even enjoys popular support for its move to replace council tax with a local income tax (discussed at length by David Scott in Government Beyond the Centre).
There is also some evidence of consensus in parliamentary proceedings. As Paul Cairney argues in The Scottish Parliament and Parties, the post-2007 committees are finally showing some willingness to work together (on issues such as community policing, sexual offences, hate crimes and asbestos-related damages), while a wide range of plenary motions (on issues such as agriculture, forced marriages and child protection) passed with a promising degree of party cohesion. There may also still be hope for the bill introducing direct elections to health boards if the pilots prove to be a success. Perhaps ironically, the main exception is in finance, with parliament passing a motion (by 65 to 60) to discourage the introduction of a local income tax, heated debates in the Finance committee about the use of public private partnerships to fund major capital projects (most notably the Forth crossing) and the annual budget bill falling at the ‘final’ hurdle (before being reintroduced soon after). Much has been made about the unprecedented nature of the SNP’s budget defeat and that this was a crisis of epic proportions. Yet, this is to give the proceedings a sense of drama that they do not deserve: Alex Salmond does not want to resign; few MSPs would welcome an impromptu election (which is not in the gift of the First Minister anyway); and, most demands made by opposition MSPs only affect the budget at the margins. Indeed, doesn’t it seem bizarre that we could still end up with cross-party support for a bill that will be almost identical to the one that failed to pass? These proceedings have also been made worse by the increased use of parliamentary procedures to make party political points. This culminated in Presiding Officer Alex Fergusson’s decision to refer the ‘veracity’ of statements made in plenary to the Standards Committee. Although this has been spun by some opposition MSPs as proof that Scottish ministers have been making misleading statements, the premise of the review is to examine the use by MSPs of points of order to make such claims!
In Scottish Government and Public Policy, Paul Cairney argues that much of the SNP’s strategy to date has been to perform a balancing act between: (a) trying to demonstrate a high level of governing competence; and (b) exposing the limits of devolution (‘think how much better we could do in an independent state’); but (c) only in a way that keeps the constitutional question on the agenda without damaging the image of Scottish ministers (by making them seem parochial and powerless rather than the best people to defend Scotland’s interests). Recent developments have shown this to be a difficult task, with perceived delays in the funding of major capital projects highlighting the limits to Scottish Government borrowing (discussed at length by David Scott in Government Beyond the Centre), negotiations with major employers on the future of Scottish jobs exposing their need to persuade rather than coerce, and issues such as fuel poverty highlighting their control of only a small part of the solution. This is on top of the usual party political constraints that we would associate with minority government (for example, undermining moves to ban alcohol sales to under-21s or replace short prison terms with community sentences), problems of implementation (on issues such as class sizes and free school meals), unpredictable crises producing criticisms of ministerial decision-making (for example, centring on Nicol Sturgeon’s handling of the C. difficile related deaths at the Vale of Leven), unfortunate criticism (such as the Council of Economic Adviser’s decision to question the SNP’s stance on nuclear power) and the occasional piece of administrative difficulty which delays seemingly straightforward legislation (as with the set-up of Creative Scotland, discussed by David Scott). One ‘quick win’ has been to transform a UK Government mistake into a positive Scottish policy initiative (by promising to maintain pension overpayments for former workers in the Scottish public sector), while more long term success by can perhaps be maintained with more visionary initiatives, such as the proposed electricity grid between Scotland and northern Europe and taking the UK lead on emissions targets, combined with policy distance between the Scottish and UK Governments (such as the ‘battle of ideas’ between public and private healthcare, the decision to allow NHS ‘top-up’ payments notwithstanding). The SNP may also further the ‘Scottish Policy Style’ through consultation and negotiation rather than ‘top-down diktat’. This may mean that, in time, ‘problems of implementation’ become ‘opportunities for local discretion’.
The Devolution Monitoring Programme is a major research project into the functioning of devolution, led by University College London’s Constitution Unit and funded by the UK and devolved Governments. It has produced over 150 reports and five books since 1999, including over 30 reports on post-devolution trends in Scottish Politics. The Scotland team is now led by Dr Paul Cairney, Lecturer in Politics, University of Aberdeen.
Paul Cairney reveals the findings of the January 2009 Scotland Devolution Monitoring Report which covers events from September 2008 to January 2009.
This is a period dominated by the effect of economic crisis which serves to show that it is difficult to predict which issues will dominate the political agenda. A range of issues which had the potential to dominate the headlines for days or weeks on end have been downgraded to second place following heightened sensitivity to the prospect of recession and unemployment. This includes: the decision to delay Jack McConnell’s departure from the Scottish Parliament (to avoid a potentially damaging bye-election for the UK Labour Government); the prospect of an end to the detention of children of asylum seekers at Dungavel (a long-term practice which brooked considerable opposition from ‘civil society’ in Scotland and put pressure on the relationship between UK and Scottish Labour ministers); reports of a rise in the number of people employed by Scottish quangos when the Scottish Government (like all governments) has promised to reduce their number; the approval of (but continued uncertainty over) Donald Trump’s golf course in Aberdeenshire; the likelihood of a public inquiry into the deaths related to C. difficile at the Vale of Leven Hospital; David Cameron’s non-rejection of Scottish independence (combined with what appears to be a ban on Conservative MSPs making a contribution to the devolution debate); and, the decision not to transfer responsibility for Scottish Parliament elections to the Scottish Parliament.
Much more could also have been made about the first (interim) report of the Commission on Scottish Devolution, led by Professor Kenneth Calman and supported by the UK government civil service (as well as a motion passed by Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrat MSPs). Yet, in this case the problem may have been the report’s contents. As Charlie Jeffery argues in The Scottish Constitutional Debate, although the report’s publication overshadowed the National Conversation conducted by the Scottish Government, very few commentators found much ‘meat’ to chew. Jeffery argues that this disinterest is unfortunate because the report discusses the principles behind potentially profound constitutional changes. First, its Independent Expert Group of Finance makes clear that any system of territorial finance which addresses the ‘right’ to fiscal autonomy but also the requirement to redistribute funding by ‘need’ has no ‘technical’ solution. Second, it entertains the prospect of establishing: ‘a distinctive welfare state in Scotland funded by resources raised in Scotland. The devolution-max option would not look out of place in the … SNP Government’s White Paper’.
For a brief period, the scale of the economic problem also produced an unusual level of consensus between the parties in Westminster and Holyrood. However, the Glenrothes bye-election subsequently heightened their differences, before Labour retained its seat and marked the end of the SNP’s remarkable honeymoon period in office and popularity. While the personalisation of politics and Gordon Brown’s premiership were key factors in previous Labour defeats, they worked in Labour’s favour this time. Brown became a ‘safe pair of hands’ and took centre stage in world politics by promoting a financial rescue plan that many countries welcomed. This allowed Labour to build on the message that small countries are vulnerable during global crises, that only the UK government could have bailed out the big banks and that the Union was crucial to Scotland’s economic stability. The ‘arc of prosperity’ - Salmond’s famous description of a range of small but successful independent nations (including Iceland) that Scotland could emulate if it became independent - was replaced in the headlines by Labour’s phrase ‘arc of insolvency’. This shifting mix of consensus and partisanship is mirrored in the actions of Jim Murphy, the new Secretary of State for Scotland. As Alan Trench discusses in Intergovernmental Relations, one of Murphy’s first statements was to assure the SNP that he was in the post to represent Scotland’s interests, as ‘Scotland's man in the cabinet rather than the cabinet's man in Scotland’. Murphy is also comfortable with the term 'Scottish Government' and became involved quickly in a number of joint meetings with Scottish Government ministers about issues such as the economic crisis and the future of Dungavel. Yet, Murphy was also a key figure during Labour’s defence of the Union and criticism of the SNP during the Glenrothes campaign.
As John Curtice argues in Public Attitudes and Elections, Labour’s win does not reflect a fundamental change in public opinion. The proportion backing independence ‘is still no lower now than it was in August 2007’ (but is still not high enough to win a referendum on independence). Similarly, although more people trust Brown (42%) over Salmond (23%) to ‘steer Scotland through the current financial crisis’, many more would prefer Salmond (38%) as First Minister than new Scottish Labour leader Iain Gray (13%). The SNP still commands ‘a larger lead over Labour than the party secured in the ballot box in May 2007’, and even enjoys popular support for its move to replace council tax with a local income tax (discussed at length by David Scott in Government Beyond the Centre).
There is also some evidence of consensus in parliamentary proceedings. As Paul Cairney argues in The Scottish Parliament and Parties, the post-2007 committees are finally showing some willingness to work together (on issues such as community policing, sexual offences, hate crimes and asbestos-related damages), while a wide range of plenary motions (on issues such as agriculture, forced marriages and child protection) passed with a promising degree of party cohesion. There may also still be hope for the bill introducing direct elections to health boards if the pilots prove to be a success. Perhaps ironically, the main exception is in finance, with parliament passing a motion (by 65 to 60) to discourage the introduction of a local income tax, heated debates in the Finance committee about the use of public private partnerships to fund major capital projects (most notably the Forth crossing) and the annual budget bill falling at the ‘final’ hurdle (before being reintroduced soon after). Much has been made about the unprecedented nature of the SNP’s budget defeat and that this was a crisis of epic proportions. Yet, this is to give the proceedings a sense of drama that they do not deserve: Alex Salmond does not want to resign; few MSPs would welcome an impromptu election (which is not in the gift of the First Minister anyway); and, most demands made by opposition MSPs only affect the budget at the margins. Indeed, doesn’t it seem bizarre that we could still end up with cross-party support for a bill that will be almost identical to the one that failed to pass? These proceedings have also been made worse by the increased use of parliamentary procedures to make party political points. This culminated in Presiding Officer Alex Fergusson’s decision to refer the ‘veracity’ of statements made in plenary to the Standards Committee. Although this has been spun by some opposition MSPs as proof that Scottish ministers have been making misleading statements, the premise of the review is to examine the use by MSPs of points of order to make such claims!
In Scottish Government and Public Policy, Paul Cairney argues that much of the SNP’s strategy to date has been to perform a balancing act between: (a) trying to demonstrate a high level of governing competence; and (b) exposing the limits of devolution (‘think how much better we could do in an independent state’); but (c) only in a way that keeps the constitutional question on the agenda without damaging the image of Scottish ministers (by making them seem parochial and powerless rather than the best people to defend Scotland’s interests). Recent developments have shown this to be a difficult task, with perceived delays in the funding of major capital projects highlighting the limits to Scottish Government borrowing (discussed at length by David Scott in Government Beyond the Centre), negotiations with major employers on the future of Scottish jobs exposing their need to persuade rather than coerce, and issues such as fuel poverty highlighting their control of only a small part of the solution. This is on top of the usual party political constraints that we would associate with minority government (for example, undermining moves to ban alcohol sales to under-21s or replace short prison terms with community sentences), problems of implementation (on issues such as class sizes and free school meals), unpredictable crises producing criticisms of ministerial decision-making (for example, centring on Nicol Sturgeon’s handling of the C. difficile related deaths at the Vale of Leven), unfortunate criticism (such as the Council of Economic Adviser’s decision to question the SNP’s stance on nuclear power) and the occasional piece of administrative difficulty which delays seemingly straightforward legislation (as with the set-up of Creative Scotland, discussed by David Scott). One ‘quick win’ has been to transform a UK Government mistake into a positive Scottish policy initiative (by promising to maintain pension overpayments for former workers in the Scottish public sector), while more long term success by can perhaps be maintained with more visionary initiatives, such as the proposed electricity grid between Scotland and northern Europe and taking the UK lead on emissions targets, combined with policy distance between the Scottish and UK Governments (such as the ‘battle of ideas’ between public and private healthcare, the decision to allow NHS ‘top-up’ payments notwithstanding). The SNP may also further the ‘Scottish Policy Style’ through consultation and negotiation rather than ‘top-down diktat’. This may mean that, in time, ‘problems of implementation’ become ‘opportunities for local discretion’.
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